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Introduction 
Chapter 1 outlined the basic function of the intellectual in society 
as transformative. As leaders of societal progress intellectuals 
have the duty of mobilising the rest of Polish society behind the 
processes of modernisation such as industrialisation and 
urbanisation. To achieve this they develop ideologies or value 
systems to explain and reinforce societal change. We noted the 
danger that these ideologies, carrying with them the intellectuals' 
universal, or 'total' perspective, can be contrary to the interests 
of democratisation if practised by intellectuals in power. In the 
West this danger has been largely averted by the 
professionalisation of intellectuals and their integration with 
different social groups in civil societyl. 
The specific characteristics of the Polish case took the relationship 
between the Polish intelligentsia and society in a different 
direction. Integration with society was stifled by the elitism of the 
milieu and the underdevelopment of Polish society. The 
relationship between the intelligentsia and the workers and 
peasants tended to be patronising rather than integrative. 
Different, mutually hostile, values and 'visions' of Poland 
continued to exist. Thus ideologies such as nationalism and 
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Marxism tended to take on a 'totalist ', exclusive perspective and 
spur the development of intolerant, populist agendas2 . For 
instance, in the inter-war period the intelligentsia tended to use 
the peasants and workers instrumentally in its pursuit of state 
power and this contributed to the rise of intolerant nationalism 
and the radicalisation of the pOlitical scene3 . In the early 
communist period, the situation was similar. The Polish 
intelligentsia continued to see its ultimate goal as state power 
rather than integration with society. The ideology of reform 
communism illustrated the milieu's continued concentration on 
the characteristics of state power. In 1956 the isolation of Polish 
social groups from each other was demonstrated by their separate 
protests against the Party-state4 . 
In the late communist period the anti-communist intelligentsia's 
ideology of 'the reconstruction of civil society I suggested a unique 
attempt by the milieu to integrate with Polish society. However, 
the ultimate aim of this project was to form a critique of state 
power. The I visions I of different social constituents of 'Solidarity' 
were sublimated into the conflict of universal categories: society 
versus state, good versus evil etc .. Thus different viSions 
continued to exist within the opposition movement5 • 
In the transition period Polish society was undergoing profound 
socio-economic and political change in the direction of a modern, 
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democratic state and a free-market economy. In this context the 
intelligentsia could have been expected to play an integrative role: 
rallying Polish society behind the programme of modernisation 
through the formulation of an ideology which would encourage 
the development of a consensual, democratic political culture. 
However, the intelligentsia had now achieved state power and this 
deepened its isolation from Polish society. It could not play the 
role of articulating societal values to the state when occupying 
the state itself. Thus the conflicting visions of Poland extant in 
Polish society remained unarticulated at state level. The ideology 
introduced by the intelligentsia in power to explain and offset the 
austerities of the transition period illustrated the isolation of the 
milieu. Poland was making its 'return to Europe' and all civilised 
Poles should be prepared to make sacrifices in the short-term for 
the achievement of this goal. Those who did not subscribe to this 
vision were undemocratic and 'beyond the pale'6. This was in 
keeping with the central role of the 'European ideal' in the ethos 
of the traditional Polish intelligentsia. 
However, other groups in Polish society did not share this 
unambiguous subscription to the project of 'returning to Europe'. 
Workers, peasants and the Catholic Church all had reasons to be 
anxious about the influence of Western European values in Polish 
life. An had their own visions of post-communist Poland., and these 
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differed significantly from the vision of a Western-style, liberal 
democratic state envisioned by the 'intelligentsia in power'. 
The industrial workers envisaged a lworkers state' where their 
role in the Solidarity trade union, their part in the downfall of 
communism and the value of their labour were finally reflected 
in control over their economic destinY. Workers thus looked to 
exert influence over the transition, especially on economic reform 
which they thought should be directed primarily by a strong 
Solidarity Trade Union and workers' co-operatives7 . The prospect 
of increased influence from Western economic interests in 
post-communist Poland increased the workers' anxiety and their 
desire for control over their own destiny. This vision was not in 
keeping With the development of a largely free market economy 
envisaged by the 'intelligentsia in power'. 
The peasantry felt that as a vital section of Polish society and one 
that had been politically impotent under communism, it deserved 
special allowances when it came to economic reform. This was 
particularly the case with the potential expansion of Western 
producers into the Polish market. Its attraction to the 
conservative, nostalgic elements of populism, though contradictory 
to the intelligentsia agenda, was understandable as the peasantry 
harked back to the pre-industrial era when rural issues were high 
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on the political agenda. Its tenuous ties with the rest of Polish 
society meant that its disillusionment was manifested not through 
a battle over Solidarity's identity (as with the 
intelligentsia/workers conflict) but with outright rejection of the 
'Solidarityethos's. 
The Catholic Church hierarchy saw Solidarity primarily as an 
outpouring of Poland's Catholic identity. It thus envisaged a 
populist, 'Catholic democracy' where, as representatives of the 
overwhelmingly Catholic popUlatiOn, it would have a major say in 
public issues and in the defence of Polish identity from external 
forces, including the secUlar West. This could be expected to 
involve support for a strong central government and for some 
reference in the new Constitution to Poland's 'Catholic identity '9. 
On their own, each vision of Solidarity could not be used as a base 
for the development of a democratic civil SOCiety in 
post-communist Poland. The populist vision of workers and 
peasants, its subscription to the 'will of the people I undermined 
the role of state institutions in the development of democracy 
parties, parliaments and governments. The Catholic Church's 
emphasiS on Solidarity's national-Catholic identity was obviously 
exclusionary. Finally the 'European' perspective of the 
intelligentsia was elitist and dismissive of other perspectiveslO• 
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The failure of the 'intelligentsia in power l to reconcile and 
integrate these competing visions undermined the attempt to 
institute democracy in post-communist Poland. For the duration 
of the Mazowiecki period, Polish society remained polarised and 
riven by deep, hostile cleavages. This situation made the position 
of the Mazowiecki government untenable. The renewal of 
anti-intelligentsia prejudices amongst broad sections of Polish 
society gave populist intellectuals sources of social support. This 
was reflected in the results of the presidential elections of winter 
1990. The Mazowiecki government was revealed as ruling on 
behalf of a narrow social group rather than a broad, society-wide 
front committed to reform. 
The first part of Chapter 4 will examine the relationship between 
the 'intelligentsia and power l and the major social groups in early 
transition Poland (the workers, the peasantry and the Catholic 
Church). The conflicting visions each had of post-communist 
Poland will be explained as manifestations of historic differences 
which had never been reconciled. These clashes Will be illustrated 
through detailed examination of 'watershed issues I • The second 
part of the chapter will deal with the Presidential election as a 
clear manifestation of the isolation of the 'intelligentsia in power I 
from the rest of Polish society. The campaign of the Mazowiecki 
campaign and the profile of his vote will illustrate the fact he was 
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communicating with only a narrow social elite. In contrast the 
success of Walesa, and the populist, dark horse candidate Stan 
Tymynski was based on their appeal to broad social groups which 
had been alienated by the government of the Ibest and brightest I. 
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4(a) Competing Visions of the 'Intelligentsia in Power I and 
Society 
(i) The Mazowiecki Government and the Workers 
Introduction 
Relations with the industrial workers were of vital s:ignificance to 
the Mazowiecki government. In 1990, after four decades of 
communist rule, Poland was an industrialised country. The 
industrial sector was the most important part of the Polish 
economyll. In 1990 industry had the largest share of GNP (44.9%). 
The highest proportion of the working population was employed 
in industry (28%). Industry contributed most to national income 
(42.4%) and accounted for most investment in the national 
economy (52.9%). 
The structural deficiencies of the industrial sector, shaped by 
communist rule, were inherited by the Mazowiecki government. 
Most workers were employed in large, state-owned, heavy 
industries such as coal-mining, steel-making, ship-building and 
chemicals. The backwardness of the Polish economy was largely 
the result of the bloated industrial sector's domination; its 
unwieldy structure, labour surpluses, overinvestment and 
intensive use of resources undermined its own efficiency and the 
effectiveness of the Polish economy as a whole12. This left Polish 
industry in a poor condition relative to the technologically 
advanced and rationalised Western firms with which it was 
supposed to compete in the post-communist future. During the 
Mazowiecki period the situation was worsened by the rapid 
collapse of Poland's major markets in the East (Comecon and the 
Soviet Union). 
The industrial sector was the most pressing area of concern for 
economic reformers. The rationalising, modernising zeal of the 
Balcerowicz Plan had a profound effect on the material condition 
and future prospects of the industrial work-force13• This sector 
was thus a vital section of Polish society. However, at the same 
time, it was in a fragile condition: it was sure to be the subject of 
far-reaching reforms and uncertain of its future14. 
Beyond these bare facts, the relationship between the industrial 
workers and the intellectual cadre of the Mazowiecki government 
involved long-term ideological and personal ties. The alliance 
between the working class and intelligentsia was the most 
important relationship within the anti-communist movement in 
Poland. In Chapter 2 we examined how the former brought to the 
opposition movement the power to bring the country's economy 
to a standstill and the latter brought articulation of interests, 
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political direction and access to elite levels of the Party-state15. 
The culInination of this process had been the legalisation of the 
Solidarity trade union movement in 1980. 
Solidarity1s victory in the June 1989 elections was obviously of 
vital importance to the labour and intelligentsia cadres of the 
movement. However workers interpreted the triumph over 
communism differently and subscribed to another set of Solidarity 
symbols. 
Put simply, the Solidarity of the intelligentsia was the Solidarity 
of the 1989 Round Table. The opposition side at the meetings 
reflected the preoccupation1s of the Polish intelligentsia: citizens I 
rights and individual freedoms in the social, political and economic 
realms. For them ISolidarityl was now a I catch-alll , citizens l 
movement with Polish society1s most cultured citizens at its head. 
This was the Solidarity of Geremek, Michnik and Kuron16• 
On the other hand, the industrial workers supported the 
Solidarity of 1980-81 - the Solidarity of strong trade unions, 
workers I councils, general strikes and mass protests organised to 
win economic concessions from the regime. This was the 
ISolidarityl of Lech Walesa. These different visions of ISolidarityl 
had been detectable from the mid-1980s17. However it was only 
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with the collapse of communism and the rise of the Mazowiecki 
administration that the conflict emerged into the open. With 
issues such as macroeconomic refor:r:n, settlement of property 
rights and formation of a new political system all being decided it 
was inevitable that these conflicting visions of Solidarity would be 
played out. The lintelligentsia in powerl pursued an idealistic 
vision of a Western-style civil society and Icivic statel based on 
political and economic freedoms for all Poles. The radical 
introduction of economic reform and free-market conditions was 
bound to lead to austerity for the industrial workforce but the 
lintelligentsia in powerl regarded this as a necessary sacrifice in 
its quest to institute a modern civil society in Poland. After all, 
the intelligentsia saw itself as a Inational' emanation. It vision of 
ISolidarityl stressed the unity of all Poles in the drive for 
democratisation and Westernisation, not just the interests of the 
industrial workers18• 
Workers looked for some recognition of their role in Solidarity 
and supported the movementls traditional association with trade 
unions and workers I counCils. Workers also anticipated strong 
state intervention to lessen the rigours of Balcerowiczls economic 
reforms. Their aspirations amounted to a vision of a Iworkersl 
statel where the Solidarity Trade Union would be involved in 
some form of Icorporatistl relationship with the government. The 
collapse of the Solidarity-based alliance between the Mazowiecki 
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government and the industrial workers can thus be interpreted 
as the result of the emergence, or re-emergence, of conflicting 
visions of independent Poland between the workers and the 
intelligentsia. The following section will chart this conflict. It will 
be organised as follows: firstly there will be an examination of the 
split in the Solidarity Left into social-democratic or centrist and 
socialist camps during the transition. The groups which emerged 
as a result of this split Will be examined as will the issues which 
acted as catalYsts for their organisation. The Mazowiecki 
government1s treatment of Lech Walesa will be presented as 
confirmation of the socio-political causes of the movement1s 
demise. 
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The Crisis of Leftist Ideology During the Transition 
Left-wing ideology in Poland has certain specific characteristics. As 
a traditionally peasant-based country, left-wing ideology in Poland 
tended to be confined to intelligentsia circles and had a 
social-democratic, theoretical rather than mass character. The 
communist programme of industrialisation accelerated the 
creation of a substantial, politically conscious labour force. The 
speed and scale of the transformation guaranteed the carryover 
of peasant culture into the industrial workforce19. The majority of 
this sector were first or second generation peasants who retained 
the populist social outlook of that milieu and the suspicion of 
state structures. In terms of economic activism the industrial 
work-force was left-wing in the conventional sense. In the 1930s 
the Polish work-force had developed radical means of making 
representations to the state (through tactics such as the 
occupation strike) and its descendent in the 1970s continued the 
tradition. Its collective demands for state protection of workers l 
economic interests and more powerfUl trade unions illustrated 
(not least to the dissident intelligentsia) the weaknesses of the 
Party-state. It was on this basis that the Solidarity movement was 
founded. The Solidarity Left represented the coalescence of the 
social democrats of the intelligentsia and the labour side of 
Solidarity. 
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We have already noted the ideological confusion inflicted on the 
Polish Left by communist rule20. This referred not just to the 
post-PZPR organisations and emergent political parties (especially 
PPS) but also to the Solidarity Left. One must note that the 
Solidarity Left had played a part in creating this difficult 
situation. Its demonisation of the communist state in opposition 
times created such an aversion to socialist ideology that the 
Solidarity Left found itself tarred with the same brush as its old 
adversary. The social-democratic intellectual Adam Michnik 
described the results of the June 1989 electiOns as a 'plebiscite on 
communism', but one could also regard them as a 'plebiscite on 
the Left' as reform communists were washed away with the old 
hard-liners21. For these reasons many members of the old 
opposition with ambitions to political power found it difficult to 
publicly espouse their Leftist beliefs22. 
More importantly the Solidarity Left experienced a difficult 
process of internal differentiation during the earlY tranSition 
period. Broadly speaking, the unravelling of the Solidarity Left 
involved the estrangement of the social-democratic, intelligentsia 
cadre from the labour side. The split was prompted by the 
former's move to a liberal, Centrist position after the appointment 
of the Mazowiecki administration. 
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The social-democratic element of the Solidarity Left was firmly 
identified with the interests of the Polish intelligentsia. Its origins 
were in the revisionist faction of the PZPR which had become 
disillusioned and split with the Party in the 1960's. The elite of 
this group was drawn from the 'Lay Left', which we have 
established as a predominantly Warsaw-based collection of 
social-democratic thinkers (such as KuroIl, Michnik and Geremek). 
Although it had distanced itself from the PZPR it was more 
inclined to compromise with the Party than other leftist strands. 
The location of this group in the capital facilitated closer links 
with the communist elite and was a cause of resentment and 
suspicion amongst other more prOvincial elements of the 
opposition23. This strand enjoyed a leading influence in the 
Mazowiecki government and in the OKP. Later it had a high 
representation in the pro-Mazowiecki government political 
organisation ROAD. 
As the elite of this strand assumed political power it developed a 
new strategy which would confirm it as the chief architect of the 
transition process. Some of its most influential leaders began to 
represent themselves as Centrists, even though their ideological 
base remained social-democratic. Bronislaw Geremek (now 
Chairman of the Solidarity Parliamentary Caucus, OKP), Jacek 
Kuron (now Minister of Labour and Social Services) and Adam 
Michnik (now editor of the pro-Mazowiecki government 
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newspaper Gazeta WyboFcza) all adopted this stance. The shift 
from the Left to the Centre was justified by reference to the 
communist past. Forty years of communism had made the 
traditional political spectrum defunct. For instance Zbigniew 
Bujak, while contending that he located himself lIin the Centre" 
added that lilt [the traditional political spectrum] does not make 
sense. -Up until now an attribute of the Left had always been a 
concern for the relationship ,between property and economy, but 
recently, all over the world, it h'as<abandoned this doctrine. 
Another attribute Qf the Leftwa$ the 'pursuit of social policies, 
which the right has now ineorporatedmto it~tprogrammesIl24. 
The attraction of the Centre is obvious given the trauma which 
Leftist thought was experiencing in Poland at that~:irrle. While 
leftist ideology had been undermined by communist rule and 
Polish right-wing ideology with its clerical and anti-Semitic 
associations remained unacceptable to the Lay Left, liberalism had 
survived the previous decades relatively intact. Vaguely 
associated with commitment to pOlitical and economic freedoms it 
served as an ideal repository for the ideological baggage of the 
left-wing, anti-communist intelligentsia. Observers cited this as 
one of the basic reasons for this strand's manoeuvring25. 
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However the shift was not entirely defensive. It was also in 
keeping with this strand's intelligentsia pedigree. Under the 
influence of the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia the 
social democrats of the Lay Left saw it as their duty to lead all 
sectors of Polish society through the testing times of the 
transition process rather than to represent the interests of the 
working class only. An alliance with the workers was necessary 
for building opposition momentum. However a broader historical 
perspective shows that the intelligentsia's traditional goal of 
achieVing a Western-style civil society in Poland could not be 
achieved through links with the working class alone. Indeed in 
the past this goal seemed to be at odds with the 'selfish' economic 
demands of the workers. Under the old regime the workers' 
demands for and achievement of short-term economic concessions 
undermined the intelligentsia's calls for lo:ng-term systemic 
reform. In transition times it seemed that the goals of the 
workers and the intelligentsia were once again diverging alo:ng 
these lines26. 
This shift left the labour side of Solidarity in a difficult position. 
The political role assumed by Solidarity through the June 1989 
elections, the movement's subsequent involvement in the 
Government and Parliament and the intelligentsia-led calls for 
Solidarity to become a pro-Mazowiecki political organisat1O&had 
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obscured the fact that it was basically a trade union. The etatist 
approach of the Solidarity intelligentsia to reform of the 
movement clashed with the labour cadre's representative 
functions. In the aftermath of the elections workers demanded 
Solidarity's return to the role of a simple trade union27. The 
opening speaker at Solidarity's National Convention, held on 
27/6/90 also criticised the movement's overlapping political and 
economic functions28. 
The fear persisted that the emasculation of the union side of the 
movement would open a flood-gate whereby the labour side would 
lose its best people to the pOlitical side, at a time when they could 
least afford to. At least as important was the fear that the 
political wing would commandeer the mythology and symbolism 
of Solidarity which still held great significance for the workers. 
The government's appropriation of the potent 'Solidarityethos' 
would obviously undermine the trade union's authority and its 
ability to defend workers I interests in the light of government 
policies29. 
One of the clearest indications of the ideological and so(}ial split 
occurring between the intelligentsia and the working-class strands 
of Solidarity was the former's recruitment of Zb~ew Bujak and 
Wladyslaw Frasyniuk. Both were famous Solidarity la"bQ.ur leaders 
who had gradually fostered links with the Solidarity intelligentsia 
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leadership. For instance, in 1980 Bujak, the leading worker 
activist from the Ursus plant just outside Warsaw, had been one 
of the first labour leaders to invite the intelligentsia-based 
organisations to join in the organisation of the regional Mazowsze 
union30. As such they were potentiallY vital politicians in the 
effort to maintain worker-intelligentsia co-operation in the 
transition period .. 
However in 8umm.er 1990 they became members of ROAD (the 
intelligentsia-based, group organised to support Mazowiecki's 
Presidential campaign31). Both began to espouse the 'Centrist' 
ideology of the intelligentsia described above. For instance Bujak 
was asked "You and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk are descended from the 
industrial working class. Are you ruling out the participation of 
your old colleagues in your party?". Bujak replied liN 0, however 
one has to realise that some workers from heavy industry are not 
resigned to the fact that this class will pass from the political 
scene if it refuses to transform itself into small industries. When 
it defends unprofitable mines or steel-works it cannot count on 
support 1132. 
Consequently the recruitment of Bujak and Frasyrll~zather 
than fostering closer worker-intelligentsia links, increased the 
polarisation of both camps33. The case of Bujak and Frasyniuk can 
thus be seen as symbolic of the general deterioration 
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intelligentsia/worker relations after the hiatus of Solidarity's 
opposition period34. The disintegration of the intelligentsia/worker 
alliance in Solidarity can be illustrated by reference to several 
key issues which occupied the public scene during the Mazowiecki 
period. 
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Watershed Issues 
(1) The Balcerowicz Plan 
Unsurprisingly the primary cause of the estrangement between 
the workers' and the intelligentsia was the Mazowiecki 
government's pursuit of economic liberalism. An obvious sign of 
the intelligentsia's move from the Left to the Centre was its 
espousal of liberal economic policies35. Workers saw a section of 
Solidarity's political activists abandoning the ideals of social justice 
and equality; seeing it as an awkward obstacle, hampering free 
enterprise. The changed mood was noted by the Polish press 
which described the development of 'liberalism with an iron 
The deterioration of the relationship between the intelligentsia 
and labour sides of Solidarity could be observed in the new 
parliament. As we have seen the immediate side-effects of the 
Balcerowicz Plan were a drastic fall in wages, a sudden drop in 
industrial production and rising unemployment37. A large and 
influential workers' lobby, the Group for the Defence of Workers' 
Interests, opposed the Plan's most damaging consequences. Their 
clashes with the government underlined the clasn between the 
."" 'iCi 
intelligentsia and worker visions of post-communis~J:3Qland. 
'~ . 
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(2) Opposition to Government's Wage Policy 
In October 1989 publication of the Government's policy on 
limiting the wage fund and indexing workers wages to the level of 
inflation attracted significant Parliamentary opposition. The 
indexation issue had been a source of controversy from the 
Magdalenka talks onward. Splits in the Solidarity side over the 
. issue had been apparent from an early stage. Bronislaw Geremek 
describes "a stormy debate in the National Executive Oommission 
[at the Round Table] over the issue of indexation"38. Some 
members of the KKW, such as Lech Kaczynski argued for the 
removal of indexation altogether but it was eventually agreed 
that the practice ought to be maintained to protect the workers 
from the worst consequences of inflation and for the sake of social 
peace . .An agreement was reached with the representatives of the 
authorities on an 80% level of indexation. 
However at this point representatives from the communist-based 
trade union organisatiOn, OPZZ demanded 100% indexation. 
Members of the Solidarity side suspected that this demand was 
designed to exploit splits within their camp39. The controversy 
caused by the OPZZls intervention in the indexation debate 
certainly touched a raw nerve in the Solidarity camp. Its leaders 
made it clear that the issue was threatening the Round Table 
itseWo. 
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The issue returned to prominence on 3rd October 1989 when the 
government presented its package of laws which changed the 
agreement reached at the Round Table. According to the new law 
workers whose wages in the third quarter of the year had 
exceeded the level of inflation would lose the right to fresh 
indexation in the next quarter. In the ensuing debate 
controversy was initially sparked by Jacek Kuron, the Minister 
for Labour and Social Policy and influential member of the Lay 
Left who openly questioned his own Government's stand on the 
issue41. This was an obvious example of the claSSic dilemma faced 
by the intellectual in politics. Having performed the Polish 
intellectuals traditional duty of elaborating the truth as he or she 
sees it, Kuron honestly stated his attitude when the situation 
called for a more pragmatic approach. 
As a result of his admission the debate was interrupted and a 
Sejm commission were charged with preparing a fresh package of 
laws. Progress in the commission was far from straightforward. 
After many hours of discussion it was decided to submit two 
different options to the Sejm. These two options reflected the 
wishes of the competing camps of the 'Centrists' and the 'Workers' 
Group'. 
The first option was the Government's proposed package which 
was supported by the Centrists. The second option was formally 
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proposed by Marcin Przybylowicza who had been invited to the 
commission as a representative of the Solidarity Trade Union and 
who had the support of the Workers' Group. His proposal reflected 
the growing unease amongst many in the Solidarity movement 
over the direction the Government was taking. For Przybylowicza 
and those he represented, the increased cost of living in transition 
Poland would have to be recompensed in kind. Echoing the stance 
of the OPZZ at the Round Table he demanded 100%, universal 
indexation: every month, every worker, regardless of their level 
of earnings should receive an amount commensurate with the 
rising cost of inflation. 
On Monday 16th October the Sejm met to settle the issue42. In the 
session that followed the second option was eliminated simply 
because the state did not have the resources to release the 
compensatory funds required. It had been calculated that taking 
this path would cost the state budget over 1.7 million zloty. 
However the de bate over the government-backed option aroused 
much more emotion than expected. An argument erupted 
between the commissioner Teresa Liszcz, who was seeking to 
amend the bill, and vice-Premier Balcerowicz himself. Balcerowicz 
contended that Liszcz's amendments would have a ver1 ~E(gative 
influence on the inflation rate and on the reform process as ~~_ 
whole. The direct intervention of one of the major architects of 
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the Plan suggested that the issue continued to touch a raw nerve 
in Government circles. 
In the end only minor amendments were made to the 
Government's proposal. Phrases such as "We have no viable 
alternative and "a necessary evil" were dropped from the statutes. 
From the full attendance at the debate and the tenor of 
Balcerowicz's language, it appeared that the government was 
signalling that rejection of this package would be regarded as a 
failure to accept the new Government's entire programme of 
economic reform before it had even began. This was symptomatic 
of the dogmatic approach of the intelligentsia in power to the 
transition process. The Sejm voted 188 for the bill and 27 against. 
However the tensions within the chamber and the growing splits 
were illustrated by the notable abstention of 133 MFs. 
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(3) Opposition to Government1s Privatisation Plan. 
The anxiety of the Lay Left and the Mazowiecki government over 
Parliamentary unity was heightened by the reception of the 
Government1s privatisation legislation in the Sejm. In this case the 
Group for the Defence of Workers l Interests mounted much more 
sustained opposition to the government1s plans. The economics 
section of this chapter hinted at why the privatisation process in 
the Polish context was bound to stir up political conflict. Those 
entrusted with the task of privatising sections of the Polish 
economy were faced with different and in some ways more 
troublesome issues than those raised by other reforms. The 
attempt to create a propertied class went to the very heart of the 
transition de bate. Which social group was to benefit most from 
the transition period in material terms? Various social forces (the 
intelligentsia, industrial workers, peasantry and Catholic Church) 
could be expected to mobilise behind different versions of the 
privatisation process. In contrast to the general nature of the 
Mazowiecki government1s other macroeconomic measures, 
privatisation thus required a higher degree of pOlitical activity or 
consensus-building43. 
A conflict emerged between the Centrist/Government vision of 
the privatisation process and the wishes of other social groups. 
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Studies carried out over the transition period illustrated how 
social and professional status influenced Poles' affiliation to 
different privatisation models. For instance, the sociologist 
Wladyslaw Adamski compared the attitudes of certain categories 
of worker over time (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Extreme preferences towards privatisation of industry 
between 1988 and 1990. 
~ocio-occupation- Attitudes Percentage of 
al categories towards answers in the 
privatisation in research of 
industry 
1990 1988 change of over 
1988-1990 
Specialists For 18.9 8.9 +10.1 
unrestricted 
privatisation 
Against 19.6 43.8 -24.2 
privatisation 
Skilled workers For 13.6 15.5 -1.9 
unrestricted 
privatisation 
Against 25.2 40.0 -14.8 
privatisation 
lFanners For 7.0 11.0 - 4.0 
unrestricted 
privatisation 
Against 26.4 34.1 -7.7 
privatisation 
source: Adamski W 'Privatisation and Group Interests' in Adamski 
W (ed) Social Conflict and Systemic Change: The Case of Poland 
1980-1992 1993 p231). 
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One can see a clifference in attitude to privatisation between the 
social elite and other groups in Polish society which widened 
during the transition process. While specialists, a group close to 
the intelligentsia in social status, approval of unlimited 
privatisation doubled between 1988 and 1990, among workers it 
weakened44. 
From the outset the Mazowiecki Government and its supporters 
in the Centrist camp of the OKP favoured a narrow, centralised 
privatisation mode145. This 'quasi-privatisation' process was the 
most centralised model. All enterprises that had been state-owned 
under the communism were transformed into jOint-stock owned 
companies whose shares were owned by the state Treasury. The 
Treasury itself would become the clear legal owner of state 
property. After financial and legal analysis and debt 
restructuring the enterprise would be offered for sale through 
public offering of shares on the soon-to-be organised stock-market 
to both domestic and foreign investors. 
Of vital importance in this context was the Office for Ownership 
Transformation appointed by the Government to oversee 
privatisation. It would decide the fate of each firm, taking into 
account its financial condition, production possibilities and 
proposals made by the directors and workers. The Sejm would 
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have indirect control of the process, chiefly through limitirig the 
number of privatisations made each year. 
There were several reasons for the Mazowiecki governmentls 
choice of the Iquasi-privatisationl model. One was its perception as 
the IWestern solutionl. As with other sections of the Balcerowicz 
Plan significant influence was exerted by the West on the 
character of the privatisation process. The Governmentls Western 
economic advisers, notably Jeffrey Sachs, advocated this 
IBritish-stylel philosophy of privatisation. They pOinted to the 
necessity of maintaining some central control in such unstable 
economic conditions. Once again the POlish intelligentsials idealistic 
admiration of Western models was a factor46. 
The Mazowiecki governmentls choice of model also suited the 
ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia. The 
quasi-privatisation model suited the Governmentls and the Lay 
Leftls desire to preserve pro-goverIilllent unity and an apolitical 
Ileave it to the expertsl atmosphere in transition Poland perfectly. 
In other words, adopting this etatist model would allow the 
lexpertsl of the Mazowiecki government to conduct the 
privatisation process from above; all that society had to do was 
passively wait for the antiCipated economic benefits. At press 
conferences the head of the Office for Ownership Transformation, 
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Krzystof Lis, continually stressed that his team had rejected 
schemes which were ideologically attractive to one domestic group 
or another; choosing a cosmopolitan, intellectually aloof approach 
instead47. 
Despite the assurances of the Mazowiecki government the 
privatisation model it envisaged would appeal mostly to richer 
social groups, leaving significant parts of Polish society out of the 
process. Moreover the government's decision not to punish 
members of the old bureaucracy who had benefited from its 
corruption meant that many former communists would have a 
significant advantage over their fellow citizens when it came to 
profiting from the privatisation process48. There was a common 
perception that the ex-communists were being given an unfair 
advantage by the privatisation process49. 
The Government's plan was also criticised as 'too Western'. It was 
criticised for failing to take into account the peculiarities of the 
Polish case. As a result of its unique history Polish society could 
not be expected to behave in the manner of their developed, 
Western counterparts. Societal distrust of the state and central 
institutions was exacerbated by the centralised privatisation 
model. The experience of communism and the Solidarity ethos all 
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suggested that Polish society would respond to a more 
decentralised process. 
The Government1s method of introducing its package increased its 
difficulties. It promoted privatisation proposals in a manner 
similar to the justification of the entire Balcerowicz Plan50. 
According to government sources there was no sound alternative, 
the stability of the nation was at stake etc.51. 
The Government1s attitude reflected the Polish intelligentsia1s 
desire to carry out the privatisation process, and the whole 
transition, in its own way, without interference from 
non-intelligentsia elements. However such an approach was 
completely unrealistic given the inherently political act of 
choosing a privatisation modeL Unlike the first raft of 
macroeconomic reforms the Government1s claim that this was the 
only option could not be justified and this undermined the 
legitimacy of the process and the Mazowiecki government as a 
whole52. 
It is not surprising that some of the most concerted opposition to 
the Government1s privatisation plan came from workers l 
representatives. Almost half a century of communist domination 
had ensured that the industrial working class regarded state 
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enterprises as their property in theory, even when this had not 
been the case in practice. Their logic assumed that the 
communists had managed the state enterprises on behalf of the 
proletariat. It had survived the injustices of the communist period 
and even been strengthened by workers' pride in the role of 
Solidarity in the overthrow of the old regime. Now that 
communism was defunct the workers' anticipated greater control 
over their enterprises. 
A survey of attitudes to the privatisation process in 1990 
revealed what the workers expected of the privatisation process 
and how these expectations differed from other groups in the 
work-place (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2 - Which Type of Ownership Transformation Appeals 
Most? 
State-led Privately Enterprise Hard to Say 
directed led 
Workers 36.3 13.2 35.3 15.2 
Managers 20.6 20.6 46.6 12.2 
Directors 13.3 37.3 37.3 12.0 
Workers' Councils 10.6 23.4 55.3 10.6 
Solidarity 9.6 21.3 58.5 10.6 
K:>pzz 39.6 10.4 41.7 8.3 
Source: Maria Jarosz 'Workers and Privatisation' in Polityka 
8/9/90 p5 
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The clear preference of workers representatives - ISolidarityl trade 
union activists, OPZZ activists and workers I Councils - was for a 
worker-owned privatisation model. The harmony between 
Solidarity and Workers council activists is understandable as 
worker council activists were veterans of Solidarity who were 
making a major effort to increase their managerial potential, and 
looked upon themselves as an alternative to incompetent 
managers53. Managers and directors, to a certain extent, also 
looked to the enterprise led privatisation strategy because this 
would give them more influence over the process than the 
state-led alternative54. 
Only company directors favoured a liberal privatisation process 
opened up to all. It is also worth noting that the workers 
themselves appeared evenly split between either the 
worker-owned privatisation process or continued state ownership 
of the industrial section. This popularity of the latter option 
reflected the workers I unease over the uncertainties of the 
privatisation programme. It is interesting to note that the 
workers I attitude to the privatisation process is more closely 
matched by the OPZZ line (which also called for continued state 
ownership) rather than Solidarity1s union activists. This 
illustrates the tensions within the Solidarity movement caused by 
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its links with the Mazowiecki government and the deterioration 
of its support amongst the workers. 
The Government's vision of privatisation appeared to exclude the 
workers from the process altogether and it was greeted in the 
work-place with the same animosity as the rest of the Balcerowicz 
Plan. Jerzy Baczynski report on the experiences of the heavy 
industry Hut Szkla enterprise during this period gives a practical 
illustration of the Government's approach to privatisation and 
how it was received by the workers. Baczynski notes the 
unanimous support of the workers' council for transformation of 
the enterprise into joint ownership with the state. He is puzzled 
by the decision because it signalled the loss of the workers I 
existing privileges; the workers' council would be dissolved, the 
management would be independent of the employees, future 
shareholders would be able to demand - and actually make - staff 
reductions. Moreover, the workers would have to use their own 
money to buy (preferential) shares in the knowledge that at least 
four times more would be contributed by people from outside 
who could well take away the lion's share of the profits without 
contributing anything to the modernisation of the factory. In 
exchange the workers could onlY have the uncertain prospect of 
higher wages, provided the business became profitable55• 
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Baczynski finds the solution to his puzzle in the 'carrot and stick' 
tactics of the Government. While stressing that there was no 
alternative to the Government's plan Balcerowicz promised to 
rescind the hated 'popiwek' tax (which had been introduced as 
part of the indexation package to punish excessive rises in 
workers' salaries) if enterprises accepted this form of 
privatisation56 . Other observers regarded the Government's 
approach with similar cynicism. For instance Kloc dismissed the 
Government's tactics as efforts to contrive a 'social pact' with the 
labour movement57. The workers' dissatisfaction with the 
Government-sponsored privatisation plan was demonstrated at a 
national meeting of enterprise workers' councils held in Zielona 
Gora on 26th March 1990. Mazowiecki and his Cabinet were 
"accused of treating the workers' councils in the same fashion as 
the previous communist regirnes"58. 
One of the first and most important outlets for this growing 
disquiet was its representative Parliamentary group which 
espoused its own version of the privatisation process. The group 
for the Defence of Workers' Interests, in tandem with a smail but 
influential workers' self-management lobby favoured the 
'Employee Stock Owned' privatisation model. Under this scheme 
previously state-owned assets are transferred primarily to the 
workers of a given state enterprise. Although it is done on an 
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individual basis, in reality the process amounts to the 
introduction of group ownership of shares as shareholders can 
only be controlled through an enterprise lJIlorkers council. This 
model was supported by a substantial section of Solidarity and 
the Group for the Defence of Workers I Interests59• 
In contrast to the Government IS 'quasi-privatisation' model the 
workers I self-governing model was closely tied to calls for 
increased decentralisation. Privatisation required the institution 
of bodies to administer it. The Mazowiecki government elected to 
create a central agency for this purpose. W orkers' representatives 
called for the creation of local and regional bodies in enterprises 
to oversee the process60. 
As well as the provision of financial credits to help the workers 
buy a stake in their own enterprise representatives called for 
strong regional policies. On March 22nd 1990 a delegation from 
the labour side of Solidarity pressed the Government to proceed 
with the privatisation process more quickly and to exercise less 
centralised control over the process61. In an interview with 
Rzeczpospolita the economist Rafal Krawczyk also criticised the 
centralised approach of the Government62. 
Draft voting on the privatisation legislation demonstrated the 
growing influence of the pro-worker parliamentary groups. The 
privatisation Agency had taken five months to arrive at its 
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recommendations but even greater delays were experienced in 
the Sejm. The Government and its supporters answered their 
critics by clairnin.g that the Employee Stock Owned model left 
whole sections of POlish society, such as farmers, office workers 
and those employed in services, out of the privatisation process 
altogether63. Legislative struggle around the privatisation bill 
lasted for ten months because of lack of consensus on basic 
principles64. 
When the Privatisation Act was finally adopted it offered a 
concession to the workers I lobby by splitting the process into two 
stages. In the first part either a given enterprise or the 
government Agency could initiate the process. Thus the split 
between the pro-Mazowiecki, intelligentsia-based Centrist group 
and workers I representative groups within the OKP was 
illustrated by the privatisation issue. 
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(4) The Walesa Factor 
Although the aforementioned economic policies of the Mazowiecki 
government were fundamental factors in the conflict between the 
intelligentsia and the workers, the new elite's treatment of Lech 
Walesa was equally important and more indicative of the clash of 
visions between the intelligentsia and workers. Irmnediately after 
the elections of June 1989 and the collapse of communism Walesa 
ruled himself out of political office. This move could be interpreted 
as another example of his political acumen or an indication of a 
conflict of interests between his status as leader of the Solidarity 
Trade Union and potential role as national statesman65. 
Nevertheless it appears that from the moment it became obvious 
that Solidarity would be called upon to form the new 
government, Walesa had been conscious of the dangers of allowing 
the Warsaw-based intellectual elite to take power. Walesa's 
nomination of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Premier was seen by the 
Warsaw intelligentsia and political observers as an attempt to get 
'his own man' into power. He represented the traditional, 
provincial, Catholic intelligentsia milieu and had been one of 
Walesa's closest advisers66. Members of the Warsaw-based Lay Left 
initially voiced concerns over Walesa's choice67. Jacek Kuron, a 
prominent member of the Warsaw intelligentsia, while stating his 
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respect and friendship with MazowieclU questioned whether he 
had the qualities to lead the country through the transition68. 
It seemed that the new Premier was too will:ing to search for 
compromises; a quality not associated with the dogmatic outlook 
of the classic, Warsaw-based intelligentsia. However Mazowiecki 
quickly showed himself willin.g to co-operate with the Warsaw 
elite and the groups attitude to the new Premier changed quickly. 
This can be seen as an example of the social solidarity of the 
Polish intelligentsia in its quest for state power69. 
By the end of 1989 Walesa therefore found himself isolated from 
the centres of political power. Over the winter he raised his 
political profile and began to make discreet overtures to the office 
of the Presidency, often through his supporters. For instance in 
February 1990 several newspapers carried articles which 
questioned the position of Wojciech Jaruzelski and suggested that 
Walesa would be the ideal alternative70. Typically Walesa would 
refuse to be drawn into an explicit announcement of his 
candidacy, but the message was clear enough. 
However, even these relatively discreet advances were met with 
immediate rebuffs from Government and OKP leadership sources. 
At a time when one would have thought that an alliance with the 
most popular labour leader and charismatic figurehead of the 
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Solidarity movement would have given the new elite much 
needed social and political support it chose instead to make an 
enemy of him. Indeed, Bronislaw Geremek., one of the new elite1s 
leading intellectuals, seemed to stress Walesa1s potentially pivotal 
role7l. 
There are several explanations for the lintelligentsia in power1sl 
rejection of Walesa1s ambitions. Firstly, the signs in early 1990 
suggested that Polish society was willing to accept the strictures of 
the Balcerowicz Plan and were content with a government of 
experts. An opinion poll published in Polityka at the end of 1989 
asked people to register their trust in members of the Mazowiecki 
government. The results were as follows (ranked according to 
popularity, in brackets % of votes counted from a general poll): 
1. Jacek Kuron - Minister of Labour and Social Affairs 
2. Leszek Balcerowicz - Minister of Finance 
3. Izabela Cywinska - Minister of Culture 
4. Henryk Samsonowicz - Minister of Education 
5. Krzysztof Skubiszewski - Minister of Foreign Affairs 
6. Aleksander Bentkowski - Minister of Justice 
7. Czeslaw Kiszczak - Minister of Internal Affairs 
8. Marcin Swiecicki - Minister of Foreign Trade 
9. Florian Siwicki - Minister of Defence 
10. Tadeusz Syryjczyk - Minister of Industry 
(20) 
(10) 
(8.5) 
(7.6) 
(6.2) 
(5.5) 
(4.9) 
(3.1) 
(2.5) 
(2.0) 
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11. Aleksander Mackiewicz - Minister of Internal Trade (1.4) 
12. Czeslaw Janicki - Minister of Agriculture 
13. Aleksander Paszynski - Minister of Housing 
(1.4) 
(1.4) 
14. Malgorzata Niezabitowska - Goverrnnent Spokeswoman (1.1) 
15. Aleksander Hall - Leader of Contact with Political Parties (1.0) 
16 - 25 All received a lower level of approval 
All members of the new government received some levels of 
support; a significant turn-around from the days of the unpopular 
regime and an indicator of the Mazowiecki government's social 
prestige72. 
In contrast Walesa's political fortunes appeared at that time to be 
in steep decline. With the union side of the Solidarity movement 
excluded from the public scene and undergoing a deep identity 
crisis its leader's personal prestige suffered. Another opinion poll 
compared public confidence in certain political leaders in terms of 
levels of approval and disapproval in the first few months of 
1990. The results were as follows: 
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Table 4.3 - Public Confidence in Political Leaders 1990 
January February March April May July 
Jaruzelski 
Approval 
65.5% 61.1% 58.5% 49.1% 46.7% 39.3% 
Disapproval 25.3 26.8 30.2 30.3 37.3 
19 
Mazowiecki 
Approval 91.3 88.9 90 84.4 81.2 76.4 
pisapproval 3.7 5.3 5.4 7.1 8 12.1 
lBalcerowicz 
~pproval 60.5 58.9 53.4 46.8 45.3 
52.4 
Disapproval 16.8 20.4 31.8 27.4 32.3 34.8 
l\Valesa 
~pproval 85 79.2 73.7 72 64.2 61.7 
Disapproval 8.9 12.6 17.9 16.7 20.7 22.6 
lMiodowicz 
~pproval 30.6 32.2 33.7 29.7 29.9 24 
pisapproval 41.5 37.7 39.8 38.3 37.9 50 
Sources: Centre for Public Opinion Research reported in 
Rzeczpospolita 25/7/90 and Polityka 30/6/90). 
In these polls one could see a drop in levels of public trust in all 
the political leaders of the early transition period. This general 
decline was caused by the end of the new elite's 'honeymoon' with 
Polish society and the austerity caused by Balcerowicz's 
programme of economic 'shock therapy'. However Walesa, in 
comparison to Mazowiecki and Balcerowicz seemed to be losing 
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public confidence at a higher rate73. Government supporters were 
convinced that Walesa could only rely on the support of a 
hard-core of followers74. 
However the substance of the attacks on Walesa emanating from 
government and intelligentsia circles suggested that there was a 
deeper motivation for the dismissal of his overtures. Walesa 
personified the aspects of Polish society which the intelligentsia in 
power wanted most to marginalise. In social terms the elitist ethos 
of the Polish intelligentsia demurred at the prospect of sharing 
hard-won power with non-intelligentsia elements. Walesa, with his 
religious devotion, passionate and at times irrational style of 
delivery, provincial accent and modest educational background 
provided the perfect foil to the profile of the sophisticated, erudite, 
cosmopolitan intellectual of Warsaw75. 
A significant proportion of the new ruling elite was socially 
prejudiced against Walesa. Critiques of 'the Chairman' contained 
elements of the elitism of the traditional Polish intelligentsia. 
Regardless of his personal popularity at this stage, Walesa 
remained a symbol of the ordinary, pious, working-class Pole. The 
rejection of his prospects symbolised the intelligentsia's rejection 
of the Polish workers I ability to contribute to the development of 
democracy. Walesa and his supporters were too provincial; they 
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lacked the necessary knowledge and competence to guide the 
traTl.3ition a...Tld in.3titute a '''Test ern 'ch,ril society'76. Statements 
such a.s "W a1esa. is not competent. enough .. ,bec8,use to govern one 
h8,S to have some unclerst8,ncliTlJ5 of the econOID-Y, of clip1om8_.cy, of 
social sciences"77 and Senator ~A Tlr1T>zej Szcz."ypiorski's open letter to 
WaleS8. wnicn 2.clvised him to "hit. t.he books 8,nd st8,rt lea.rniTlJ5, 
because it is never too late for that"78 '.l"Tere further illustrative of 
this elitism. As if to confirm the class basis of the conflict, Walesa 
and his supporters immediately began to attack the Government 
and the leadership of the OKP as a 'Warsaw-Cracow clique 
consistin.g of 'egg-heads'79. 
Some intellectuals saw the row as the inevitable result of the 
opposition intelligentsia's cynical manipulation of Walesa durin.g 
the communist period .. After the introduction of Martial Law the 
'Walesa myth I had been gilded by Solidarity intellectuals as an 
instrument to exert political pressure on the regime from the 
Polish workin.g class and from the West, both of which saw him as 
a hero. With the fall of communism this tactic backfired as Walesa 
appeared to have assumed some of the aura tlle irltellectLlals bad 
bathed him in80, This attitude may overstate the role of the Polish 
intelligentsia in creating Walesa's image. After all, he came to 
prominence as a workers' leader without the assistance of the 
intellectual. However Solidarity intellectuals contributed to his 
popularity as part of the cross-class Solidarity alliance. 
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Thus the traditional tendency of the Polish intelligentsia to 
patronise rather than represent the interests of the industrial 
workers was evident in the relationship between the Mazowiecki 
government and this sector in 1990. Conflicting visions of Poland, 
evident throughout modern Polish history emerged fully after the 
brief period of anti-communist unity. As the numerically 
dominant social category of the time, and one with a particularly 
important part in the Solidarity movement, the deterioration of 
the relationship with the workers was particularly damaging to 
the prospects of the 'intelligentsia in power'. The level of labour 
unrest rose throughout 1990. Whereas at the beginning of the 
year there had been only a few, random outbursts, the total 
amount by the end of the year reached 250. The protests 
involved a total number of 115,687 workers and resulted in 
159,016 lost working daysBl. This level of unrest was not 
comparable to the scale and organisation of the Solidarity-led 
protests of the early 1980s. The 1990 unrest was small and 
short-lived. However it illustrated worker disenchantment with 
the Mazowiecki administration. The analysis of Mazowiecki's vote 
in the Presidential elections, where he received very little support 
from the industrial working class, illustrates just how far the 
relationship between the intelligentsia and the industrial workers 
had declined since Solidarity's heydaT2• 
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(li) The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry 
Introduction 
In 1990 the Polish peasantry represented an uncertain but 
potentially significant pOlitical force. About 30% of the Polish 
population lived in small towns and villages. Approximately 27% 
of the nation was directly employed in or dependent on private 
farms. The agricultural sector provided 14.9% of the National 
Income83. The size of the peasantry and its role as suppliers of 
food-stuffs for domestic consumption and export guaranteed its 
importance to the Polish state. The importance of the peasantry is 
particularly marked in times of political and economic 
uncertainty where its role as a force of stability or volatility can 
prove decisive84. 
After the June 1989 elections 81 MFs and two Senators hailed 
from peasant political organisations, including the ex-communist 
affiliated Polish Peasant Party 'Rebirth' which retained a well 
organised infrastructure and press. This represented a potentially 
powerful pOlitical base85. The political influence of the peasantry 
was bound to be boosted by the revival of the historic Polish 
Peasant Party (PSL86) which had been a considerable force in the 
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countryside and a serious adversary of the communist-based 
peasant party (ZSL87). 
The size of the agricultural sector and the potential economic and 
political influence of the peasantry made events in this area of 
vital concern to the Mazowiecki Government. The thesis has 
pointed to the existence of the rural/urban divide in Poland as a 
major barrier to the formation of consensual state/society and 
inter-society cleavages. It is thus regarded as a barrier to the 
development of a democratic, civil societyB8. Moreover, with the 
Polish state now dominated by the predominantlY urban-based 
intelligentsia there was a danger that the urban/rural and 
state/society divides could reinforce one another. 
It was therefore vital that the Mazowiecki government ensured 
the unification of the peasantry under the banner of the 
ISolidarity ethos I i.e. under the intelligentsia1s vision of what a 
democratic, civil society amounted to in independent Poland. On 
the one hand the peasantsl support of the Solidarity-led, 
evolutionary programme of reform would contribute significantly 
to the stability of the lintelligentsia in power I and the success of 
its Icivil society I project. On the other hand a unified peasant 
party, organised in opposition to the reform programme could 
pose a great threat to the cohesion of the Solidarity movement, 
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the unity of the pro-Govermnent camp in the OKP and the 
authority of the govermnent itse1f39. 
This section will argue that pro-govermnent unity was 
undermined by the re-emergence of historic differences between 
the peasantry and intelligentsia over the vision of a democratic 
Poland .. The intelligentsia1s letatistl approach to transition through 
the Mazowiecki govermnent stirred the peasantry1s traditional 
suspicion of the state. The return to prominence of the 
urban/rural divide and its associated intelligentsia/peasant, 
liberal/populist oppositions disrupted the intelligentsia1s attempt 
to build a consensual framework for the development of civil 
society through the Solidarity movement. 
A brief review of the intelligentsia/peasant relationship in the 
years leading up to 1989 reveals the magnitude of the task facing 
the Mazowiecki govermnent as it tried to manufacture this 
consensus. As a class the peasantry had been alienated from the 
centres of political power in pre-war and communist and 
Solidarity opposition periods. We noted the lack of cohesion and 
leadership in the pre-war peasant movements90. 
Under communism the peasantry demonstrated its potential 
influence through the armed struggle against the communists 
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which continued in the Polish countryside after the end of W.W.IT 
and in the ultimate failure of the regime1s collectivisation 
programme. The latter had important consequences for the 
Mazowiecki administration. Uniquely in East-Central Europe 
Poland in 1990 had an agricultural sector which was dominated 
by private smailholdings instead of state farms or co-operatives91• 
Polish farmers maintenance of private property consolidated their 
feelings of autonomy from and suspicion of the state. Nevertheless 
the communist regime continued to treat agriculture as of 
secondary importance to the expanding industrial sector. 
Compulsory deliveries of agricultural products to the state, 
restrictive taxes and under-investment further alienated the 
Polish peasantry from the centres of political power. The anti-state 
attitude of the peasantry, bolstered by its ownership of the means 
of production and the discrimination of the communist regime, 
was an obstacle to the Mazowiecki government as it attempted to 
overcome state/society hostilities in transition POland. 
After 1947 the peasants lost independent political representation 
through the forced merger of the peasant movement into the 
communist-affiliated ZSL. However the traditional urban/rural 
divide in Poland and the isolation of the peasantry as a social 
group meant that ZSL developed its own membership, 
organisations and press in the countryside92. When opposition to 
the communist regime began to form the peasantry maintained 
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its tradition of self-organisation. On the one hand farmers followed 
the example of the workers and organised their own independent 
trade union under the Solidarity banner. The Trade Union of 
Individual farmers Solidarity (Solidarity RP3 ) was banned under 
Martial Law but it survived in the countryside with the help of 
the Catholic Church. In 1989 it entered several dozen MPs and 
Senators to Parliament. 
However, although farmers associated themselves with the broad 
church of the Solidarity movement and remained an important 
part of the national consciousness, its 'sect' was organised 
independently of the urban-based workers and intelligentsia. The 
influence of the intelligentsia amongst the urban workers, which 
was important for giving the opposition movement a political 
direction towards the construction of a 'democratic civil society' 
was much less apparent amongst the peasantry. In his history of 
KOR (the primary instrument for the intelligentsia's attempts to 
build links with other social groups in Poland) Jan J ozef Lipski 
conceded this point94• 
In his first hand report of the occupation strike of 1980 in 
Rzeszow by peasants demanding the registration of 'Rural 
Solidarity', Timothy Garton Ash stresses the desire for peasant 
self-determination. Autonomy of the peasantry from both the 
communist state and mainstream Solidarity was a priority. 
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Garton Ash tells us that members of the Peasantsl Strike 
Committee "are set on achieving a 'Gdansk Agreement for the 
Countryside'. Their three-page list of demands has been thrashed 
out by the strikers themselves, with very little help from 
intellectuals or lexpertsl ... "95. Thus the triumvirate of intelligentsia, 
Church and urban workers provided the base for the Solidarity 
movement's attempt to rebuild a 'democratic civil society' under 
Communism while the peasantry resolutely ploughed its own 
furrow. The peasantry's traditions of state alienation and social 
isolation were obstacles to the establishment of consensual 
state/society relations in the Mazowiecki period. The nebulous 
'Solidarity ethos I of cross-class activity on which this consensus 
was to be built meant least to the peasantry. 
In transition times the peasantry's own view of post-communist 
civil society emerged. It was based on an idealistic vision of 
pre-modern, paternalistic structures with the family farm at its 
base96. The characteristics of the Polish peasantry's traditional 
conservatism: an attachment to communal values, either familial, 
religious or ethnic, and suspicion of cosmopolitan or foreign 
influences, described previously97 were in evidence. The link 
between the contemporary peasantry and traditional attitudes 
was based on the 'politics of nostalgia'98. A strong, interventionist 
state, sympathetic to peasant interests was demanded. Frustration 
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of these wishes obviously threatened the resurrection of the 
peasantry's traditional feelings of alienation and resentment. 
However this vision clashed with the 'intelligentsia in powerlsl 
championing of 'progressive politics I based on individual freedoms 
and responsibilities. This could be summarised as the clash 
between a I folkish I and a I civil I society. The introduction of a 
free-market economy, one of the main projects of the Mazowiecki 
government, encouraged industrialisation and urbanisation which 
necessarily threatened the peasant's traditional, rural way of 
life99. Moreover it ushered in Western economic interests with 
which the peasantry would have to compete. Defending Poland 
from Western influences was at odds with the intelligentsia's 
espousal of the West as the home Civilisation and the ultimate 
destination of transition Poland. The clash between 'Europeans' 
and 'nationalists' which came to prominence in the Presidential 
campaign of 1990 can at least partially be traced to the long-term 
conflict between the urban intelligentsia's progressive vision of 
Poland's place in a modern Europe and the peasantry's more 
insular, conservative outlook. The following section will examine 
how the introduction of the Balcerowicz Plan revealed the deep 
divisions between the peasantry and the 'intelligentsia in power I 
and how this was reflected in the political arena. 
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The Balcerowicz Plan and Mazowiecki Government/Peasant 
Relations 
The chief agent of the split between the peasantry and the 
'intelligentsia in power I was the Balcerowicz Plan of economic 
reform. The Plan introduced the principles of a modern., Western., 
free-market economy without giving the Polish peasantry the 
kind of economic privileges it demanded. As a result the, the 
peasantry united according to its traditional agenda of 
conservative, defensive politics. This move was accompanied by 
recourse to populism which rejected the moves of the 
'intelligentsia in power I to modernise the country along 
Western-European lines 100. The basic features of the Balcerowicz 
Plan101 caused a significant deterioration in the situation of 
Poland's peasant farmers in 1990. 
The Mazowiecki government inherited an agricultural sector 
which had been severely damaged by the communists' 
mismanagement. Agriculture had been under-subsidised in 
deference to industrial expansion and the command system had 
obscured true levels of agricultural production and domestic 
demand. However, by freeing prices, strictly limiting subsidies, 
levying high taxes and encouraging foreign trade, the Balcerowicz 
Plan threatened the livelihood of many farmers. Immediately 
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after the introduction of the Plan agricultural production in 
many areas became totally unprofitable. This was the result of 
the rising cost of the means of production, inflated insurance 
contributions and high taxes, while the prices paid for 
agricultural products remained incommensurably low. Figures 
from 1990 illustrated the peasants plight. Between March and 
December 1989 the price of tractors rose by 800% and from 
December 1989 to January 1990 by 1800. According to Eugeniusz 
Szpytwa, leader of the Trade Union of Pig-breeders and Producers, 
the costs of production were outstripping the profit from meat by 
a half: IIIn December the necessary fodder cost 6.6, thousand zloty 
but pork could only be sold for 4.5 thousand zloty. As a result 
entire villages are meeting the additional charge for the meat 
they produce .. I am 156,000 zloty in deficit, not counting the 
wages of our workers, the death of some pigs, energy, business 
ventures and vets l payments. That1s why we in the union can 
clearly observe farmers ceasing to buy fodder and liquidating 
their pigs ... We, the toiling villages are being skinned alive II 102. 
The inexperienced new Government, dominated by the 
urban-based intelligentsia, also proved ill-equipped to tackle the 
immediate needs of the agricultural sector. The government1s 
policy of purchasing agricultural products from the West provided 
an example of its inadequacy The new government was 
particularly conscious of the danger of food shortages at a time of 
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economic austerity. As a result it purchased grain and meat from 
the West and applied for Western food aid. However by Spring 
1990 it was clear that Poland had a significant surplus of 
agricultural products due to overproduction and a lower level of 
domestic demand than anticipated. Collapse of trade with the 
Soviet Union meant that these surpluses could not be siphoned off 
to the East. The government was forced to ask the peasantry to 
destroy domestically produced surpluses of butter, milk and 
grain103. In July 1990 'Folityka' reported the existence of "a 
40,000 ton butter mountain which is going to go rancid"104• 
Criticism of the Government's approach to the agricultural sector 
soon emerged from farming circles. The accusation that the 
'intelligentsia in power I lacked the knowledge and expertise to 
manage the sector struck at the heart of the intelligentsia's belief 
in its competence as a government of the 'best and brightest'. In 
February 1990 the National Council of the Trade Union of 
Individual Farmers' 'Solidarity' criticised the "misunderstandings 
of agricultural problems and the attitudes and aspirations of 
farmers"105• 
A conflict of interests thus emerged between the peasants and the 
Mazowiecki government. Farmers wanted an end to the "pricing 
madness ". In other words, they wanted guaranteed profitability. 
That would be secured by setting minimum prices; a level, fixed 
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by the state, below which prices would not be allowed to fall. In 
practice this would mean that if the prices of basic agricultural 
products began to fall on the market, the state would have the 
responsibility of purchasing the surplus supplies for a guaranteed 
price. It would also have to protect the farmers from failed 
harvests. 
In effect the peasantry was outlining its vision of the new Poland. 
It called for a strong, interventionist state which would protect 
what it regarded as a vital bastion of Polish society from collapse. 
Domestic produce had to be supported in the face of cheaper or 
better quality imports from the West. This was in keeping with 
the peasantry's traditional insularity when it came to the concept 
of 'Europe' and the 'West'. A 1990 poll of peasant attitudes 
revealed the peasantry's desire for priVileged treatment from the 
governmentlOtl • 
The government's vision of the new Poland was very different. 
Poland was being guided by the lIintelligentsia in power II back to 
the West. This entailed the radical introduction of a free-market 
economy and any deviation from the plan would undermine the 
entire project. To artificially set prices would be contrary to the 
current guiding principles of the economy, in which prices are 
decided by the market. If the state set the minimum prices of 
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food-stuffs it would have to reta:in subsidies :in the state budget. 
That would mean spiralling inflation. In effect the new 
government was declaring its :intention to modernise Polish 
agriculture along with the rest of the country by subjecting it to 
the market mechanism. This logic was repeatedly expressed by the 
author of economic reform, F:inance Minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz107• 
The conflict provoked a more radical temper amongst the Polish 
peasants :in their relationship with the government. Research 
conducted by CBOS at the end of April 1990 on a nation-wide 
scale exam:ined the attitudes of the peasantry. The poll clearly 
exposed the state of :increasing tension :in the villages caused by 
the Balcerowicz Plan. 64% of those polled thought that the 
government's agricultural policies not only failed to promote 
:increased production, but actually made it more difficult 108. 
When it came to forms of protest, a significant number advocated 
radical measures - 19% were for strikes and demonstrations, 18% 
for non-payment of taxes and 11 % for boycotting elections. 82% of 
those polled had sympathy with these protests and onlY 7% 
regarded them as unjustified. Throughout Spring and Summer of 
1990 peasants staged brief blockades :in various parts of the 
country. 
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There were signs that the conflict between the Mazowiecki 
government and the peasantry was awakening the traditional 
urban/rural cleavage. The complaint that liThe weight of the 
reforms lies on the backs of the farmers II 109 could easily be 
interpreted as just the latest chapter in the oppression of Poland's 
rural areas by the Warsaw government llO. 
In 1990 Adam Michnik wrote of the political situation in 
Hungary and the conflict between the Free Democrats and the 
Democratic Forum. According to Michnik, the origins of the clash 
lay in the traditional cultural difference between urban and 
rural areas in Hungarylll. Michnik's appraisal of the urban/rural 
conflict as a major factor in contemporary Hungarian politics 
could easily have been applied to the situation in Poland in 1990. 
As we have seen., the urban/rural divide was a prominent feature 
of Polish society throughout the pre-communist and communist 
periods. In fact, at the same time, Polish observers were making 
similar points about the Polish situation. For instance Anna 
Tatarkiewicz identified Poland1s western border as the line 
dividing the continent between urban-dominated countries and 
countries where urban/rural conflicts were still unsettled1l2. 
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In this context, polls taken in Poland in 1984, 1987/88 and 1990 
to discover what the public thought were the main conflicts of 
the time were reveali:n.g (see Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 IIConflicting Sides - Who is in Conflict with Whom?1I (in 0/0 
from a general survey). 
Conflicting Sides Year 
'84 '87/'88 '90 
~uthorities (gov't etc) 24.8 22.4 4.2 
~ersus national society 
tUrban versus Rural 6.9 0.7 9.8 
!Authorities (old or 5.2 2.9 2.9 
~ew) versus Solidarity 
~ZPR, Communists, 3.3 2 2.6 
!party versus the Rest 
IRich versus Poor - 5.9 4.5 
Old Authorities versus - - 3.5 
iNew Authorities 
bifferent Parties - - 6 
~ongst Themselves 
Conflict Within the - - 2.8 
Authorities 
~onflict Within - - 3.5 
Solidarity 
Walesa Versus - - 3.5 
Mazowiecki 
Sources: Krzystof J asiewicz 'Polska wyborca - w dziesiec lat po 
sierpniu' in Dlaczego Tak Glosowano S. Gebethnera and K. 
Jasiewicz eds 1993 p98). 
The table illustrates the replacement of the old divide between 
Polish society and the communist state with a series of new 
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the peasantry was one of the most obVious illustrations of this 
upheaval. Throughout the communist era the media had served to 
downplay urban/rural differences. The peasant was portrayed as 
a tireless worker, worthy of respect but not envy1l6. 
The fall of communism removed the ideological motivations of this 
propaganda. The new freedom of the media meant that Poles 
began to learn more about the standard of liVing in different 
regions. Consequently the media's portrayal of the peasantry 
altered radically as did the farmer's popular image: "We see the 
peasant most often in his Sunday best in front of a single storey 
house with a garage, with at least one car in the background and 
agricultural machinery. Not since the time of the Kulaks has the 
intelligentsia looked at the peasantry with such envy" 117. 
Politicisation of the Peasantry 
The disenchantment of the peasantry with the Mazowiecki 
government was reflected in the development of peasant political 
organisations. Although there was sympathy amongst the 
peasantry for the radical protests of some of their colleagues, 
party political actiVity was the most popular option. In the CBOS 
poll referred to earlier 71% of those peasants polled pOinted to the 
need for party pOlitical action118. With 50 members the 'Farming 
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Walesa could only resort to ranting and raving about 
Warsaw cliques and coteries that monopolised government, 
about wretched egg-heads who had no connection to average 
people, and a bout self-important parliamentarians who are 
absolutelY uninterested in those who elected them" (Voytek 
Zubek 'Walesa's Leadership and Poland's Transition' 
Problems of Communism Jan-April 1991 p77, henceforth 
Zubek (a)). One of Walesa's supporters, J Maziaski, provides 
an example: liThe Warsaw-Cracow salon, in coalition with the 
former nomenklatura, is striving, just as the Gierek 
government did, to use the system for jobs and foreign 
contacts. Members of the salon have, with lightning speed 
acquired a philosophy to justify their status; choosing, like 
the aristocracy, to consider themselves better than the rest 
of their countrymen" (J. Maziaski Tygodnik Solidarnosc 
No.24 1990). See also Wierbicki, P, 'Tantrums of the 
Egg-heads' Tygodnik Solidarnosc 11/5/90. 
liThe biggest mistake of the doctors and professors was to 
transform [Walesa] into gold. Now that same choir proclaims 
him a boor, ruthlessly reaching for government and who is 
audacious enough to call them, the elite, egg-heads" ('Looking 
askance' Kultura Nr 10/517 1990 p20). 
Glowny Urzad Statistyczny, Rocznik Statystyczny Warsaw: 
GUS 1992. 
see 'The Tadeusz Mazowiecki Vote' Chapter 4 p626. 
figures from 'Rocznik statystyczny' GUS Warsaw 1990 and 
1991. 
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Section' represented the largest formal lobby within the OKP and 
the possibility of its transformation into an independent political 
party would clearly threaten the unity of the OKP which was so 
vital to the plans of the 'intelligentsia in power'. 
An equal threat was posed by the possible character of a unified 
peasant party. Unification according to the peasantry's traditional 
agenda was contrary to the government's desire to encourage the 
integration of the farmers with the rest of Polish society. An 
autonomous political organisation defending specific, rural values 
would discourage the peasantry from supporting the 
Solidarity-based pro-reform movement. As a result of the differing 
agendas mentioned above the most popular type of organisation 
proved to be reminiscent of the peasantry's traditional insular 
movements. Farmers opted above all to organise themselves into 
peasant parties, rallying only behind the farmers. According to 
polls, the majority were for the existence of one, strong peasant 
party which would prepare a national programme, concentrating 
specifically on the interests of agriculture and the villages. Only a 
small minority advocated organising the farmers into nation-Wide, 
cross-class organisations1l9. 
Up until May 1990 the traditional internecine rivalries of the 
Polish peasant movement had been continued by three conflicting 
strands; PSL 'Solidarity', PSL 'Rebirth' (formerly affiliated to the 
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communists) and PSL I Wilanow I (the revived form of the pre-war 
peasant movement). PSL Solidarity could be traced back to a 
decision by farmers in 1980 to follow the examples of the 
industrial workers and found an independent trade union under 
Solidarity. Repressed duri.ng Martial Law, it began to re-emerge in 
1988 and by the time of the Round table talks had around 1000 
district branches. On April 20th 1989 it was officiallY re-registered 
as a trade union and in the Sejm elections of June it won 52 
seats in both houses. 
In August 1989 its MFs and Senators formed an independent 
agrarian lobby in the OKP Solidarity caucus and, under Jozef 
Slisz, began to move toward organisi.ng a political extension of the 
union. However, in December Slisz lost the chairmanship of PSL 
Solidarity to Gabriel Janowski. Tensions within the peasant 
movement over its relationship with the Mazowiecki government 
seemed to be behind the vote. The new chairman was considered 
IImore economically minded and more radical vis a vis the 
Government II 120. 
Organisi.ng the peasantry under the auspices of an essentiallY 
workers I movement became increasi.ngly impractical given the 
re-awakening of class identities. Moreover the reception given by 
the peasantry to the new government IS agricultural policies 
prompted its leaders to distance themselves from Solidarityls 
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parliamentary representation. Despite assuming a more radical 
stance, PSL Solidarity continued to suffer from its association 
with Solidarity. The revived PSL I Wilanow I was hostile to it for 
the aforementioned reasons while the ex-communist PSL 'Rebirth' 
always had an anti-Bolidarity bias. Thus PSL Solidarity was 
largely absent from the process of peasant unification in Spring 
1990 and this marked the victory of a traditional, conservative 
view of peasant organisation over a progressive, integrative 
approach. 
PSL 'Solidarity' was the only peasant organisation which appeared 
to give credence to the massive social changes which had occurred 
under communist rule. Industrialisation, urbanisation and the 
development of modern notions of citizenship and nationhood all 
supported bringing the peasant community closer to the urban 
population and modern Polish society as a whole. For different 
reasons the two remaining peasant organisations choose to ignore 
these aspects of communist rule and instead concentrated on the 
pre-modern, conservative peasant traditions of the inter-war 
period. 
PSL 'Rebirth' as the direct successor of the communist's peasant 
I allyl the ZSL was keen to set aside the communist period and 
prove its credentials as a peasant party in the traditional mould. 
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Its chairman was Kaziemierz Olesiak, former apparatchik and 
ex-deputy Premier in the last communist government of 
Mieczyslaw Rakowski. The ZSL organisation was compromised in 
the eyes of the majority of the Polish peasantry by its past 
association with the regime. In the territorial elections of May 
1990 "in practically every province the voters referred to it as 
the repainted PSL'. Since 1988 there had been a distinct dissident 
movement within the ZSL, directed against the organisations 
subjugation to Oommunist control. In the June 1989 elections the 
dissenters managed to get some of its members elected through 
the co-operation of Solidarity. However, the Party establishment 
were able to survive and neutralise internal opposition by 
aborting the old organisation's policies along with its name at a 
Congress in November 1989121. 
Though morally bankrupt the organisation possessed material 
assets which were attractive to the reorganising peasant 
movement. PSL 'Rebirth' had maintained premises, printing 
eqUipment, cars and, not least, a membership of around 300,000. 
At its inception it had acknowledged the wrongs committed by 
the communists toward the peasantry but stressed the coercive 
nature of the alliance with the PZPR122. 
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The claim of PSL IRebirthl to the traditions of the movement 
brought them into conflict with the other peasant organisation -
PSL IWilanowl. Being the direct heir of the pre-war peasant 
tradition PSL IWilanowl also stressed its continuity with 
pre-communist peasant organisations. It included in its 
membership surviving activists of the pre-war PSL. Led by 
General Franciszek Kaminski, it returned to the political scene as 
a result of the transition. It was nicknamed PSL IWilanowl after 
the location of its political base and it enjoyed the full support of 
the Catholic Church. As in the inter-war period, PSL I Wilanow I 
strongly identified itself with Christian values and Catholic social 
philosophy. It was more socially conservative than its Solidarity 
equivalent, defending the distinct cultural identity of rural 
Poland. While economically it was more liberal than PSL 
Solidarity it criticised the government IS anti-inflation package and 
demanded special treatment for farmers throughout the 
marketisation process. 
Despite the historical hostility between PSL IRe birth I and PSL 
IWilanowl, leaders from both sides realised the benefits which 
would accrue from unification. Essentially each side possessed 
assets which the other craved. Though morally bankrupt, PSL 
IRebirthl possessed material assets which were attractive to the 
general movement. On the other hand the leadership of PSL 
IWilanowl would undoubtedly command the moral backing and 
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approval of the majority of the Polish peasantry. We should also 
note that both strands were united in their deepe:ning hostility to 
PSL 'Solidarity' and the pOlicies of the Mazowiecki government. 
Kaminski and Olesiak consequently began to discuss possible 
unification and settled on a joint congress of both strands, to be 
held on the 5th May 1990123. 
Events surrounding the Congress suggested that the movement 
would unify under the traditional conservatism of the peasantry. 
The influence of the CathOliC Church was apparent as the 
Congress was preceded by a Mass where the priest spoke of the 
moral superiority of the villages because of their greater 
religiosity, work-ethic, respect for the family and relationship with 
nature. Outside the Congress the peasant newspapers "Dziennik 
Ludowy" and "Gazeta Ludowa" were joined by stalls representing 
nationalist and populist organisations such as the National Party 
(SN). On his way to the Congress one peasant delegate announced 
"We are going to ally with the fraternal National Party! We 
support a peasant/nationalist alliance II 124. 
Roman Bartoszcze was appointed leader of the unified PSL. 
Though relatively young, Bartoszcze appeared to be an ideal 
representative of the traditional, conservative image the unifying 
congress was trying to project. In short, he enjoyed the support of 
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the Catholic Church and he was committed to defending the 
independence of the peasant movement. During the congress 
Bartoszcze was firmly placed in this moral centre; Father 
Boguslaw Bijak a PSL leader from Wilanow described him as a 
Iman of the Church I 125. 
Under the leadership of Roman Bartoszcze the unified PSL 
increased pressure on the Mazowiecki government for more 
favourable rural pOlicies and committed themselves to producing 
an alternative economic plan by autumn 1990. In its vision of a 
Christian Poland with a strong, interventionist state PSL fitted in 
the Centre/Right of the political spectrum as it stood in 1990, It 
described itself as lIof the Centre but somewhat to the Right 11126. It 
was therefore potentially attractive to the gathering Right of 
Centre coalition being organised under the auspices of the PC. In 
JUly 1990 Slawomir Siwek, a spokesman for PC, stated his hope 
that the PSL would become an ally of his own organisation as it 
built a populist, anti-Mazowiecki front127. 
In September 1990 the PSL resigned from participation in the 
government - withdrawing all of support for its members. It 
wanted to stand as a Ithird force l , a Idark horse l in the 
forthcoming Parliamentary elections, and also to profit from the 
conflict between Walesa and Mazowiecki128. This was the beginning 
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of PSL's ongoing attempt to play the role of 'kin.g-maker' in Polish 
politics129. 
At the same time Bartoszcze announced that he would be 
running against Mazowiecki in the forthcoming Presidential 
elections. When Bartoszcze failed to get the necessary votes to 
continue into the final round of voting in the Presidential 
elections he transferred his support to Walesa rather than 
Mazowiecki. All evidence from the Presidential polls suggests that 
Mazowiecki's support amongst the Polish peasantry was 
minimal130. 
In conclusion one can see how the clash between the 
fundamentally contradictory agendas of the Polish intelligentsia 
and the peasantry undermined the social authority of the 
Mazowiecki government. The traditional urban/rural divide could 
not be overcome by the intelligentsia's vision of a unitary, civil 
society and its attempt to impose this view merely spurred the 
crystallisation of the peasantry as a source of pOlitical opposition. 
Stanislaw Mazan, an MP for the Polish Peasants Party 'Rebirth' 
voiced the peasantry's rejection of the Mazowiecki government's 
version of democracy and its disillusionment with the 'Solidarity 
ethos': "How can it be right that during a Sejm debate the Prime 
Minister was absent and the OKP and PZPR benches were empty? 
Doesn't this mean that a new coalition has been established? 
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Solidarity is talking just like the communists did; identifying the 
Solidarity movement with the government. We battled head on 
with the Reds for 45 years but now democracy has commenced 
by kicking the peasantry in the stomach"131. 
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(iii) The Mazowiecki Government and the Catholic Church 
Relations with the Catholic Church were important to the 
Mazowiecki government for a number of reasons. To begin with, 
the Church remained a particUlarly important social institution 
in Poland. It entered the transition period in a confident mood. As 
we have seen, its moral authority and social prestige had allowed 
it to reach a modus vivendi with the ommunist regime. As 
communism waned the Church built strong ties with the 
anti-communist opposition movement, including its intelligentsia 
cadre. During the late communist period the alliance between the 
Church and the opposition intelligentsia was vital to the success 
of Solidarity; its involvement as a mediator in the Round Table 
talks and later as a vital contributor to Solidarity's campaign. in 
the partially free elections of June 1989132 paid testament to its 
influence in the political sphere in the prelude to the transition. 
Opinion polls from 1990 suggested that the Church remained an 
influential public institution during the early transition period 
(see Table 4.5 - ). 
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Table 4.5 "Who Governs in Poland Today?" (0/0) 
To a great To a certain Average Not Much Very Little Do not 
extent extent know 
IPZPR 4.4 10.2 16.5 24.5 35.4 8.5 
~SL 2.5 12.8 31.2 26.9 15.2 10.8 
SD 2.1 1l.4 3l.0 27.3 14.8 12.2 
Solidarity 40.2 41.3 11.0 2.9 2.0 2.1 
OPZZ 2.5 11.8 28.8 25.9 19.6 9.9 
Church 28.7 37.6 18.9 7.3 3.1 4.2 
Source: CBOS polls reported in IPoland and the Poles I Polityka 
30/12/89 p7). 
The Church was thus commonly perceived as one of the major 
forces filling the vacuum in public power left by the 
disintegration of the Communist Party and its satellites. According 
to the Polish public, only Solidarity - under whose banner the 
Mazowiecki government was exercising power - exceeded the 
Church in terms of political influence133. 
Given the continuing public influence of the Church, its 
relationship with the Mazowiecki government was of vital 
importance. The support of such a major institution in Polish 
society woUld be vital in building a consensual civil society 
through Solidarity. CathOliC social teaching and Christian values 
were a fundamental component of the ISolidarity ethosl. It was 
around common values such as justice, truthfulness and 
individual freedom that the secular intelligentsia and the Catholic 
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Church carne together under the auspices of the Solidarity 
movement. If Solidarity unity was to be maintained into the 
transition period then this alliance was essential. The type of 
catch-all social movement envisaged by Solidarity's intellectual 
elite would rely heavily on moralistic rather than political or 
economic criteria and the Catholic Church was the undoubted 
Polish authority in this respect. 
Conversely, we have noted the Catholic Church's tendency to 
treat Polish society along I organic I lines through reference to the 
Pole=Catholic equation134. This view, which also justified a 
prominent role for the Church in public affairs, obviously 
threatened to polarise society and undermine the development of 
a pluralist, civil society in post-communist Poland. 
This section will examine the relationship between the Catholic 
Church and the 'intelligentsia in power'. Traditionally the 
Church's association of Polish nationhood with the CathOlic 
religion and its socially and politically conservative conception of 
Poland opposed the intelligentsia's liberal, progressive vision of 
Polish identity. However in the late communist period both 
groups had been supportive of the broad concepts of 'democracy' 
and 'civil society'. This link was based on the common demand for 
greater freedom of expression for Polish society. The communist 
government's refusal to meet this demand encouraged 
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co-operation between both groups in the construction of 'civil 
society' as a realm of Polish social life independent of communist 
interference. The Church/intelligentsia alliance was thus founded 
on rejection of communist rule rather than a common vision of 
Polish identity. 
With the advent of the transition process, differences emerged 
between the Church hierarchy and the 'intelligentsia in power' 
over what a democratic, civil society would amount to in reality. 
The progressive intelligentsia cadre of the Mazowiecki 
government and conservative elements within the Church 
hierarchy had different visions of the new Poland and its 
relationship with 'Europe' or 'the West '. Implementing their 
disparate visions would entail the creation of different 
institutional arrangements within Polish civil society. The conflict 
thus involved the question of the very nature of the Polish state: 
should there be a secular or religious state? The following section 
will explain the deterioration of the relationship between the 
Mazowiecki government and the Catholic Church hierarchy in 
this context. 
The Church's Vision of Post-Communist Poland 
The struggle between the 'intelligentsia in power' and the Catholic 
Church to impose their visions on the nascent civil society 
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involved competing interpretations of recent Polish history. For 
the leaders of Poland1s Catholics, such as Cardinal Jozef Glemp, the 
Church1s roles as an independent institution in a supposedly 
totalitarian state and a fundamental pillar of the Solidarity 
movement were instrumental to the fall of the communist 
regirne135. 
Despite the Churchls attempt to present it as a product of the 
communist era, the conflict which developed over the role of the 
Church in independent Poland echoed the traditional quarrels 
over the nation1s Ultimate destinY. Was the shape of 
post-communist Poland to be determined along Dmowski1s 
I organicist I ethnic and religious criteria - he referred to Poland as 
lIa live social organism, having a spiritual specificity derived from 
racial and historical basesll136 - or by Pilsudski1s multi-ethnic, 
communitarian vision? The clash was reminiscent of the struggle 
between clerical and secUlar intelligentsia groups in Poland1s 
previous period of sovereignty during the Second Republic137. In 
1988 a witness to this period, Czeslaw Milosz, noted the historical 
antecedents of Church/intelligentsia relations and predicted the 
rupture of 1990138. 
The historic link between the I organicist I strand of Polish cultural 
identity and the Catholic faith, summarised by the Pole=Catholic 
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equation, was resurrected139. In 1988 Cardinal Glemp outlined his 
dream of the future Poland which was based on this long-standing 
model140. In practice this vision entailed a populist definition of 
democracy. Poland was a baptised nation (95% of Polish citizens 
were Catholic) and official recognition of the Church's role in 
public life would, so the logic ran, only be democratic. 
However, Polish society was thus generally disapproving of 
Church intervention in political or public spheres. The communist 
legacy appeared to be supportive of a secular system and rejection 
of public institutions based on any ideology or creed141. 
Research from OBOP polls in November 1990 illustrated this: 
1. Catholicism should be the state religion and the Catholic Church 
should have an assured influence on decisions concerning public -
9.1% 
2. The Church and Catholicism should be supported by the state 
but with protection of the rights of other religions and atheists to 
publicly voice their convictions and freedoms - 26.9% 
3. The state should be completely separate from religious issues 
which should remain a private matter for every citizen - 61 % 
4. Undecided - 2.9 
Source: 'Faith, religion, politics' gcie Warszawy no.20 1991 p3. 
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However the idea of state institutions neutral in terms of religion 
was regarded by the Church hierarchy as a continuation of the 
anti-clerical, anti-religious and thus anti-democratic aspects of the 
communist state. It was this atheistic arrangement that Poland's 
Catholic society had found undemocratic and risen up against. 
The pre-communist period of the Second Republic, with its close 
ties between Church and State, was held up as a far worthier 
historical model142. 
A 'Catholic democracy' would strictly define the institutions of 
Poland's post-Communist civil society and the political community 
expected to participate in them. The I organicist I vision of the 
nation naturally leads to a civil society where divisions and 
differences are not tolerated. Loyalty to a higher set of values 
takes precedence over individual or group interests. Political 
competition concerns the right to represent the will of 'the people I 
as a whole not the interplay of partial interests in society. The 
democratic rights of non-Catholic minority groups (such as the 
country's remaining Byelorussian, Ukrainian, German and 
Jewish and Gypsy populations) and individuals (e.g. in the areas 
of family planning, education, divorce, homosexuality etc.) would 
all be effected by the introduction of the 'Pole=Catholic" equation 
to the public sphere143• 
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The Catholic hierarchy also shared Polish populism1s traditional 
hostility to foreign influences. Under communist rule the Church 
had been a fundamental repository of Polish identity in an 
otherwise alien, atheistic system. In transition Poland the Church 
was needed more than ever to defend Poland from Western value 
systems. Following the defeat of atheistic communism, the excesses 
of the irreligious, decadent West were regarded as a new threat to 
Poland1s moral codes144• 
The Church1s idea of Poland1s role in Europe thus inclined to the 
populist search for external enemies outlined in Chapter 1145. 
Internal unity was to be supported by the identification of 
external threats. The Church warned that opening the country 
up to the rest of Europe would threaten the moral fibre of Polish 
society; a Pastoral letter from 1991 attacked the IIblasphemy, 
falsehood and pornography which had engulfed the mass media ll146• 
Instead Poland1s Catholicism had to be protected as a precious 
element of national identity and a potential example to the rest of 
the continent which had gone astray. This message was 
particularly welcome in rural Poland. As we have seen, the 
influence of the Catholic Church was traditionally strong in the 
provinces. Worry over the possible effect of Western Europe1s 
limmorall culture on Polish society also mirrored the rural 
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population1s fears that opening Poland up to European influences 
in the economic sphere would benefit urban areas and social 
groups such as the urban-based intelligentsia at its expense147. This 
attitude to Europe seemed to be the theme emergin.g from Pope 
John Paul1s tour of provincial Poland in the Summer of 1991148. 
Differences Between Church and Intelligentsia Visions 
Despite Polish society1s general desire for the separation of the 
Church from the State, feelin.gs on the issue were strongest 
amongst the lay intelllgentsia149. The Church1s vision of Poland 
and its relationship with Europe contradicted that of the 
intelligentsia. On the one hand the intelligentsia1s conception of 
Polish civil society was founded on an individualistic vision of 
democracy. This was based on the example of West European 
liberal democracies. The declared aim of the anti-communist 
intelli.gentsia had been the achievement of individual freedoms 
which were guaranteed in the West. According to the progressive 
ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia IEuropel was lIa 
talisman word..synonymous with ... civilizationll150. 
Consequently in transition Poland the task of the lintelligentsia in 
powerl was to introduce Western, democratic practices. This 
included the guarantee of individual freedoms, secularisation of 
state institutions and the encouragement of economic and 
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cultural contacts with the West. As we have seen, the Church1s 
populist vision of a democratic, civil society could be defined in 
relation to the Catholicism of the masses and a stress on national 
or Ipolishl values. Moreover Europe was seen as a potential threat 
to Polish society1s moral well-being and cohesion. Wiktor Kulerski, 
a teacher, former member of KOR and the Secretary of State for 
Education under Mazowiecki succinctly outlined the fundamental 
conflict between the Church and intelligentsia in the Mazowiecki 
period along the lines of a clash between a secular and a liberal 
state151. 
In lay intelligentsia circles it was believed that reviving the 
traditional IPolish=Catholicl formula would usher in intolerance, 
divisiveness, parochialism and xenophobic nationalism; all of 
which would threaten Poland1s return to the IWestern European 
traditionl152. Thus from being a partner in the reconstruction of a 
modern, democratic, civil society the Church, with its populist 
version of democracy and traditional, conservative vision of 
Poland was now regarded by the progressive intelligentsia as one 
of its main opponents 153. 
One can also argue that in seeking to impose its vision on the 
whole of Polish society the church was mirroring the Itotalisingl 
approach of the lintelligentsia in powerl. The Catholic church1s 
conception of Poland1s I organic I unity was reminiscent of the 
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intelligentsia's elitist vision of democratisation outlined 
previously154. 
Of course, the Church's vision was conservative and 
backward-looking while the intelligentsia's was forward-looking 
but both shared the same desire to dOminate and lead the rest of 
society during the transition. ConsequentlY the most vociferous 
critics of the Church's pOlitical ambitions were found amongst 
prominent members of the lay intelligentsia who were exercising 
political influence through the Mazowiecki government. Their 
attack included a different version of recent Polish history from 
that presented by the Church hierarchy. The Church's role in the 
fall of communism was presented as much more ambiguous. 
Adam Michnik, a leading member of the Lay Left, was prominent 
in the revision of the Church's anti-communist credentials. This is 
important because Michnik had been the chief architect of the 
intelligentsia/Church alliance under communism155. His 
appreciation of the Church's historic role as guardian of Polish 
identity had been Vital to this process. In transition times 
Michnik's attitude was somewhat revised; the emphasis shifted 
from appreciation of its role as institutional defender and 
spiritual centre of Solidarity to a description of its modus vivendi 
with the communist state155. Again the breakdown of the 
relationship between the Church and the 'intelligentsia in power' 
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during the Mazowiecki period can be illustrated by tracing the 
course of concrete political issues. 
The Watershed Debate: Return of Religious Education to Schools 
The Church became embroiled in several controversial public 
issues in 1990 such as the return of Church property, abortion 
and religious instruction in schools. The abortion issue is 
examined at the end of this section as an illustration of the 
Right's instrumental use of religion to build an anti-government 
political coalition. The de bate over the return of religious 
education to Polish schools serves as an illustration of the general 
breakdown in relations between the Mazowiecki 
government/intelligentsia and the Catholic hierarchy. The issue 
was seminal as it referred directly to the clash between both 
group's vision of what a democratic, civil society amounted to in 
the Polish case. Would the special status of the Catholic Church in 
Poland be enshrined in restrictive new education legislation or 
would the Mazowiecki government follow the example of secular, 
Western systems?157 
Religious education has a significant history in Poland, 
particularly so in terms of Church/intelligentsia relations. As we 
have seen, religious instruction in Polish schools was removed by 
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the Stalinist regime. In the 'thaw' of 1956 it had briefly made a 
comeback contrary to the wishes of the revisionist intelligentsia158. 
It was eradicated again in the early 1960s. The Catholic Church 
was therefore forced to organise classes through its own 
structures. In each parish places in church buildings were set 
aside for catechism lessons. In the 1970s and 1980s this practice 
was expanded for a variety of other uses and it contributed to 
the organisation of the anti-communist movement 159. Thus the 
issue of religious education was simultaneously a reminder of 
historic differences between the Church and the lay intelligentsia 
and a symbol of both groups I alliance during the late communist 
period. 
After the fall of communism it became clear that the Catholic 
Church expected the return of full religious education in schools 
to be a priority for the Mazowiecki government. The Bishops' 
240th Plenary Conference, held in Warsaw from April 30th May 
2nd 1990 included a discussion on the re-introduction of religious 
education in schools. The official communique stated: liThe Polish 
Bishops I Conference, considering demands made by the CatholiC 
public, expressed its unanimous support for the full return of 
religious instruction in schools and for this to be guaranteed in 
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the constitution and the [projected] Law on National Education"160. 
The return of religious education was justified by the Church 
hierarchy in terms of its version of a democratic civil society 
outlined earlier. Polish society was overwhelmingly Catholic and 
thus the interests of democracy would be served if this fact was 
reflected in the educational system. Bishop Alojzy Orszullk, Deputy 
Secretary of the Polish Episcopate and participant at the 
I MagdalenkaI talks, explained the Church1s position: "Now the 
Church was participating in the reconstruction of the state and 
wished to playa part in the reform of education as well ... the 
educational system should reflect the Christian ethical values that 
were cornmon to the vast majority of Polish people ll161. 
Unlike an issue such as abortion, the Church hierarchy in 1990 
could count on the weight of public opinion in their demand for 
the return of religious education. From a CBOS poll in May 1990 
it was clear that the majority of Poles supported the return of 
religious education to schools (60% for and 27.6% against). 
However support for the Episcopate1s demands varied according 
to social background. For instance almost 80% of private farmers 
were for and 12% against; 74% of unqualified workers were for, 
12% against; 72% of pensioners and retired for and 18% against. 
Most significant was the fact that the majority of members of the 
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intelligentsia polled were opposed to the Episcopate's plans (60% 
against and 25% for)l62. 
The intellectual elite of the Mazowiecki government found the 
issue particularly difficult to resolve. As members of the 
intelligentsia, their attitude to the Bishops I stance was negative. 
The return of compulsory religious education was regarded as a 
significant limit on the individual freedoms the opposition 
intelligentsia had fought so hard for under communism. Moreover 
it was regarded as a significant part of the Church's strategy to 
institute a prominent public role in Poland. 
This in itself was seen as a retrograde step for a country with 
ambitions to return to a predominantly secular Europe. At the 
outset representatives of the Mazowiecki government pronounced 
its reservations over the issue of religious education. Professor 
Henryk Samsonowicz, the Minister for Education, made it clear 
that he regarded the return of compulsory religious education as 
undemocratic163. 
On the other hand the government was aware of the potential for 
the issue to spark wider social unrest. Given the poll results it 
was obvious that by resolutely opposing the return of religious 
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education the government courted an anti-intelligentsia backlash 
which could severely undermine its social support. The Church 
hierarchy was aware that its stance could affect the government1s 
fragility and used this to exert its influence on the education 
issue and others. As in the case of the abortion debate, the 
Church1s opponents amongst the lay intelligentsia were presented 
as unreformed communists whose opposition to the 
reintroduction of religious education was in keeping with their 
political biographies. Tarring someone with the communist brush 
was, in the atmosphere of early transition Poland, a potentially 
devastating tactic. In an interview with Teresa Toranska, the 
Secretary of State for Education, Wiktor Kulerski, gave his 
impression of the Church1s exploitation of the political biographies 
of the new ruling elite164. 
As a result a compromise was reached whereby representatives 
from the Government and the Conference of the Polish Episcopate 
formed a Joint Commission to negotiate a policy on the issue. A 
tense atmosphere was apparent from the outset. Wiktor Kulerski 
was the first choice of Minister Samsonowicz for government 
representative but the Church was unhappy with this choice. 
Under-secretary Anna Radziwill was selected instead. As the 
Commission debated it became apparent that the hierarchies 
influence was being brought to bear. The public pronouncements 
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of government representatives became less strident. For instance 
Radziwill at her first press conference as under-secretary had 
stated that the school should be a place for a "cult of competence" 
rather than the cult of religion and when asked in a Polityka 
interview when crucifixes and religious education would return 
to schools had replied "Never". By May she told the same 
newspaper that crucifixes were central to the lives of all 
Christians165. The Church later demanded that Radziwill be 
replaced but Samsonowicz this time refused166. 
In August 1990 the Joint Commission published a fourteen point 
plan for the reintroduction of religious education to schools 
dealing with the academic year 1990/91167. The announcement of 
the Commissions decision immediately caused controversy. In 
effect the Mazowiecki Government had decreed that religion 
should be taught in schools - a major step in instituting 
Catholicism as a state religion - without consulting the public or 
parliament 168. The controversy involved not only the substance of 
the issue but the manner in which religious education was being 
re-introduced in a supposedly democratic Poland. In the 
"Economist" it was reported that "Questions were raised about 
the power of a shadowy "Government-and-Church Council" ... which 
had considerable influence over government decisions"169. For 
instance the SdRP (the major off-shoot of the defunct Communist 
Party 170) reported the decisions of the Joint Commission to the 
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Advocate for Citizens' Rights and the Constitutional Tribunal. The 
government side at the Joint Commission seemed to share the 
concern that democratic, constitutional channels were being 
bypassed by the Commission. The SdBP complaints were publicly 
recognised by the Ministry of National Education (MEN) as "r ight 
and proper for basic democracy"171. 
It was only much later that the level of antagonism between the 
Episcopate and members of the government over the issue and 
the Joint Commissions results could be revealed. In his interview 
with Toranska in 1994 Wiktor Kulerski gives an insight into the 
gravity of the split. He reveals that he was prepared to resign 
over the issue along with all of his Undersecretaries. The only 
thing which stopped them was the awareness of the Mazowiecki 
Government's fragile base of social support and the fear that their 
actions would preCipitate disintegration of the whole 
administration172. 
The Episcopate had identified a fundamental weakness in the 
Mazowiecki government. The rule by representatives of a narrow 
social group on the merit of intellectual expertise rather than 
through a political mandate left the Mazowiecki government 
uncertain of its base of support. Fear that opposition to the 
Church's initiatives might weaken its electoral support effectively 
530 
paralysed the Igovernment of the inteJ.ligentsia". It thus gave in to 
Church demands even if they contradicted the intelligentsia 
ethos173. 
One can conclude that the transition period witnessed the 
breakdown of the alliance between inteJ.ligentsia. and Catholic 
Church forces. The former had a 'progressive' vision of a Poland 
opened up to Western influences in sociaL economic, pOlitical and 
cultural spheres. The latter had a more conservative approach; 
continuing to regard Poland as a bastion of Catholic values 
against the 'atheistic' East and I secular I West. 
Throughout 1990 the Polish Episcopate, although officially neutral 
fostered contacts with emerging Right wing political forces which 
were voicing populist opposition to the Mazowiecki government 
and the Lay Left leadership of the OKP. Primate Glemp 
demonstrated his own political preferences by publicly receiving 
leaders of the right-of-centre Christian-Democratic Labour Party 
and the Christian National Union174. In the Presidential campaign 
the Church made it known that it supported the conservative 
brand of Catholicism espoused by Walesa over Mazowiecki's liberal 
Catholicism175. 
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The Politicisation of the Catholic Church and the Rise of the 
Radical Right 
The radical Right took advantage of the Church's continued desire 
to playa prominent public role. The Church hierarchy and the 
clerical-nationalist strand of the Polish Right had common cause176. 
Both subscribed to the conservative form of Polish nationalism 
and the populist vision of Polish democracy which was as wary of 
Western influences in the country as Eastern intervention. Both 
felt that this outlook was being passed over by the more 
progressive 'Europeanism' and liberalism of the new elite. There 
was therefore a link between the conservative tradition of Polish 
Catholicism and the clerical tradition of the Polish Right 177. 
The emerging radical Right saw the Church with its 
organisational strength and social authority as an ideal ally in its 
quest for political power. From Autumn 1989 onward Catholic 
and nationalist pOlitical organisations began to champion the 
cause for a closer relationship between the Church and the State 
in independent Poland. The Christian National Union (ZChN178) 
stated: "The Polish Republic, as a social and political community of 
the Catholic, Polish nation, should be described in the constitution 
as a Christian state which accepts God as the Master of creation, 
participates in acts of worshipping God and respects the citizens' 
Catholic conscience"179. 
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Such attitudes did not stem from sincere religious conviction but 
from political ambition. The Church was championed by the Right 
as the implacable opponent of and victor over communism. Thus 
Church opponents in transition Poland were treated by the Right 
as unpatriotic and associated with the old regime. The 
intelligentsia cadre of the Mazowiecki government was opposed to 
Church influence in the public sphere because it was contrary to 
its dream of a liberal democracy. However the intelligentsia's 
stance fitted the radical Right's portrayal of the Mazowiecki 
government and its supporters as secretly linked to the old 
Communist authorities. The polarisation of attitudes to the 
Church thus served the radical Right's attempt to undermine the 
social authority of the Mazowiecki government. 
In 1994 after ZChN had played a significant part in the 
government of Olszewski Wiktor Kulerski, the Secretary of State 
for Education under Mazowiecki, singled it out ZChN as a prime 
example of the Right's use of the Church as an institutional 
foothold180. A good illustration of the link between the 
mobilisation of the radical right and the Catholic Church is 
provided by the debate over abortion in 1989-90. 
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The Issue of Abortion. 
Abortion remains one of the most controversial issues in many 
Western countries; splitting societies along party-political, religious 
and ideological lines. However in Central Europe and particularly 
in transition Poland the issue was the subject of heated debate. In 
1955 the Soviet Union liberalised abortion legislation, making it 
freely available on demand. High abortion rates proved the 
popularity of the move amongst Central and Eastern European 
societies. For instance in 1975-79, there were 218 abortions per 
1,000 live births in Poland 181. 
Despite this the state's liberal approach to abortion had been 
subject to strong criticism from certain elements, particularly the 
Catholic and other churches. With the collapse of communism and 
the advent of the transition these forces pressed for more 
restrictive abortion legislation. In September 1989 the Commission 
of the Polish Episcopate on Family Matters made it clear that, as 
far as the Church was concerned, the banning of abortion was an 
automatic step for the newly independent republic182. 
However, the Church did not enjoy the support of Polish society 
on this issue (as it did with religious education). In August 1991 a 
questionnaire by PENTOR (an independent Polish-American public 
opinion institute) for "Zycie Warszawy" gave the following results: 
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52% in favour of abortion on demand and 11% of banning 
abortion altogether. In March 1992 another PENTOR poll gave 
similar results: 
1. Abortion should be banned, irrespective of circumstances: 10% 
2. Abortion may be permitted only to preserve the life of the 
mother or to prevent the completion of a pregnancy that has 
resulted from rape: 21 % 
3. Abortion should be permitted in order to preserve the life of 
the mother, to prevent the completion of a pregnancy resulting 
from rape, and also in the case of social and economic difficulties: 
15% 
4. Abortion should be the woman's affair only and should on no 
account be penalised: 53% 
source: Euginiusz Smialowski 'For and Against Abortion' in East 
European Reporter Vol.5 No.3 May/June 1992 p23). 
Thus almost 70% of those polled thought that abortion should be 
either freely available or available after consideration of the 
socio-economic background of individual cases. These positions 
were contrary to the Episcopate's pOlicy183. Indeed the actions of 
the Church hierarchy spurred the development of social 
organisations which explicitly opposed its anti-abortion policy. 
Women's associations "Pr o-F emina II , "Ruch Samo-obrony Kobiet" 
("Womens l Self-Defence Movement"), "Godnosc Kobiety" ("Women1s 
Pride") and "Polskie Stowarzyszenie Feministyczne" ("polish 
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Feminist Associationll ) vigorously opposed the Episcopate's 
stance184. 
Despite Polish society's generally pro-choice attitude the Church 
found some groups which were prepared to support its 
anti-abortion stance for political reasons185• This process had begun 
in Spring 1989 when the Catholic organisations (p AX186, UChSS, 
ZK-S) set up by the communist regime to counter the influence of 
the Church realised that the Party-state system was 
disintegrating. They cynically used the abortion issue in an 
attempt to distance themselves from certain features of their 
Communist pasts. Poland's abortion legislation had been liberalised 
in 1956/57 contrary to the doctrines of the Polish Catholic 
Church. However in 1989 PAX set the context for the debate by 
presenting these laws as the creation of the Stalinist era and thus 
in operation before PAX came into existence after the thaw of 
1956. Stalinism had been condemned by successive communist 
regimes for its extreme, anti-Polish character. 
At the same time :N[Ps associated with PAX through the JlCatholic 
Social Union" (ZK-S) proposed a set of laws on liThe legal 
protection of the Unborn Childll to the Sejm. It called for the 
arbitrary prohibition of abortion (regardless of the health of the 
mother or child, the economic situation or living conditions of the 
536 
mother and the circumstances in which the life was conceived. 
The project proposed women and doctors involved in abortions be 
sentenced to three years imprisonment187. 
The proposed laws were discussed stormily in the Health 
Commission, but in the flux of the Mazowiecki take-over the 
package did not find its way to the Sejm itself. However from 
Autumn 1989 proponents of an anti-abortion bill renewed the 
attack. It suited the emerging Right to subscribe to this myth 
perpetrated by PAX and it also portrayed the abortion legislation 
as a product of Stalinism (Le. communism at its least 'Polish' most 
alien or 'Russian')l88. 
Emergent parties of the radical right cited the fight for 
anti-abortion legislation as one of their fundamental goals. In the 
OKP the abortion issue contributed to the crystallisation of 
internal differences. For instance eight MPs and Senators who 
were Catholic activists formed the Christian National Union 
(ZChN) in October 1989 within the OKP structure. In its founding 
resolution it stated: "We will demand respect for the Christian 
principles professed by the vast majority of society in social life 
and in education. Laws aimed at removing the Christian outlook 
of our social life, attacking Catholic ethics, the rights of the 
unborn, the rights of the family and the rights of the Church 
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should be changed"189• The ZChN subsequently presented its "Law 
on the Legal Protection of the Unborn" to the Sejm. It proposed a 
total ban on abortion except when the mothers life was in danger 
and called for a two year prison sentence on the doctors who 
performed it. 
The Mazowiecki government and its supporters in the Sejm and 
Senate were opposed to the rapid introduction of anti-abortion 
legislation for several reasons. Firstly its main constituency, the 
Polish intelligentsia, was the group least in favour of restrictions 
on abortion, seeing it as a purely private matter. This was in 
keeping with its generally liberal outlook. Secondly, as we have 
seen elsewhere, it was opposed to allowing the Church hierarchy 
such influence in public life, particularly when the majority of 
public opinion was opposed to its stand. Finally it was aware that 
the issue was being manipulated and agitated by certain political 
forces for their own benefit; a process which could undermine the 
government IS authority 190. 
For all of these reasons the abortion debate paralysed the Polish 
parliament during the Mazowiecki era. The ZChN's proposals were 
stalled in a Senate body throughout 1990. On 19th September 
1990 the Commission voted on the ZChN's proposals. Six voted for 
the proposals but only nine of its fifteen members (13 men and 
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two women) were present. The day before the Commission voted, 
Zofia Kuratowska, one of its female members, who subsequently 
did not attend the vote, met with representatives of feminist 
organisations which were picketing the Senate. Dr. Kuratowska 
promised that during the general Senate debate she would vote 
against the project though IIshe had the impression she would be 
in the minority ll191. On September 29th the Senate finally 
approved a draft law tightening restrictions on abortion. It 
rejected the clause that would have jailed women for up to two 
years for having an abortion but retained this penalty for 
doctors. Doctors could only terminate pregnancies resulting from 
rape, incest or when a woman's life was in danger. Only 76 of the 
100 Senators took part in the vote: 56 for, one against, 19 
abstained192• The draft bill now returned to the Sejm where it 
embarked on a similarly tortuous legislative journey which 
outlasted the Mazowiecki government's term in office. 
In an article in IIWomen and Life ll the Senator Anna 
Bogucka-8kowronska tried to explain why many members of the 
Sejm and Senate were caught between personal support for the 
pro-choice lobby and fear of losing the political support of the 
Catholic Church in the context of forthcoming parliamentary 
elections193• This dilemma was exacerbated by the high 
intelligentsia representation in the Sejm and Senate. The 
intelligentsia's code of morality, ethics and commitment to the 
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truth as it perceived it which had marked the opposition period 
was being compromised by the inevitable pragmatism and 
bargaining of political life. 
Predictably the radical Right chose to interpret the stalling of the 
ZChNls anti-abortion proposals in the Senate as further evidence 
of the new elite1s links with the old regime, based on the shared 
intelligentsia background of the opposition and reformist PZPR 
elites. The logic of the Right was simple: how could one term as 
undemocratic a set of laws designed to remove legislation which 
was one of the defining products of the totalitarian era ?194 
In this manner the Catholic Church was drawn into the 
consolidation of the Polish Right under the banner of populism 
and nationalism. The politicisation of the Church reached a peak 
in the Presidential campaign when degree of religiosity became a 
determining factor in voting patterns195. The Pope himself was 
drawn into the fray. His speeches were analysed and interpreted 
by domestic politicians according to their own agendas196. 
This survey of the relationship between the Mazowiecki 
government and different sections of Polish society has highlighted 
the continued existence of irreconcilable visions of Poland. The 
elitism and totalist I perspective of the intelligentsia in power 
meant that it regarded its vision as the best, indeed only, one to 
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follow. As a result the values of other social forces were 
disregarded. This was contrary to the Mazowiecki government's 
espousal of democratic values. In 1990 it also contributed to the 
rise of anti-state forces. Intellectuals and politicians alienated from 
the Warsaw ruling elite could draw on the frustrations of these 
social forces to build a populist, anti-intelligentsia front. The 
following examination of the Presidential elections should be seen 
in this context. 
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Ties' in John A. Hall ed. Civil Society: Theory, History, 
ComQarison Polity Press Oxford 1995 pl18). 
see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' 
Chapter 2 p248. 
see 'The Mazowiecki Government and Solidarity' Chapter 3 
p380. 
see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' 
Chapter 2 p261. 
see Chapter 3 p381. 
"never before in Poland and maybe never ... in Europe has 
migration from the countryside to the towns achieved such 
dimension over such a short time" (Kazimierz Piesowicz, 
'Social and Demographic Consequences of World War IT and 
the German Occupation in Poland' Oeconomica Polona No. 1 
1983 p82). 
see 'The Legacy of the Command Economy' Chapter 3 p295. 
see Walicki (b) p97. 
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Krzeminski and Wladyka conclude that the old opposition 
Left was in a state of IIparalysisll: liThe ISolidarity Left I gets 
lost in interpretation, obfuscation, the quest for euphemisms 
and new words. It is on the defensive because practically it 
does not want to acknowledge itselfl (Adam Krzeminski and 
Wieslaw Wladyka IUnder the Lid of the Vat I Polityka 
10/3/90 p6). 
Krzeminski and Wladyka note this Leftist strand 
characterised by a group of IInoble leftists ... who wove a web 
of political connections - stronger than political differences, 
based as much on social background as way of thinkingll 
(Ibid. p6). 
quoted in Mariusz Janicki IThe Polish Political Panorama I 
Polityka 7/7/90 p4. 
IIClearly their [the social democrats] claims of political 
Centrism are devised as a shield (their enemies would say 
smokescreen) against society1s instinctive dislike of the Leftll 
(Friszke p97). 
Kazimierz Korab observed that IIRepresentatives of the Left 
have begun to call themselves 'Europeans' .. as "intellectuals'. 
Instead of the workers the civic state has emerged in their 
field of interest ll CThe Left and Right Camps of Solidarityl in 
Tygodnik Solidarnosc 3/8/90 p15). 
IIMany activists see a potential crisis in the movement giving 
up its representative function and taking up a role in 
government. That is why leaders are demanding that the 
Union severs itself from politics and return to its simple 
form. This chapter is over. The price of political involvement 
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is too high" (Jagienka Wilczak 'A Virtuous Dream' Polityka 
18/11/89 p3). 
"We have invested an awful lot in this government. Today it 
is time for our own interests. We will no longer tolerate this 
loss of authority" (Gazeta Wyborcza 28/6/90 pI). 
Wilczak commented, "There are those for whom the 
'Solidarity' placard is indispensable, without it, they argue, 
we are helpless, at the mercy of the government. In reality 
it is, after all, still 'their' government. Here everything still 
has to be demanded" (Jagienka Wilczak 'A Virtuous Dream' 
Polityka 18/11/89 p3). 
see Kennedy (a) p89. 
see 'Formation of Centrum and ROAD I Chapter 3 p415 and 
Appendix I p685. 
Zbigniew Bujak IWest of Centre l Polityka 28/7/90 p5. 
"Apparently substantially influenced by the environment of 
the intelligentsia leadership, these two potentially pivotal 
politicians began to abandon the interests of their native 
constituencies. Bearded and now attired as graduate 
students, they began to focus almost exclusively upon the 
'Europeanness' and IWesternness l of their movement ... They 
seemed almost completely uninterested in addressing the 
issues of central concern to the urban working class" 
(Voytek Zubek 'The Rise and Fall of Poland's Best and 
Brightest' in Soviet Studies Vol.44 No.4 1992 p597). 
"In critical circles the opinion dominates that the two 
workers, Bujak and Frasyniuk, who stand for the values of 
ROAD, have now abandoned their old class and surrendered 
themselves to the manoeuvrings of the Warsaw 
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intelligentsia (Leftists add the Right)" (Zdzislaw Pietrasik 
'Themes From the Marriage' Polityka 28/7/90 p6). 
Ost explains how the intelligentsia's support of a market 
economy played a part in the disintegration of its 
relationship with the workers in the transition period: "In 
post-Communist society, when the government takes steps to 
reintroduce a market economy ... workers find that they have 
their own particular interests to defend. At this point, 
however, their old intellectual allies no longer care to 
articulate those interests. They are satisfied simply with the 
end of the old system, particularly as they themselves 
become the leaders of the new one. The alliance breaks down 
because the commonality of their interests breaks down" 
(Ost p91). 
"The hard reality of the dominant political ideology of 
today ... entails a stone-faced listening to complaints and an 
insistence that we have to set in motion the fly-wheel of the 
economy, only then will we be able to think a bout the rest, 
about poverty etc. (Adam Krzeminski and Wieslaw Wladyka 
'Under the Lid of the Vat' Polityka 10/3/90 pI). 
see 'Initial Results of Balcerowicz Plan' Chapter 3 p317. 
Geremek (b) p125 
Geremek tells us that "On this issue the OPZZ represented 
the interests of the 'establishment'; the party leadership 
group" (Ibid. p125) 
For instance Tadeusz Mazowiecki stated pessimistically "This 
is a very grave situation for all concerned with the issue. 
Without indexation the whole agreement is impossible" 
(quoted in Dubinski K 'Magdalenka - Epoch-making 
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Transaction' published in Polityka 29/9/90 p8).Lech Walesa 
agreed that "There will be no agreement, there will be no 
Round Table. The OPZZ has destroyed the well-being of the 
Round Ta ble" (Ibid. p8). 
Henryk Domaranczyk tells us that liThe sensation of the 
debate was the self-criticism of Kuron, who, commenting on 
the recent direction of the Government's work on this issue, 
admitted that he had made a mistake in finding nothing of 
the old regime's policies worth retaining" (Henryk 
Domaranczyk Sto Dni Mazowieckiego Warsaw: Andrzej 
Bonanski 1990 p323, henceforth Domaranczyk). 
liThe Sejm box was full to bursting, Mazowiecki had also 
arrived, illustrating the significance the Government 
attached to this issue" (Domaranczyk p324). 
Kazimierz Poznanski explains the process thus: liAs there are 
so many variants of property rights, which differ in terms 
of the opportunities they offer to various social groups in 
meeting their economic needs and in enhancing their 
relative pOlitical power, serious conflicts are inevitable" 
(Kazimierz Poznanski 'Privatisation of the Polish Economy: 
Problems of Transition' in Soviet Studies Vo1.44 No.4 1992 
p646, henceforth Poznanski). 
Adamski concludes that "Workers differ from specialists not 
only by their weaker support for extremely liberal solutions 
(unlimited privatisation), but also by a much stronger 
attachment to the status quo ... Workers' relatively stronger 
attachment to "socialized" industry and relatively weaker 
support for extremely liberal solutions lead to the 
hypothesis that workers, unlike specialists, consider 
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privatisation a threat rather than an opportunityll 
(Adamski p230). 
Poznanski identifies IIA variety of political group:ings ... as 
supporters of strong state involvement. Among them is ... the 
Lay Left, whose leadership recruits largely from Marxist 
Revisionists such as Kuron, Michnik and Geremekll 
(Poznanski p646). 
Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon tells us IIPrivatisation strategy in 
Poland was based explicitly from the beginning on Western 
experience. Reformers wanted to transplant a proven 
method from developed Western countries and avoid 
compromise solutions II (Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon 
'Privatisation Strategy and its Political Context I in Starr RF 
ed. Transition to Democracy in Poland New York: St 
Martinis Press 1993 p139, henceforth Cannon). 
For instance Lis insisted liThe solutions we are propos:ing are 
neither liberal nor socialist. We are professionals and we are 
draw:ing on the experience of other countriesll (Louise 
Vinton 'Privatisation Plan Prepared' RFE Vol.1 N 0.14 
16/4/90 p30). 
Swiatkowski Cannon explains that liThe Ministry of 
Privatisation presented its own plans for open sale of shares 
as 'people's capitalism', where all Polish citizens could freely 
buy stock. This was an unconvinc:ing argument because 
behind the appearance of equality of access, there existed 
great inequality. It was known that Polish society was poor 
and only higher level Communists and black marketeers 
could be used to buy sharesll (Cannon p128). 
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"Many people think that the nomenklatura is ru:nning the 
show just as it did in the past, without admitting its 
responsibility for the state to which it drove the country, 
delaying change and extracting personal profits wherever 
they are to be had" (Kazimierz Dziewanowski Tygodnik 
Powszechny 7/1/90)' 
see IThe Intelligentsia in Power and Economic Reform l 
Chapter 3 p307. 
liThe designers of the [privatisation] programme completely 
ignored its political packaging ... The transition so far has been 
conducted from the top. It has encouraged passive 
adjustment ... While passivity is instrumental in depressing 
effective demand without triggering social unrest, this 
approach has also been responsible for the limited impact 
that the privatisation process has had so far" (Bartlomiej 
Kaminski ISystemic Underpi:nn.in.gs of the Transition in 
Poland: The Shadow of the Round-Table Agreement I in 
Studies in Comparative Communism Vol.XXIV No.2, June 
1991 p188). 
As Swiatkowski Cannon tells us II Attacks on the Ministry1s 
arbitrary and bureaucratic methods, its centralisation of 
authority, and provision of speCial privileges to 
nomenklatura and foreign investors underscored the 
illegitimacy of the privatisation law" (Cannon p139). 
see Ibid. p139. 
see Maria Jarosz IWorkers and Privatisation l in Polityka 
8/9/90 p5. 
see J erzy Baczynski IA Few Questions, Insufficient Answers I 
Polityka 15/9/90 p3. 
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"I would give that a special award as best economic idea of 
the season. I am afraid that the Government1s type of 
macro-argument appears to be inadequate. If advocates of 
privatisation cannot find a better way of convincing the 
work-force that transforming the enterprise would be 
profitable then one can expect there to be serious unrest in 
the transformed business - irrespective of how decisive the 
majority raised amongst the workers is" (Ibid. p3). 
see Kazimierz Kloc IIndustrial conflicts in Poland 1991-921 
Labour Focus on Eastern Europe Vol.44 No.1 1993 p35. 
reported in Gazeta Wyborcza 27/3/90 
The chief critics of the Government plan have been the 
proponents of some form of employee ownership. These 
critics, who are an influential lobby in the Sejm, in the OKP 
and in Solidarity itself, have argued that the legislation ... has 
failed to include an alternative transferring the ownership 
of the state-owned enterprises to the plants l workers II 
(Louise Vinton IPrivatisation Plan Prepared l RFE Report on 
Eastern Europe Vol.l No.14 6/4/90 p30). 
liAs a result of the Communist experience .. .Polish citizens 
distrusted large government-run institutions ... which they 
really did not understand. They understood employee 
councils which, in the public1s perceptiOn, signified a 
decentralisation of economic deCision-making and local 
initiative" (Cannon p129). 
reported in Gazeta Wyborcza 22/3/90 p2. 
"In spite of its privatisation slogans, the government in 
practice covets state property, changing only the name of 
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the bureaucratic owner from Isocial proprietorl to Istate 
treasuryl (Rzeczpospolita 19/3/90). 
for a fuller description of the conflict between the workers I 
representatives and the privatisation agency see 
Rzeczpospolita 31/1/90, 8/2/90, Gazeta Wyborcza 
1,3,9,12/2/90)' 
see Kalman Miszei IPrivatisation in Eastern Europe: A 
Comparative Study of Poland and Hungaryl Soviet Studies 
Vol.44 No.2 1992 p289. 
Jacek Syski observed that Walesa Ills caught between 
political and union obligations, not being able to decide on 
his future ll (Jacek Syski IFarewell to the Myth I POlityka 
16/6/90 p1). 
see Appendix II p760. 
III remember the almost hysterical hostility of opposition 
groups to Tadeusz Mazowiecki ... That hostility was the result 
of conflicts among intellectual circles to which the current 
Premier belongedll (Smiecz, ILooking askance I Kultura Nr 
10/517 1990 p20). 
III must honestly say that I was apprehensive. I had known 
Tadeusz for years and my major reservations concerned his 
virtues: the tendency to give a hearing to as large a number 
of views as pOSSible, taking time to consider before reaching 
a decisionll (Kuron (c) p16). 
IIBy throwing his entire political weight behind Mazowiecki1s 
elevation to Prime Minister, Walesa and his faction hoped to 
stem the rapidly growing momentum of the leaders of the 
Warsaw intelligentsia ... However, after accepting the 
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nomination., Mazowiecki not only did not lean on the Walesa 
faction., but, in contrast, virtually shut it out from 
participation in the formation of government. Instead, the 
new Prime Minister moved rapidly toward reconciliation 
with the leaders of the Warsaw intelligentsia ... " (Zubek (c) 
p584). 
Wit old Pawlowski listed the participants in the press 
campaign: "'Will the President resign?' - pondered the front 
page of "Sztandar Mlodych". "Dziennik Ludowy", also on the 
front page, went a step further and asked "Who for the 
Belvedere?". There were five respondents, five times - Lech 
Walesa. "Will Walesa become President?" asked Krzysztof 
Czabanski in "Tygodnik SOlidarnosc"" (Wit old Pawlowski 'The 
Skin on the Bear' POlityka 3/3/90 p3). 
For him Walesa was needed as "the keystone between the 
trade union ... and the political structure representing the 
interests of the state" (Geremek (b) p208). 
"The fact alone that all of the names of the current 
government were acknowledged is a big success for the 
Premier and the whole of his new team. All the more so as 
these names emerged with concrete and significant levels of 
trust" (Stanislaw Nowicki 'Poland and the Poles' in Polityka 
23-30/12/89 p7). 
"The first quarter of 1990 was conspicuous by the 
persistence of the high social authority of Premier 
Mazowiecki. The star of Lech Walesa was beg:inning to dim" 
(Gebethnera, Sand Jasiewicz K Dlaczego Tak Glosowano 
p17). 
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Jacek Syski's appraisal of Walesa's standing was 
representative of the mood in Government circles at this 
time: "I cannot see either a majority in the Sejm or in the 
general elections, which now or in the future would give the 
Chairman a place in the Belvedere. Rather everything 
indicates that only a place in the Pantheon of History will 
suffice, where he would appear as something strange, 
shocking ... " ('Farewell to the Myth' POlityka 16/6/90 p7). 
In 1990 an article in the journal Kultura noted the class 
context of the clash between elements of the new political 
elite and Walesa and the dangers of dismissing the latter's 
political capabilities: "The emperor has no clothes, that is 
true, but he has extraordinary political intuition and many 
correct instincts in his proletarian temperament. His 
common nose senses the smells inaccessible to the perfumed 
noses of the intelligentsia" ('Looking askance' Kultura Nr 
10/517 1990 p20). 
"Lech Walesa is a little like a nuclear bomb whose 
detonation today could destroy everything in Poland (the 
stability of the new political system and himself). Just like a 
nuclear bomb he is becoming increasingly useless in peaceful 
and prosaic times, which are not now times of battle and of 
war strategies, but of the entire democratic game of 
interests, bidding, compromises and competence, for which 
the Chairman does not have the most obvious patience" 
('Farewell to the Myth' Polityka 16/6/90 p7). 
Tadeusz Chrzanowski 'Walesa-Presidency-Democracy' 
Tygodnik Powszechny 8/7/90 pl. 
cited in Andrzej Gruszczynski 'The Echo of Communism' 
Tygodnik Solidarnosc 3/8/90. 
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liThe peasants chances of influencing the political sphere 
increase sharply in times of national crises ll ('The Peasantry 
as a Class I in Shanin p265). 
see Friszke p98. 
see Appendix I p704. 
see Appendix I p693. 
see 'The Polish Intelligentsia and Society' Chapter 1 p123. 
In May 1990, as the peasant organisations moved towards 
unification, an editorial in the pro-Government IIGazeta 
Wyborcza ll warned: liThe Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) might 
shake the stability of the existing political arrangement, 
block the government's economic programme, and even 
break the parliamentary coalition with the Citizens' 
Parliamentary Caucus ll (Gazeta Wyborcza 7/5/90 pI). 
see lInter-war Society' Chapter 2 p186. 
in 1990 private farms accounted for 76% of agricultural 
production, state farms 18.6% and co-operatives 3.7%, figures 
from 'Rocznik statystycznyl GUS Warsaw 1990 and 1991. 
see Friszke p97. 
see Appendix I p676. 
IINaturally, KOR's work among the peasants began somewhat 
later than its work amongst the workers, and it is difficult 
today to establish the details of the process with precisionll 
(JJ Lipski KOR University of California Press London 1985 
p255). 
555 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
toO 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
Garton Ash, T. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: 
Solidarity, 1980-82 London, Cape 1983 p114. 
see PSL policies in Appendix I p704. 
see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 1 p124. 
"it calls upon a conservatism with its roots in rural, 
peasant cultures, traditions which emphasise pre-war 
traditions of nation, family, religion, and strong national 
states. It is a conservatism distrustful of modernity and the 
secular values of post-war Western Europe" (Hockenos, Paul 
Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist 
Eastern Europe London, Routledge 1993 pl0). 
"Industrialisation ... lowers the importance of the countryside 
in the national production, curbs its 'food monopoly' by 
developing international trade, stimulates village-level 
polarisation ... " (Teodor Shanin 'The Peasantry as a Class II in 
Shanin p256). 
see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 2 p124. 
see 'Initial Results of the Balcerowicz Plan I Chapter 3 p317. 
Quoted in Jagienka Wilczak IGreat Expectations' Polityka 
20/1/90 p6. 
see Pawel Tarnowski 'Flooded With Milkl Polityka 30/6/90. 
Henryk Maziejuk 'Fears for the Future I Polityka 21/7/90 
p4. 
Quoted in Tygodnik Rolnikow Solidarnosc 2/2/90. 
"From the outset the liberal character of the Balcerowicz 
Plan was not in harmony with the expectations of 
country-fOlk. It placed identical emphasis on the economy as 
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a whole, while the peasants, practically universally (92% of 
those polled), demanded special. privileged treatment for 
agriculture, which had to help Poland out of crisis II (Jerzy 
Gluszynski and Grzegorz Szymaniuk 'As the Peasants See It' 
Polityka 21/7/90 p4). 
liThe demand for guaranteed minimum prices, presented so 
clearly by the peasant union, is impossible to accept and it is 
at variance with the accepted foundations of the economic 
game. II (Quoted in Henryk Maziejuk 'Fears for the Future' 
Polityka 21/7/90 p4). 
IIThis programme was immediatelY branded II anti-peasant II, 
and had a negative effect on the relationship between the 
villages and the realisation of the policies of the Mazowiecki 
government II (Gluszynski and Szymaniuk 'As the Peasants 
See It' Polityka 21/7/90 p4). 
Jagienka Wilczak 'Great Expectations' Polityka 20/1/90 pI. 
At the time Mariusz Janicki warned that the dispute 
between the city and the village, concerning the production 
of food-stuffs could go beyond economic issues and spark 
IIhistorical resentments ll (Mariusz Janicki 'Knight or Pawn?' 
Polityka 29/9/90 p5). 
liThe Free Democrats represent the culture of liberal 
political thought in Europe. The Forum looks for its roots 
rather in the national tradition .. I see the renaissance of two 
major traditions of Hungarian history: ruralist and 
urbanist. The town and the village; two types of mentality 
and sensibility, two cultural mentalities and two spiritual 
biographies. That is the genealogy of the conflict II Michnik 
(k) p72. 
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"Our western border .. .is the border between the 
Germanic-urban Europe and the Slavic-rural Europe" (Anna 
Tatarkiewicz 'From the Village to Europe' POlityka 8/9/90 
pI6). 
Jasiewicz tells us "Research indicated that, more often than 
in the past, conflicts were occurring in the socio-economic 
field, most particularlY in the rural/urban one (workers, 
the intelligentsia versus the peasantry)" (Gebethner and 
J asiewicz p99). 
taken from seminar liThe Bases of Party Competition in 
Eastern Europe" given at Glasgow University January 1997, 
see also G. EVans and S Whitefield 'Identyfying the Bases of 
Party Competition in Eastern Europe' in British Journal of 
Political Science 23 (1993) pp521-48. 
"One of the most dramatic conflicts to appear on the 
national scene is that between the cities and the villages; the 
intelligentsia is not able to reach an understanding with the 
peasantry. There is a gulf between them. As the townspeople 
of Klimia and Radczya say "You can lead yourselves and we 
will lead ourselves. Every man for himself and the devil 
take the hindmost" (Zdzislaw Pietrasik 'Themes from the 
Marriage I Polityka 28/7/90 pI). 
"In the past cameras showed the exhausting hardships of 
agriculture, portraying it as arduous work, often carried 
out in atrocious weather, which in the cities could not 
possibly provoke jealousy. A city-dweller could be poorer, but 
he had more of the basic comforts of life (an apartment 
with amenities, access to culture Y' (Ibid. p6). 
Ibid p6 .. 
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Gluszynski and SZynlaniuk lAs the Peasants See It' 
Polityka 21/7/90 p4 
Ibid. p4. 
see Friszke p98. 
Mariusz Janicki referred sardonically to the party thus: 
liThe PSL, the old ZSL which has changed everything apart 
from its HQ, members and pastil ('Knight or Pawn? I in 
Polityka 12/5/90 p5). 
"According to this assumption the massed ranks of the ZSL 
at grass-roots level remained 'clean'. Likewise the leadership 
of PSL 'Rebirth' could be recognised as the heirs of Witos, 
Rataj and Mikolajczyk [major figures of the pre-war peasant 
movement] II (Aleksander Checko IUp with the Greenl 
Polityka 12/5/90 pI). 
Checko observed that the congress would "naturally profit 
from the combination of synlbolism and authority 
(Wilanow) and the strength of raw materials and thousands 
of members ('Rebirth'). This was the assumption of the 
agreement reached between Francisek Kaminski and 
Kazirnierz Olesiak" (Ibid. pI) 
see Ibid. pI. 
see Ibid. pI. 
"polish Political Landscape" in Polityka 28/7/90 see also 
Appendix I p704. 
liThe peasantry with their customary strong support for 
Christian values and adherence to the social teaching of the 
Church as a base for their programmes will .. need a Centre 
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party. I hope that party will be the PC" (Slawomir Siwek 
'Poruzumieniem Centrum - Let's Discuss' in Polityka 28/7/90 
p7). 
see Mariusz Janicki 'Knight or Pawn? I Polityka 29/9/90 
p5. 
see Appendix I p704. 
see 'The Tadeusz Mazowiecki Vote l Chapter 4 p626. 
Quoted in Jagienka Wilczak IGreat Expectations' Polityka 
20/1/90 p6. 
see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' 
Chapter 2 p259. 
Nowicki observes that "From these results one can conclude 
that the average Pole sees Solidarity and to a lesser degree 
the Church as the main actors today and - judging from the 
votes - these are the two fundamental forces Imaking 
politics I in Poland" (,Poland and the Poles' Polityka 30/12/89 
p7). 
see 'polish Society' Chapter 1 p52, lInter-war Society' 
Chapter 2 p149 and 'Communist Society' Chapter 2 p174. 
In 1991 the "Economist" noted: liThe triumph of Solidarity 
was seen by many as a triumph for the church, which had 
preached against communism, harboured Solidarity activists 
and paid for underground presses throughout the dismal 
1980s" (' ... and unto Poland, what is God's' Economist 25/5/91 
p55). 
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see Roman Dmowski Mysli N owoczesnego Polaka Grunwald 
Warsaw 1989 p71 
see 'Intelligentsia in the Inter-war period' Chapter 2 p191. 
"I think that this alliance [between the lay intelligentsia and 
the Church] was splendid. It is only that in Poland there has 
ensued an increase in nationalist tendencies which remind 
me - someone familiar with the inter-war period - of the 
alliance between the Catholic Church and right-wing politics. 
It seems to me that we are at a dangerous stage. Amongst 
the hierarchy of the Catholic Church there are certainlY 
many people who understand this danger, but there are also 
many who completely fail to see how much the Catholic 
Church could lose, if it departs from the intellectuals or the 
intelligentsia. Continually there are in the Polish Church 
strong elements which explain various social upheavals as 
the work of Trotskyists, masons and Western agents" 
(Czeslaw Milosz Tygodnik Mazowsze January 1988). 
"The problem of the Church's hostility to the modern, 
pluralist and liberal conception of a democratic state may be 
explained, in part, by the fact that many, if not the 
majority, of the Church hierarchy hold an inter-war vision 
of a democratic Poland" (Mirella W. Eberts 'The Church and 
Democracy in Poland' Europe-Asia Studies Vol.50 No.5 July 
1998 p836, henceforth Eberts). 
"Against the background of the truth of the baptised natiOn, 
one cannot flatly renounce the notion of 'Polish=Catholic"' 
(Kultura No.7-8 1988 cited in Piotr Ogrodzinski, Henryk 
Szlajfer 'Two Kingdoms' East European Reporter May/June 
1992 p19). 
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IIAfter 45 years of living in an ideological state the vast 
majority of Poles are not looking for a religious or Catholic 
state. They are against state intervention in matters of 
individual conscience. ( 'Faith, religion, politics' Zycie 
Warszawy no.20 1991 p3). 
At the beginning of 1991 Cardinal Glemp stated the 
institutional outcome of this vision when he announced his 
desire to end lithe communist-inspired separation of church 
and state" C ... and unto Poland, what is God's ' Economist 
25/5/91 p55). 
liThe Catholic church states openly that democracy must 
obey limits that are pregiven and that cannot be altered by 
the principle of popular sovereigntyll (Przeworski (b) p62). 
lithe Church found another lenemyl of Christian values: the 
secular western states and its materialism, neutral schools, 
tolerance of abortion, drugs, but, above all, empty churchesll 
(Urszula Nowakowska Ana's Land: Sisterhood in Eastern 
Europe Westview Press 1997 p28). 
see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 1 p124. 
see Pastoral Letter in Gazeta Wyborcza 13/9/91 pI. 
see 'The Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantryl 
Chapter 4 p498. 
Irena Grudzinska Gross summarises the Pope's message and 
outlines his defensive vision of Poland in Europe: lIy ou are 
the real Europe - he was saying to the audience assembled in 
Polish provincial towns - just hold on to your Catholicism 
and you are going to be more European than Western 
Europe ... The ideal Europe of John Paul II is agrarian, 
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anti-modernist, devout and simple, pre-industrial and 
anti-intellectual [my italics]. Its identity is built against the 
cosmopolitanism (and abortion, divorce, crime, poverty, 
atheism) of Paris or Londonll (Irena Grudzinska Gross Ipost 
Communist Resentment, or the Rewriting of Polish History' 
in East European Politics and Societies Vol.6 No.2 Spring 
1992 p148). 
liThe possible transformation of the Catholic Church into the 
state Church of Poland has been seen as a threat by the 
intelligentsia for many decades ... [and] was clearly perceived 
[as such] by the left-wing intelligentsia who were inclined to 
promote far-reaching reforms ll , Kosela p125). 
see 'A Dictionary of the Last Decade' Res Publica Nos.7-8/91 
cited in 'Europe' East European Reporter Vo1.5 No.2 
March/April 1992 p51. 
III think that from the start the Church saw the chance to 
build a Catholic democracy in Poland instead of the liberal 
democracies functioning in the West" ('Without a Golden 
Mean' in Toranska T My 1994 p194, henceforth Toranska). 
Ills the Church more universal or national, more accessible 
or closed? .. We want to return to Europe, that is fine, but 
Europe is a long way away not only in terms of this 
country's backward economy but in its clerical intolerance ll 
(Maria Taniewska-Peszko IIntimate regulations I Polityka 
19/5/90 pl0). 
lilt seems that the Church's idea of civil society is completely 
different from that understood by the democratic opposition. 
The range of social freedom which the Church seeks is 
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sigrlliicantly more limitedll (Arato A 'The Democratic Theory 
of the Polish Opposition' ~yka Nr.311989). 
see Introduction to Chapter 3 p287. 
see 'The Intelligentsia in the Late Communist Period' 
Chapter 2 p258. 
IILet us not mythologise the Church. The opposition could 
rely on its goodwill only after 13 December [1981, the start 
of Martial Law]. Its support was not always constant. The 
Church was anti-Communist, but its analysis of the situation 
did not suggest that Communism could fall. On the contrary, 
it believed that Communism would exist and that was why 
it had to adjust itself reasonably to it ... I resent the current 
presentation of the Church's history as one long campaign of 
democratic oppositionll (Gazeta Wyborcza 25/4/92)' 
liThe issue of religion in schools does not essentially have an 
ideological character ... it is concerned with something more, 
namely the state treating every attitude with neutrality, 
without favouring one over another II (Mariusz Janicki 'A 
Difficult Lesson in Religion' POlityka 18/8/90 pI). 
see 'The Intelligentsia in the Early Communist Period 
Chapter 2 p240. 
IIThis practice helped make the Catholic Church a centre for 
political activity and strengthen social bonds outside the 
schools and work-places, which were the focal points of 
Communist control and indoctrination. Such bonds 
facilitated the development of independent social movements 
such as Solidarityll (Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka 'Bishops Call for 
Religious Instruction in Schools' RFE Report on Eastern 
Europe Vol.l No.23 8/6/90 p35-38) 
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see Slowo Powszechne 4-6/5/90 pL 
reported in Gazeta Wyborcza 9/5/90 p2. 
IIFollowers of the first [Episcopate's] option are most often of 
older age, residents of the villages and smaller towns, of a 
lower level of education and worse material conditions .. .on 
the other hand their adversaries - against the return of 
religious education to schools - in general represent the 
typical features of the social elitell (Jerzy Gluszynski 
IRinging the Bell For Religion' Polityka 16/6/90 p7). 
IIWhile in complete support of making catechism lessons 
accessible in local schools I am opposed to introducing 
religion as an obligatory subject in elementary school. That 
is because there exists a danger of a conflict of conscience, 
which the state ought to actively opposell interview in Zycie 
Warszawy quoted in IW kraju l Polityka 9/6/90 p2). 
IIMazowiecki could not refuse ... [because] he was branded as a 
'leftist ', a term which was applied to the whole group to 
which he belonged. After all, all of those major politicians: 
Kuron, Geremek, are burdened with a certain garb from the 
past. It is very easy to trace Kuron's or Geremek's 
communist past .. Thus Cardinal Glemp speaking on television 
said that those opposed to the introduction of religious 
education to schools are those who had previously removed 
itll (Toranska p212). 
see Ewa N owakowska interview with Radziwill 'The People 
Are At Fault, Not the Structures I Polityka 21/7/90 pl0. 
see interview with Kulerski in Toranska p202. 
for full text see Polityka 18/8/90 p6. 
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IIUnder considerable pressure from the Church, the 
Mazowiecki government moved quickly to address the 
problem of religious education, refraining from conducting 
any broad consultation on the matter or putting the issue 
in front of Parliarnent ll (Eberts p821). 
' ... and unto Poland, what is God's' ,Economist 25/5/91 p55. 
see Appendix I p701. 
see 'A Difficult Lesson in Religion' Polityka 18/8/90 pI). 
Janicki tells us lilts difficult to avoid the impression that the 
overturning of the Joint Commission's results by the 
Tribunal would be welcomed by MEN with a quiet sigh of 
relief' (Ibid.)' 
see Toranska p202. 
Voytek Zubek comments: IIWithout a whimper ... the self-styled 
'arch-European' governing elite permitted the return of 
religious instruction to public schools ... The ChurchJs 
momentum in implementing its social agenda seemed to be 
unstoppable ll (Zubek (a) p8l). 
see Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka 'Polish Bishops Discuss Current 
Issues' in RFE Report on Eastern Europe 20/4/90 p27. 
see Eberts p827. 
see 'The Weakness of the Political Scene' Chapter 3 p367. 
liThe two are concerned with defending national culture 
against the flood of foreign influences; Arnericanisation, 
bolshevism, pornography etc.1I (Adam Krzeminski, Wieslaw 
Wladyka 'The Ugly Face of Europe' Polityka 4/8/90 p5). 
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see Appendix I p722. 
see Warsaw Voice 10/5/92 pI. 
"A large place in public life was taken by those who took 
advantage of the Church instrumentally for their own 
political aims" (Interview with Wiktor Kulerski in Toranska 
p212). 
see Hellen p208. 
"We declare and remind you that basic human rights, and 
thus the rights of the unborn child, depend on human 
nature and are its natural privilege, not the result of 
recognition by whatever social group" (quoted in Ewa 
Nowakowska 'Enforced Thoughtlessness' POlityka 19/5/90 
pl0). 
lithe majority of Poles accept [abortion] to be either 
available on demand or after a medical and ethical 
consultation process" (Hellen p184). 
liThe contention that the issue cannot be a subject of 
discussion is a glaring violation of the most fundamental 
laws of democracy and an attempt to dogmatically impose 
Catholic obligations on everyone. This is a totalitarian 
position!" (Ewa N owakowska 'Enforced Thoughtlessness' 
Polityka 19/5/90 pl0). 
Krzeminski and Wladyka note "a natural affinity, although 
from different positions, between the radical Right and 
Catholic orthodoxy in the issue of abortion" (Adam 
Krzeminski, Wieslaw Wladyka 'The Ugly Face of Europe' _ 
Polityka 4/8/90 p5). 
see Appendix I p698. 
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see Ewa N owakowska 'Enforced Thoughtlessness I POlityka 
19/5/90 pl0. 
Spiewak tells us that the radical Right "fought against the 
old abortion law as a Stalinist creation (although it was 
introduced in 1957)" (Spiewak p32). 
cited in Slodkowska p187. 
see Maria Taniewska-Peszko IIntimate Regulations' Polityka 
19/5/90 pl0. 
quoted in Ewa N owakowska 'Reason Loses to Fear' Polityka 
29/9/90 pl0. 
see 'Weekly record of events l RFE/RL Vol.l No.41 12/10/90 
p49. 
"A negative attitude to the project is treated as an attack on 
the faith and on the Church ... If people do not sign the 
initiative it is expected, for example, that there would be a 
lack of support from the Church side in the approaching 
Parliamentary election campaign" (cited in 'Reason Loses to 
Fear' Polityka 29/9/90 pl0). 
Spiewak explained that, according to the Right, "Those who 
do not support the Church and the banning of abortion, 
derived from natural law, are Red" (Spiewak p32). 
see 'Analysis of the Results of the Presidential Elections' 
Chapter 4 p618. 
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"Duri.ng an audience the Pope quoted one of Mazowiecki1s 
speeches to POlish pilgrims. ROAD sympathisers tried to 
interpret this as a sign of the Pope1s anti-Walesa attitude. 
Does that mean that when he quotes Walesa, as at the 
beginni:ng of September, he voices his opposition to 
Mazowiecki?" (Morawski, D IThe Church is not an 
Instrument I Tygodnik Solidarnosc 26/10/90 p3). 
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4(b) The Presidential Elections 
Introduction 
The contest for the Office of President of the Polish Republic, 
which was conducted in the Summer and Autumn of 1990 is 
worthy of close scrutiny for three reasons. Firstly, the 
Presidential Office was a potentially decisive influence on the 
development of a democratic, pOlitical system based on a 
consensual civil society. The construction of a democratic polity 
depends on achieving a balance of power between legislative and 
executive branches of government1. 
In the constitutional flux of early transition Poland the powers of 
the Office were uncertain. In this atmosphere the character and 
ambitions of the office1s first post-communist incumbent could be 
expected to influence its powers. In turn, the eventual balance 
between Poland1s legislative and executive branches of 
government was bound to influence the development of civil 
society. The institutions of civil society (political parties, trade 
unions, interest groups etc.) operate according to the balance of 
power between central state institutions. A strong parliament 
would place the emphasis on elite negotiation and competition 
between the political representatives of various social and 
economic interests. On the other hand, a strong president would 
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introduce a more populist arrangement with a strong leader 
directing affairs on behalf of a supposedly homogeneous society. 
Failure to achieve a balanced arrangement could result in 
authoritarian rule or parliamentary inertia and a potential 
authoritarian backlash. Both of these scenarios could obviously 
impede the development of liberal democracy. This section will 
begin by outlining the debate on the powers of the president. It 
will explain why the representatives of the Polish intelligentsia 
within the Mazowiecki government opposed the model of a strong 
president while Lech Walesa and his followers supported it. 
Secondly, the election revealed the depth of the split between the 
'intelligentsia in power I and the representatives of other social 
groups. The often vindictive, personal battle between Mazowiecki 
and the other presidential candidates, most notably Lech Walesa, 
tended to conceal how the different visions of the intelligentsia, 
workers, peasantry and Church were influencing the politics of 
the time. Nevertheless, the depth of animosity and the prominence 
of certain themes (such as anti-Semitism., anti-intellectualism., 
elitism., 'Europeannism' etc.) confirmed that the conflict between 
different visions of post-communist Poland was shaping the 
campaign. 
571 
In particular, an examination of the electoral campaign mounted 
by Mazowiecki camp will illustrate that its intelligentsia pedigree 
was in evidence. It will demonstrate how the influence of this 
lineage served Mazowiecki's campaign poorly in the election. As 
such the campaign's failure is seen as representative of the 
weaknesses of intellectuals as politicians. 
The eventual results of the presidential election - where 
Mazowiecki came a humiliating third behind Walesa and the 'dark 
horse candidate Stanislaw Tyminski - were illustrative of the 
isolation of the Mazowiecki government in it's incarnation as the 
'intelligentsia in power I from Polish society in general. 
Mazowiecki's performance at the polls suggested that by the end 
of 1990 his government of 'the best and brightest I was no longer 
supported beyond the narrow confines of it's intelligentsia 
constituency. 
This result, in effect, ended the Polish intelligentsia's most 
committed attempt to lead Polish society through the transition 
process from the helm of the state. It was the clearest sign of 
Polish society's rejection of the intelligentsia's project of 
'rebuilding civil society'. The defeat marked the failure of the 
intellectuals of the Mazowiecki government to transform 
Solidarity into a cross-class movement which would lead Poland's 
Ireturn to the West '. The isolation of the 'intelligentsia in power I 
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showed its interpretation of 'civil society' and the 'Solidarity 
ethos' to be myths Which, though vital in opposition-building 
under communism, did not provide a realistic blueprint for 
building a consensual, democratic system. 
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(i) Presidential-Parliamentary Models 
Within the context of democratisation, Poland had no definite 
model of the presidency to follow. In Western democracies there is 
no consensus on the ideal model of parliamentary-presidential 
relations. Each democracy differs in terms of the functions of the 
presidential office. Common to each system is the perception of the 
president as a figurehead or representative of society as a whole. 
Differences arise over the amount of political power this type of 
sin.gle representative should exercise. 
Generally speakin.g, presidential functions fall into two categories: 
ceremonial and governmental. In the former category the 
president acts as head of state with formal but largely symbolic 
functions such as representin.g the country on the international 
scene. In the latter category the president acts as head of 
government and can propose and amend legislation, oversee the 
implementation of policies and co-ordinate individual policies into 
a unified government programme. 
Political scientists usually identify three basic models of 
presidential-parliamentary relations: IPure parliamentarianism', 
Ipure presidentialism' and 'quasi-presidentialism,2. The 
'parliamentary' model gives control of the executive to a Premier 
or Prime Minister (the leader of the party which has most 
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parliamentary support) and a Cabinet of Ministers (this similarly 
reflects the balance of power in the legislature). In this system 
the president, if there is such an office, has purelY ceremonial 
functions. He or she formally appoints the Premier and Cabinet 
though these decisions have already been made. The government 
is responsible to Parliament as it can be forced to resign if a vote 
of no-confidence is carried. Great Britain is seen as one of the 
leading examples of the parliamentary model. 
An advantage of this system is that the fusion of parliamentary 
and executive branches facilitates the passage of the government's 
programme. On the other hand, if the party system is unstable 
and fragmented there is the threat of frequent votes of 
no-confidence. Moreover the indirect election of a Premier either 
formally or informally through the legislature denies popular 
input into the political process. Also, if the legislature is dominated 
by a small number of large parties (e.g. the Labour and 
Conservative parties in the UK.) the government can be accused 
of dominating parliament in an undemocratic way. 
The second system is purely presidential. Here the president is 
both head of state and head of government. He or she combines 
ceremonial and governmental functions. The president is elected 
independently of the legislature for a fixed term of office. Under 
this arrangement the president can initiate, propose or veto 
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legislation. Moreover, he or she is answerable to the 'people' and 
the Constitution and can only be ousted by the legislature for 
serious misdemeanours. A leading example of this system is the 
USA .. 
The presidential system can aid executive stability and also 
provide the population with a means of participating directly in 
the political life of the country. On the other hand, if the 
president hails from a different party from the one dominant in 
the legislature, political rivalry can be manifested in 
confrontations between branches of government. Political issues 
can become em broiled in legal or constitutional struggles. The 
recent case of the embattled United States presidential office 
under the Democrat Clinton clashing with a Congress dominated 
by the Republican Party provides an example of this danger. 
Moreover, the potential exists for presidential powers to be 
abused for authoritarian purposes. Although constitutional 
safeguards are usually central to the functioning of a presidential 
system South American countries provide examples of how 
presidentialism can descend into authoritarianism. 
The final system is termed 'quasi-presidential'. In this 
arrangement the president is elected independently of the 
legislature but his or her functions are different from those 
under the purely presidential system. He has ceremonial but also 
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some govermnental functions. For instance, he nominates the 
premier (usually subject to ratification by parliament) and selects 
cabinet ministers with the premier. He or she can dismiss the 
premier and cabinet and call new elections under certain 
circumstances. The president also has the power of legislative 
veto. In a state of emergency he or she can rule by decree 
through emergency powers. 
The main characteristic of the iquasi-presidentiali system is thus 
the dual centres of executive power. The premier and the 
president have to share govermnental functions. The relationship 
between the two centres varies over time according to the 
balance of power in the legislature. If the presidentis party holds 
the initiative then he or she becomes the dominant figure in the 
govermnent and the same applies to the premier. When the 
parliament is weak and fragmented the president becomes the 
centre of pOlitical authority. France is seen as the prime example 
of this system. 
One advantage of the iquasi-presidentiali system is that it is 
adaptable and can encourage stability and continuity. If the 
president has strong parliamentary support he or she can become 
the centre of legislative activity. If this support is absent then the 
parliament becomes the main source of political power. Another 
benefit is that the population can partiCipate directlY in the 
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election of the president. Finally the president can act as a 
'supra-political' arbiter over competing parties. A major 
disadvantage of this system is the tendency towards dictatorial 
rule, noted in the presidential model. If the president's party bases 
itself on his or her person they can become vehicles for the 
president's ambitions. Parliament could thus be completely 
subordinated to the will of the president. Secondly the system 
could again create a 'stand-off between a premier and president 
who hailed from competing parties. 
There is a no consensus on the ideal model of democratic 
parliamentary-presidential relations. Moreover, even when 
codified in the constitution, the features of the model can be 
altered. A striking example of this is he constitution of the Fifth 
French Republic. This was an attempt to overcome the 
parliamentary weaknesses which had plagued the Third and 
Fourth Republics. The solution was to incorporate both 
parliamentary and presidential elements. Nevertheless, under De 
Gaulle, the model became increasingly presidential. 
The issue of parliamentary-presidential relations in Poland in 
1990 included all of these wider themes in some form or another. 
The complexity of the Polish case was naturally heightened by the 
fact that the country was attempting to construct, rather than 
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maintain a democratic polity. Choices had to be made over which 
model of presidential-parliamentary relations suited the purpose 
of democratisation. Political scientists remain divided on the 
question. Most recent studies suggest that presidential systems 
may contribute more to the collapse of emergent democracies 
than parliamentary systems, particularly when combined with an 
extremely fragmented party system3 . In this situation a powerful 
president can dominate a fractious parliament and justify the 
undemocratic concentration of powers in his office. Beyond 
warning of these dangers, political scientist were reluctant to 
propose parliamentary/presidential models for Poland4 . 
Moreover, there were no native, historical models for the Poles to 
follOW in their quest for democratisation. Throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the organs of state had 
dominated rather than reflected the values of Polish society. We 
have already noted the tendency of POland1s party system to 
fragmentation. The brief period of parliamentary democracy in 
the inter-war period had led to fragmentation and the advent of 
presidential authoritarianism under Pilsudski5 • In 1990 the 
nascent party system was similarly fragmented6 and, as noted 
above, this presented real dangers for the development of a 
democratic relationship between the president and parliament. 
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Communism had subordinated all institutions to the Party 7. 
Moreover the office of the president was subject to the process of 
political bargainirlg that had left most state organs in a state of 
flux at the onset of the transition process. At the Round Table it 
became clear that the communists saw the presidency as an 
instrument to preserve a power base in the new system. The 
president was to be elected by the Sejm and Senate, united in the 
National Assembly by a majority of votes of at least half the total 
membership. Under the remit of the June 1989 elections, where 
the PZPR and it's satellites were guaranteed 65% of the 460 - seat 
Sejm, it was safe to assume that the new president would be the 
choice of the communists. Thus at the Round Table the 
communist side sought broad legislative and executive powers for 
the office. 
Solidarity accepted the idea of a strong president as a necessary 
source of stability for the transition period. This referred in 
particular to the perceived threat of Soviet intervention in 
Poland. Kuron mentions how the dangers which resulted in 
Poland's location at "the heart of the empire" influenced the 
Solidarity side during the negotiations8 . Nevertheless the 
Solidarity side at the Round Table tried to contain the 
office-holders potential for abuse of power by introducing a 
number of conditions and constraints. 
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At the IMagdalenka l talks which preceded the Round Table proper 
the presidential office proved a controversial topic of debate. 
Solidarity argued against the granting of a legislative veto to the 
president. It also questioned the Constitution1s description of his 
role as guarantor of the Isecurity of the state l (Article 28f), a 
phrase which in the past had justified the communist regimes l 
repressive policies9 . However the communist side was insistent. 
General Kiszczak of the communist side replied uYou gave your 
agreement to the formula of the president. That was in the 
package. We cannot agree with further considerations or 
modifications ll10• 
The result of this manoeuvring was a vague and complicated set 
of powers and obligations for the presidential office. For instance, 
the president was to be the Supreme Commander of the armed 
forces. He could therefore declare war and appoint a Commander 
in Chief but only if the Sejm was not in session. He could declare 
Martial Law but only in a state of emergency and for a limited 
period of time. Moreover during Martial Law Parliament could 
not be dissolved or the constitution amended. The president could 
also nominate or dismiss candidates for Prime Minister and Head 
of the National Bank but these again were subject to Sejm 
approval. He could initiate legislation and issue ordinances but he 
could not issue decrees. Any legislation had to have his Signature 
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in order to be binding. He could propose amendrrlents or veto 
legislation passed by the Sejm, but the Sejm could override him 
with a 2/3 majority. However, given the fact that Solidarity 
would be a minority in the envisaged Icontract Sejml a communist 
president's veto of legislation would be unlikely to be overturned. 
Finally the president could call general elections but he could 
only do so prematurely in carefully specified situations. 
The office therefore could be described as 'quasi-presidential'. It 
existed in a peculiar stasis between power and subservience to 
parliament; between a parliamentary and presidential system of 
government. However its status had been arrived at through elite 
negotiation and as part of the wider Round Table agreement. 
Obviously the office had been created as part of the game of Icat 
and mousel between the Solidarity and communist sides rather 
than through social consensus. What's more, the logic on which 
the bargaining of the Round Table was based (Le. 
communist/Solidarity power-sharing) was made redundant by the 
collapse of communist rule and the rise of the Mazowiecki 
government. In the new atmosphere the vagueness of the 
president's powers became a major problem for the new elitell. 
The vagueness of the office ensured that the presidential election 
contest involved not onlY the identity of the incumbent but the 
potential evolution of presidential powers. As such it was part of 
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the general struggle between the intelligentsia and other social 
groups over competing I visions I of post-communist Poland. The 
issue provided one of the main means of differentiating between 
the disintegrating factions of Solidarity. After the onset of the 
IWar at the Topl one could discern the antecedents of Centre 
Alliance and ROAD from their version of presidential powers. 
We have already established that populism favours a strong 
presidential model12. The populist view of society as a 
homogeneous community with well-defined values sees little use 
for a parliamentary Ital.king shop I where self-serving elites detract 
from the effective practice of government. Walesa and his 
supporters saw the Polish parliament and government as the base 
of their new political enemies - the Warsaw-based intelligentsia 
and the Mazowiecki camp. A strong president was seen as a 
necessary counter balance against the political power of this 
Icosmopolitanl elite. A direct relationship between leader and 
people (primarily manifested in the general election of the 
president) was favoured .. Walesa took this direct relationship 
further: as a potential president he compared himself to the 
IFlying Dutchmanl travelling through Poland as a 
trouble-shooter13. Walesa and his supporters called for a 
presidential office with important legislative powers. They usually 
referred to the retention and strengthening of the president1s 
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power of veto over parliamentary legislation and his competence 
to appoint prominent members of parliament and government 14. 
In addition, the populist view of the wider world as a threat 
demanded a strong leader to protect 'Polish' values and interests. 
Calls for a powerful president were usually linked with the 
perceived need for decisiveness and direction in the chaos of the 
transition period; for someone who could appeal directly to the 
general public rather than specific groups. Walesa himself was 
reported as saying that Poland needed a "president with an axe" 
to cut his way through the post-communist wilderness15• 
A strong president would encourage the development of a civil 
society whose plurality and freedom was limited. Basic 'Polish' 
values, whether worker, peasant or Catholic based, would be 
transmitted directly to the leader. Interests would not be arrived 
at through the complex interaction of a variety of social, 
economic and pOlitical groups. The threat to democracy in the 
presidential model (noted earlier) was therefore obvious in 
transition Poland. Wales a could justify government by decree 
through reference to fundamental 'Polish' values that were not 
open to debate. 
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Mazowiecki and his supporters in the Government and OKP 
displayed their intelligentsia pedigree in their ambivalent 
approach to the issue of presidential powers. The ethos of the 
Polish intelligentsia combined idealisation of egalitarian principles 
with an elitist, messianic sense of individual leadership - so long as 
the individual was a cultivated, intellectual Pole16. The reign of 
Pilsudski could be seen as a time when many sections of the Polish 
intelligentsia supported the rule of an authoritarian president 
because he filled the criteria of the politically committed Polish 
intellectual17. 
This is important as the support of the Mazowiecki government 
for a parliamentary system can be interpreted as a manifestation 
of its democratic credentials or as a vindication of its belief in 
concentrating power in the hands of a small group of 
intellectuals/statesmen - after all the Sejm was dominated by 
representatives of the intelligentsia milieu. One commentator on 
the Polish transition saw in the person of Tyminski an ironic 
caricature of the Polish intelligentsia's traditional longing for a 
'Great Man' who would lead the country back to the West18• 
However the intelligentsia's prejudice against non-intelligentsia 
elements, particularly as personified by Walesa19 ensured that his 
vision of the presidency was unequivocally dismissed as 
'quasi-dictatorial' and authoritarian. Adam Michnik presented a 
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picture of an incompetent, authoritarian President Walesa 
hacking his way clumsily through Poland's nascent democracy2°. 
The threat that Walesa would shape the presidency to suit his 
outlook (in a manner similar to De Gaulle in France) confirmed 
the Mazowiecki camp's support of a parliamentary model. The 
camp called for a president who was more of a mediator between 
a strong parliament and a strong government. He or she was to 
be a national figure-head, answerable to the Premier and Cabinet 
Ministers, rather than an active participant in the legislative 
process21. 
The Mazowiecki camp's commitment to a strong Parliament and 
Government was informed by the Polish intelligentsia's 
commitment to the introduction of a legalistic, democratic pOlitical 
system. Its liberal/elitist vision of the transition process stressed 
the importance of parliament as the arena for various issues and 
debates to be carried out. The fact that at the time parliament 
was dominated by Mazowiecki's supporters was obviously salient. 
This model would eventually facilitate the development of a 
pluralist civil SOCiety with groups competing peacefully for 
political influence across a range of issues. However the potential 
disadvantages of the parliamentary model (noted previously) 
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were apparent in 1990. The fragmentation of the OKP within 
parliarnent22 threatened legislative impasse23• The Mazowiecki 
camps dOmination of both parliament and government also fuelled 
the Walesa camp1s accusation that democracy was being hijacked 
by the Warsaw intellectual elite. 
In conclusion the presidential de bate carried important 
consequences for Poland in terms of the immediate transition 
process as well as long-term constitutional implications24. It 
reflected the competing visions of state/civil society/ society 
relations outlined previously. The following section will study the 
campaign itself. It will examine how the intelligentsia1s elitist 
vision of Polish democracy was manifested in the Mazowiecki 
campaign. Primarily this will be achieved through comparison 
with the populist approach of his main opponent, Lech Walesa. 
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eli) Comparison of the Mazowiecki and Walesa Campaigns 
By Summer 1990 there were six main candidates for the 
presidency25. Five were associated with emerging political strands 
which we discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Mazowiecki's main 
constituency was the liberal intelligentsia, Walesa represented the 
trade union side of Solidarity and industrial workers in general. 
Roman Bartoszcze ran as a candidate for the peasant movement. 
Wlodirnierz Cimoszewicz ran with the support of ex-communist 
organisations. Leszek Moczulski fought his campaign on behalf of 
the radical, independent strand. They were joined by the 
mysterious emigre businessman Stan Tyminski, whose campaign 
will be examined in the course of this section. 
However, initially at least, it seemed that the Presidential 
campaign would amount to a head-to-head contest between the 
two representatives of the Solidarity movement: Mazowiecki and 
Walesa. Most polls taken before the start of campaigning showed 
these two to be clear leaders and rivals26. The roots and 
consequences of the 'Tyminski phenomenon I can be seen as a 
product of the clash between these camps and will be dealt with 
in due course. This section will concentrate on Mazowiecki's and 
Walesa's candidacies. Contrasting the campaigns shows how the 
former's approach was informed by it's intelligentsia pedigree to 
it's detriment. 
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Electoral Programmes 
A comparison of both campsl electoral platforms in terms of 
practical programmes shows that there was very little 
difference27. The pOlitical programme of the Walesa camp, 
presented by PC, was summarised under the slogan 'acceleration'. 
Although intended as a critique of the Mazowiecki Government's 
policies it consisted, for the most part, of vague pronouncements 
which were not substantially different from the reform process 
being carried out at that time. Polish society's confusion was 
illustrated by the response to a Polityka poll which asked what 
the slogan 'acceleration' was concerned with. 61% thought it 
referred to a change in Government personnel, 55% the timing 
and range of privatisation, 38.5% growth in production, 38% 
elections to Senate and Sejm, 33.5% reform of citizens' committees 
into political groups, only 23% the election of Walesa to the 
presidency28. 
Nonetheless, during the campaign the Walesa team drew 
particular attention to three basic issues which were at odds 
with the Government's policies. These issues reflect populist 
themes which have been examined more fully in the previous 
section. The first was a call for the encouragement of political 
plurality and democracy29. This demand was usually linked to 
criticisms of the Warsaw elite's control of power and it's refusal to 
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encourage the development of distinct political organisations, as 
demonstrated in the debate over the future of the OKP and the 
citizens I committees. Walesa himself repeated the need for 
IIgenuine pluralismll and condemned lithe new monopoly on 
political power ll30. 
The second theme of the Walesa camp's program was economic. A 
group of distinguished economists who had shifted to the Walesa 
side began to criticise the Balcerowicz Plan. While announcing 
themselves to be in agreement with the general direction of 
economic reform they criticised what they saw as its excessive 
monetarism, which was impeding capital formation and 
contributing to economic stagnation. They also found fault with 
the slowness of the privatisation process which was allowing the 
nomenklatura of the old regime time to transform themselves 
into new entrepreneurs31. 
This argument was related to the third basic demand of the 
Walesa camp: to accelerate the process of bringing to account 
those guilty of perpetrating crimes against Polish society under 
the auspices of the old system. 'Decommunisation' was not to be 
carried out on the basis of collective responsibility but through 
the prosecution of those individuals who were most culpable. In 
one of his earliest Sejm speeches as Premier Mazowiecki described 
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his approach to the process of 'decommunisation'. A "thick line" 
was to be drawn under the communist past. General differences 
between communist times and the new era would be remembered 
but personal criticisms and vengeful attacks on certain 
institutions and groups were to be avoided. This attitude was in 
keeping with the Polish intelligentsia's negative attitude to the 
'politics of nostalgia'. It was symptomatic of a determination to 
avoid inflaming Polish society with potentially heated issues 
during a rational, evolutionary transition32• 
However, this conciliatory approach could also be interpreted as 
another indication of the ongoing links between the social 
democratic faction of the new government and representatives of 
the old regime. The "Magdalenka conspiracy", dealt with 
previous1T3 , was a prominent manifestation of this point of view . 
Not surprisingly this interpretation proved most popular amongst 
Walesa's supporters as they called for the acceleration of the 
decommunisation process. Lech Kaczynski, one of the leaders of 
the Centre Alliance, criticised the system of "dual power which 
allowed members of the former establishment to retain influence 
while giving a new Solidarity elite exclusive control over public 
life 1134. Adam Glapinski, another member of PC and Walesa 
supporter attacked those members of the new elite with social 
democratic pedigrees as rozowi (pinkos); as crypto-communists 
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who secretly subscribed to Marxism and were constructing a new 
nomenklatura35. 
The Walesa camp1s policy of laccelerationl was open to criticism. It 
subscribed to the simplistic populist claim that getting rid of the 
ruling elite and replacing it with Itruel representatives of the 
people would solve all of society1s ills. Several observers wondered 
how the Centre Agreement could promise to remedy the plight of 
workers, farmers and peasants and state employees alienated from 
the reform process while simultaneously advocating a more rapid 
restructuring of the economy36 along market lines. 
However, the Mazowiecki camp1s response, when it eventually 
came, offered little that contradicted the aims and structure of 
Walesa and the Centre Agreement. Both groups were presented in 
Chapter 3 as typical intellectual organisations which combined 
loose internal structures with a tendency to theorise on 
universal, moral categories37. They consisted of a loose affiliation 
of various groups which were united by support for Walesa or 
Mazowiecki rather than a specific ideology. As a result both could 
offer little more than general statements of intent which could 
not arouse internal or external criticism. ROAD, which 
championed the candidacy of Mazowiecki presented it1s program 
in July 1990; two months after the first declaration of the PC. It1s 
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founding aims amounted to a broad espousal of a liberal 
democracy and a market econo:rny38. 
As such the organisation seemed content to echo the general, 
platitudinous proclamations of itls rival. Moreover, while praising 
the achievements of the Mazowiecki government thus far, it 
seemed to accept the PCIS assertion that certain changes in the 
pace and direction of the transition process were necessary39. It 
thus called for an acceleration of the processes of 
decommunisation and privatisation, and the encouragement of 
political pluralism - demands first made by PC40. 
In conclusion, in terms of electoral programmes and specifiC 
policies, there was very little difference between the Mazowiecki 
and Wales a camps. The poverty and lack of differentiation were 
illustrated by the attacks exchanged between the two camps at 
the begiIlning of the campaign which were more personal than 
political. These assaults associated the Walesa camp with 
anti-Semitism and the Mazowiecki camp with an elitist vision of 
Polandls place in Europe. Both images served the presidential 
contest and the ambitions of both candidates poorly and sullied 
the wider image of Polish democracy. However they clearly 
signalled the conflict that existed between the lintelligentsia in 
power I and representatives of other social groups over their 
respective visions of the future Poland. 
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Anti-Semitism in the Presidential Campaign 
This section will examine the Walesa camp's association with 
anti-Semitism in the presidential campaign. The group1s recourse 
to attacking the alleged Jewish origins of some of the Mazowiecki 
camp's most prominent figures is seen as symptomatic of an 
essentially authoritarian, populist outlook. The section will stress 
the anti-intelligentsia nature of anti-Semitism in its Polish form in 
order to illustrate how the IWar at the Top' between Walesa and 
Mazowiecki was based on class conflict between the intelligentsia 
and other sections of Polish society over control of the transition 
process and over differing versions of democracy. 
Chapter 2 established anti-Semitism as a traditional under-current 
in Polish politicallife41. As a staunchly Catholic country with a 
small but influential Jewish community, anti-Semitism could be 
expected to play some part in Polish politics. It emerged into the 
mainstream at times of national turmoil (such as the mid-1930s 
and 1968) when popular frustrations could be channelled by 
authoritarian populists against particular pOlitical elites or social 
groups for political ends. In 1990, when Poland again faced a 
period of socio-economic trauma one could detect anti-Semitic 
tendencies throughout society at grass-root and elite levels. 
Evidence from polls in the early 1990s suggests that a significant 
part of Polish society were suspicious of the Jewish community. 
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At the time of the 1991 parliamentary elections Krzysztof 
J asiewicz polled voters with the following question: IISometimes 
one hears that in our country people of Jewish ancestry play too 
large a role. Do you agree with this view or not?1I The responses 
were as fOllows42: 
1. Definitely yes -
2. Rather yes -
12.0% 
20.0 
3. Neither yes or no - 15.1 
4. Rather no - 23.4 
5. Definitely no - 12.9 
6. Difficult to say - 16.5 
Thus almost as many of those polled supported the view that 
Jews were too influential as rejected it. Research published by 
Hockenos in 1993 suggested that 47% of Poles opposed the right of 
Jews to stand for parliament43. 
Anti-Semitism was apparent amongst Poland's social and political 
elites. A conflict between the hierarchy of the Catholic Church 
and Jewish representatives, sparked by Jewish protests in July 
1989 over the presence of a Carmelite convent at Auschwitz, 
launched Polish-Jewish relations as a factor in the transition 
process. For the first time in 45 years Poland was completely free 
to interpret it's war-time past and this brought tensions to the 
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surface. In August 1989 Poland1s Catholic Primate, Cardinal Jozef 
Glemp, heightened Polish-Jewish tensions in a sermon which 
defended the rights to maintain a Catholic institution within the 
walls of an extermination camp synonymous with the Jewish 
holocaust. Cardinal Glemp1s response to Jewish protests contained 
stereotypical anti-Semitic undertones, such as a reference to the 
Jewish people1s international, cosmopolitan influence44. 
There was also evidence of continued anti-Semitic feeling amongst 
Poland1s political leaders. For instance Jaroslaw Kaczynski reports 
a conversation he had in 1989 with Aleksander Bentowski, head 
of the communist peasant organisation ZSL and soon-to-be 
Minister of Justice in the Mazowiecki government, concerning 
Jacek Kuron1s ambitions to be Marshall of the Senate. Bentowski 
did not rate Kuron1s chances: IIWell you know, I have such stupid 
people in my group ... Kuron is a Jew and they will never agree to 
We mentioned previously that anti-Semitism was a basic 
component of Polish populism46. However it is important to 
explain in more detail why the issue of anti-Semitism should 
emerge during the transition period. After all Poland in 1990 was 
close to being mono-national and mono-religious. The Jewish 
community represented a small part of a numerically minute 
group of national minorities. In the absence of official statistics for 
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1990 the size of Poland's minority populations was approximate. 
Estimates for the Jewish community ranged between 5-16,00047. 
The fact remained, however, that the Jewish community of 
Poland in 1990 represented a tiny minority in a total population 
of over thirty-eight million. 
Several factors can be submitted to explain the re-appearance of 
anti-Semitism in 1990. Of course, it can be seen as part of the 
general tendency apparent in Polish society to escape from the 
trauma of transition through the politics of populism and 
nostalgia48. The economic and political problems of the present 
could be ignored by an attempt to reconstruct an idealised Second 
Republic. This era could be revised as a time of national 
independence and economic strength. A vital factor in this, so the 
logic ran, had been the dominance of the Polish=Catholic type over 
the Jews, manifested in the pre-WWIl years by state-sponsored 
anti-Semitism49. 
Related to this attempt to recreate the political order of the 
inter-war period was the desire to forget about communist rule 
which, in some quarters, was equated with Jewish interests. Since 
the arrival in Poland of persecuted and politically radical Jews in 
the late nineteenth century Marxism and communism had been 
associated with Jewish intellectuals50. The link was strengthened 
after W.W.IT when Polish Jews who had survived Nazi rule either 
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by fleeing to the Soviet Union or by being incorporated into it in 
1939 returned to swell the ranks of the PPR (Polish Workers I 
Party - forerunner of the PZPR) and the Communist Security 
Forces51. The PZPR's periodic purges of Jewish elements within the 
Party (such as in 1968) confirmed the "Zydokomuna" 
("Jewish-Communist") as the stereotypical antithesis of the 
Polak-Katolik (Polish-Catholic) modeL Thus in 1989, as Polish 
society attempted to dismiss the post-war period as an aberration 
in the nation's history, it was convenient to portray communism 
as the result of I alieni, Jewish influences in public life. 
Moreover, the suspicion that the communist elite was still 
influencing power in transition Poland was linked to the belief 
that too much political power remained in Jewish hands - the 
government facade had changed but the Jews remained in power. 
As we have seen much of the artillery of the radical Right 
centred on the interpretation of the Round Table as an agreement 
between the communist regime and crypto-communist elements of 
the Solidarity side whose most prominent representatives were of 
Jewish origin. 
From the perspective of this thesis it is most important to note 
the linkage between Polish anti-Semitism and anti-intellectualism. 
As we have seen, the Polish intelligentsia traditionally included 
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Jewish elements and this had on occasion reinforced the social 
barriers between this milieu and the rest of Polish society52. The 
fact that the milieu was also composed of numerically superior 
Catholic Poles did not detract from the potency of anti-Semitism as 
an anti-intelligentsia weapon. 
Anti-Semitism was one of the most controversial and emotive 
weapons in the Polish anti-intellectual armoury. It had been 
employed as the liberal intelligentsia1s dream of a democratic 
Second Republic degenerated into authoritarianism and again 
during the repression of the student demonstrations of 1968. Thus 
in 1990 anti-Semitism could be seen as a manifestation of many 
Poles I sense of exclusion from a government made up of Warsaw 
intellectuals53. In 1990 the journalist Tomasz Jerz reported a 
conversation he had with Polish visitors to Auschwitz on the 
subject of the Jews of Poland. In the course of the conversation 
almost every luminary of the Warsaw-based ILay Left I 
intelligentsia milieu (Geremek, Mazowiecki, Michnik, Kuron), who 
formed the core of the post-communist political elite, was 
portrayed as a Jewish enemy of Ithe people l54• 
It was in this context that Walesa and his supporters launched 
anti-Semitic attacks on leading representatives of the Mazowiecki 
camp. It was common knowledge that some of Mazowiecki1s most 
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distinguished intellectual supporters such as Adam Michnik and 
Jacek Kuron were of Jewish extraction. It is also worth noting 
that, although several of these figures had past links with the 
communists, all had suffered repression through their activities as 
prominent, dissident intellectuals under communism. Many still 
enjoyed high standing in the eyes of Polish society as a whole. 
Nevertheless at press conferences Walesa himself demanded they 
publicly stated their Jewish identity, as if it were something to 
hide55. When Walesa realised that his remarks had aroused 
considerable emotion on both sides of the issue he quickly 
distanced himself from anti-Semitic ideology. In September 1990 
he portrayed himself as a committed opponent of anti-Semitism56. 
However it was too late to rein in the forces his camp had 
attempted to exploit. 
Premier Mazowiecki himself was soon the subject of anti-Semitic 
attacks. Mazowiecki's family tree became an unlikely theme of the 
Presidential campaign. During a Solidarity Congress in April 1990 
at which Walesa was re-elected as Chairman, a small but 
well-organised group demonstrated against the IJ ewish influence I 
in Poland, especially against Mazowiecki57. Stars of David were 
painted on Mazowiecki campaign posters and as late as November 
1990 a supporter at a Walesa presidential rally claimed that 
Mazowiecki's father was Jewish58. 
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Representatives of both the Jewish, intellectual community and 
Catholic circles recognised and condemned the Walesa camp's 
manipulation of anti-Semitic tendencies to provoke an 
anti-intelligentsia, anti-government reaction in Polish society59. 
Thus the emergence of anti-Semitism in the Polish presidential 
campaign of 1990 can be at least partially explained as a 
manifestation of the anti-intelligentsia tendencies of the Walesa 
camp. As such it is further proof of the growing conflicts between 
the 'intelligentsia in power' and the rest of Polish society. The 
extent to which anti-Semitic agitation served the interests of the 
Walesa campaign was questionable. As far as the influence of the 
Catholic hierarchy is concerned, we have already seen that Poles' 
commitment to the faith did not amount to a slavish obedience to 
the hierarchy's line on social and political matters60. We have also 
seen from opinion polls that majority support for anti-Semitism as 
a feature of a pOlitical campaign could not be guaranteed. Indeed 
there were significant parts of Polish society who regarded 
anti-Semitism as a scourge of Polish politics which could sully the 
nation's image abroad at a crucial time61. 
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IEuropeannisml and the Mazowiecki Camp 
The Mazowiecki camp countered these tactics with increased 
emphasis on itls Ipro-Europeanl stance. As the election heated up 
itls identification with the broad currents of West European 
liberal democracy was contrasted with the narrow parochialism 
of the Walesa camp. Anti-Semitism was presented as one of the 
most obnoxious, anti-democratic manifestations of the PCls 
retrograde perspective. Adam Michnik claimed that anti-Semitism 
constituted a valid litmus test for undemocratic tendencies62. The 
presidential battle was concerned with Polandls future 
relationship with the democratic, Western world. Was the 
dominatin.g attitude to be enlightened or blinkered? For instance, 
in an interview with Polityka, Zbigniew Bujak refused to 
differentiate between ROAD and PC on the basis of the traditional 
Left-Right political spectrum. Instead he located ROAD liTo the 
West of Centre, meanin.g IIcloser to Western democracy, 
civilisationll63 • On television Mazowiecki associated his candidacy 
with need for IIPolandls participation in the European concert ll64• 
Durin.g the campaign leading intellectuals associated with 
Mazowieckrs candidacy organised a selective club of IEuropeansl 
to debate issues arisin.g from Polandls Ireturn to the West l. Thus, 
although one of the stated aims of PC was European integration, 
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all of the aforementioned developments firmly associated ROAD 
and Mazowiecki1s candidacy with a IEuropean l perspective. 
As we have seen this was in keeping with the ethos of the Polish 
intelligentsia which had always included an adulation of Western 
values. Moreover, lofty discussions on the place of Poland in the 
European cultural transition reflected the intelligentsia1s 
tendency to theorise on lofty, universal planes rather than 
become embroiled in the messy business of Ibread and butter l 
political issues. The appeal of the return to Europe l to society at 
large was more doubtful. The xenophobia of largely rural societies 
was evident in Poland1s traditional suspicion of Western Europe. 
In 1989 this insular current had been at a low ebb with the 
prospect of Poland1s swift integration into the more prosperous 
West. However, in 1990 it became clear that the West was not 
going to provide serious help nor integrate Poland rapidly into 
the EU. The economic austerity being experienced by Polish 
society was a direct result of the strictures of the Balcerowicz 
Plan - a plan that Western institutions and advisers had helped to 
shape. As a result, although Poles were generally aware of the 
necessity of strong links with the West, they were wary and 
mindful of the past failures of the West to support the cause of 
Polish freedom. They were suspicious of Western and especially 
German economic motives. Would Western involvement mean 
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economic exploitation? A poll from 1990 carried out by 
Wladyslaw Adamski concerning opinions on Poland's relationship 
with East and West reflected this ambivalence (see Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6: Opinions on Poland's relations with East and West in 
1990 
Percentage 
of answers 
Opinions on Decidedly Rather yes Rather not Decidedly It's difficult to 
[poland's yes not say 
elations with 
he East and 
West 
The West 15.9 24.8 30.3 8.4 20.6 
aiways 
exploited us 
The West is 21.4 24.3 20.6 8.3 15.5 
morally 
obliged to be 
of assistance to 
Poland 
The East 58.6 28.1 3.4 1.2 8.7 
always 
exploited us 
The East is 38.0 28.2 13.6 5.0 15.1 
morally 
obliged to be 
of assistance to 
Poland 
Nobody will 53.3 28.6 9.7 1.3 7.0 
help us, we can 
ely on 
ourselves 
Poles expect 40.9 35.2 11.4 1.9 10.7 
00 much from 
pther countries 
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Source: Adamski W (ed) Societal Conflict and Systemic Change: 
The Case of Poland 1980-1992 Warsaw IF is 1993 p164. 
Although the majority of respondents felt Poland had been abused 
by the East there was a sense of bei:ng wronged by the West in 
the past amongst a significant proportion. Expectation of political 
and economic assistance was mixed with a suspicion of Western 
motives65. As a result the Mazowiecki camp's concentration on 
the 'European plane I was a dangerous electoral tactic. It 
threatened to increase the alienation of ordinary Poles 
pre-occupied with day to day survival from the ruling elite which 
was theorisi:ng on a topic which at best engendered apathy and at 
worst hostility66. Just as with the Wales a camp's association with 
anti-Semitism, the Mazowiecki group1s espousal of 'European' 
values was of doubtful electoral value67. 
The clash between the anti-Semitism of the Walesa camp and the 
'Europeanism' of the Mazowiecki camp was a version of the 
inter-war conflict between different nationalist and socialist 
intellectual strands (represented by Dmowski's and Pilsudski) 
over their visions of independent Poland. As we have noted., 
neither was particularly democratic because they were intolerant 
of certain groups in society (in Dmowski's case ethnic minorities 
and in Pilsudski's case those who did not subscribe to his vision of 
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'Polishness(68). Both Walesa and Mazowiecki could be accused of 
similar intolerance and of failing to address the 'bread and butter' 
issues in transition Poland. Evidence suggests that the two 
candidates' substitution of these pre-occupations for meaningful 
political debate, alienated a significant part of the electorate. One 
of the most prominent manifestations of this process was the 
Tyminski phenomenon69. 
The Campaigns on Polish Television 
The purpose of this section is to examine the portrayal of 
Mazowiecki on TV during the course of the campaign. The 
Premier failed to project a positive image and the Mazowiecki 
camp's poor handling of the media was a direct result of the 
intelligentsia's elitist and idealistic elements. Consequently this 
issue was representative of the general difficulties of the 
'intelligentsia in power' which led to it's isolation from the rest of 
Polish society and it's eventual downfall. The Mazowiecki camp's 
limitation will be highlighted through comparison with the more 
popular image conveyed by Walesa. 
The role of the Polish media in the campaign deserves attention 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, as this thesis is concerned with 
the development of civil society in Poland and the function of the 
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intellectual, the part played by the Polish media in 1990 has 
particular significance. In democratic countries the mass media 
plays a vital part in the political process, especially at election 
times. It is mainly through the independent, objective press and 
TV that parties and candidates make their policies known to the 
electorate. Likewise it is through those channels that voters can 
best register their opinions on issues and see them discussed. 
Further, in the West the media is one of the major means by 
which intellectuals can influence public debate and shape 
relations between state and society. As a mediatory organ 
between SOCiety and state and an arena for public debate, the 
mass media forms an important part of the functions of Icivil 
societyl as understood by this thesis. 
For the Mazowiecki government the mass media was particularly 
important. The administration regarded itself as a patriotic 
emanation of the Polish nation and, as we have seen, it 
continually addressed the nation as a whole. As a government of 
the Ibest and brightest I and proponents of civil society, the 
Mazowiecki administration was aware of the media1s vital 
functions in Western political systems (some of its most 
prominent members, such as Michnik and Turowicz, were 
newspaper editors). Thus the Mazowiecki camp could have been 
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expected to pay particular attention it's relationship with the 
mass media. 
Secondly, the presidential campaigns of 1990 were the first to be 
mounted on a national-scale in the conditions of completely free 
elections and through television free from state regulation. 
Although the Mazowiecki government was formally in control of 
TV, it did not exercise the same restrictions as previous 
communist regimes. For instance, each of the six main candidates 
were given five minutes of television coverage every evening. 
Thirdly the transformation of the political scene was still at a 
very early stage. The candidates for the presidency lacked 
nation-wide party organisations through which they could appeal 
to the electorate on a nation-wide scale. The ability of the media 
to address Polish society as a whole was thus significant. Finally, 
the lack of SUbstance apparent in the camps of Mazowiecki and 
Walesa in terms of policy differences (see above) concentrated 
voters' attention on the personalities and public images of both 
candidates. Obviously Polish television was the main medium for 
conveying these public images. The following analysis refers to J. 
Bralczyk's and M. Mrosowski's study of the Mazowiecki and 
Walesa camp's use of Polish television to project their candidate's 
image70. 
608 
There were some similarities between the Mazowiecki and Walesa 
campaigns mounted through Polish television. Firstly, in terms of 
format, both candidates tended to avoid making many personal 
policy statements; relying instead on their high personal prestige 
in Polish society. This was in keeping with the lack of a detailed 
political programme in both camps and the similarity of their 
electoral platforms. Instead, supporters of Mazowiecki and Walesa 
testified to their personal strengths and qualities. Montage 
sequences reminded audiences of the prominent part played by 
the candidates in the fall of communism and the advent of the 
transition. 
However, when one compares the tone of the two television 
campaigns, difference emerge. The campaign mounted by the 
Walesa camp on television resembled in tone the popUlar, lup-beat l 
modelS of contemporary, Western electioneering more closely than 
it1s avowedly Ipro-Westernl rival. This is because Walesa1s populist 
electoral platform suited this style of electioneering. He was 
continually presented as a Iman of the people 171. Walesa stressed 
this popular image by frequently addressing the audience directly 
and repeating the phrase III am strong through your strength and 
wise through your wisdomll72. The model of a strong president 
with direct ties to Ithe peoplel was thus emphasised. 
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Simplistic solutions were given for the problems facing transition 
Poland. Active participation in political and economic life by 
everyone in Polish society would lead to profit a bility and 
democracy. Although, as we have seen, the logic of these promises 
could be questioned, their influence on a society experiencing 
severe economic austerity cannot be underestimated. The Walesa 
campaign also utilised it's candidate's humour and sense of irony 
to some effect. Elements of ant i-Wale sa propaganda, such as the 
Mazowiecki camp's portrayal of him with a menacing axe were 
adopted by the Walesa camp as humorous, pro-Walesa symbols. 
In sum, in it's populist, positive and light-hearted approach to the 
television campaign, the Walesa camp reproduced some of the 
features of successful, Western-style electioneering73. 
The tone of the Mazowiecki's campaign was markedly different. 
Mazowiecki's montage sequences most frequently presented him 
as a man removed from the people: a Iman of State', Premier of 
the first non-communist Government and close acquaintance of 
other luminaries of the Solidarity movement. This associated the 
candidate with the political elite rather than with Polish society 
in general; a strategy perfectly in keeping with the elitist 
elements of the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia but out of step 
with modern electioneering techniques. 
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The Mazowiecki camp was also reluctant to indulge in the 
positive, simplistic assessments of Poland' s situation presented in 
Walesa's broadcasts. The economic difficulties of the transition 
process were treated as unfortunate but inevitable74. It appeared 
that the ex-dissidents of the Mazowiecki camp interpreted Walesa's 
appeals to societal mood through television as another 
manifestation of the group1s inherent populism. It also regarded 
these tactics as similar to the I dishonest I manipulation of 
information and the media under communist control. As 
representatives of the Polish intelligentsia they were committed to 
presenting the truth as they saw it. Thus they gave a sombre, 
realistic presentation of Poland' s problems. 
Mazowiecki's personal demeanour during these broadcasts 
matched this uncomfortable message. He lacked the humour and 
self-irony of Walesa and seemed uneasy in the glare of publicity 75. 
The Premier's performance was such that during the course of 
the campaign he became associated with a tortoise from the 
"polish ZOO" television cabaret76. Mazowiecki's inability to 
communicate effectively with the society he deigned to lead was 
emblematic of the alienation of the 'intelligentsia in power I from 
society in 1990. 
The "lack of will to win" was a direct result of the Polish 
intellectual's political dilettantism: the genuine belief that he had 
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a moral right and duty to rule. Mazowiecki's background should 
have been enough to convince the electorate of his suitability for 
office without recourse to demeaning pOlitical competition in the 
public arena. In any case intellectuals are not best equipped for 
the cut and thrust of everyday political competition and 
electioneering77. 
In conclusion the intelligentsia pedigree of the Mazowiecki 
government was apparent in the Premier's presidential campaign 
and it accounted for many of it's weaknesses. While Walesa seemed 
to have accepted the need to engage society as the key to 
successful media campaigns in modern democracies the 
Mazowiecki camp with it's subdued tone, unpleasant message and 
attempt to portray Walesa as a scapegoat appeared to the 
populace more as a reminder of the interminable and vindictive 
political broadcasts of the communist past. Just as with that 
other organ of civil society, political parties, the relationship 
between the 'intelligentsia in power' and the media was 
ambivalent and uneasy. Both political plurality and a free media 
were regarded as vital for the functioning of a democratic civil 
society. However both were also regarded by the intelligentsia as 
potential centres from where the forces of populism could 
threaten it's vision of the transition to democracy in Poland. 
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Despite these stylistic differences, the campaigns of Mazowiecki 
and Walesa were, as we have seen, similar in terms of content. 
The resultant exchange of personal insults and employment of 
anti-Semitic and pro-European rhetoric alienated sections of Polish 
society who were also disillusioned at the acrimonious 
disintegration of the Solidarity movement. The following section 
will explain the meteoric rise of the unknown Stanislaw Tyminski 
as the direct result of this situation. 
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(iii) The Tyminski Phenomenon 
The weaknesses of the Walesa and particularly the Mazowiecki 
campaigns provide much of the explanation for the rise of 
Stanislaw Tyminski as a I dark-horse I candidate in the race for the 
Presidency. We have already noted the programmatic vagueness of 
the Walesa and Mazowiecki camps. In addition ROADls tendency to 
indulge in elitist ruminations on the theme of IEuropel was 
continually criticised by Walesa1s followers while the latent 
anti-Semitism of certain strands associated with PC was 
denounced by Mazowiecki1s group. This exchange proved mutually 
damaging78. 
Tyminski owed much of his popularity to the general sense of 
disillusionment with Solidarity politicians caused by this personal 
in-fighting79. More pertinentlY for this thesis Tyminski1s sudden 
popularity illustrates the alienation of a significant part of Polish 
society from the Mazowiecki government. Table 4.7 illustrates 
Polish society1s attitude to the leaders of the reform process before 
the Presidential campaign began. 
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Table 4.7: Nett Support For Public Figures November '89 - March 
'90 (0/0) 
November January 90 February March 90 
1989 90 
T Mazowiecki 93 88 84 65 
L Walesa 90 76 67 56 
W J aruzelski 54 47 36 32 
L Balcerowicz No data 44 39 21 
source: Gazeta Wyborcza 17/4/90. 
Those polled were asked to express whether the activities of the 
above-mentioned public figures were concordant with their own 
interests. The relative nett support was calculated by deducting 
the % who said no from the % who said yes. One of the most 
obvious conclusions to be drawn from the above table was the 
general decline in public support for those people prominent in 
the transition process. In. this way one can detect a rising tide of 
social discontent with the effects of systemic and economic reform 
and dissatisfaction with those who were associated with it. 
Analysing the results from the perspective of the presidential 
elections one can state that even in the first few months of 1990 
the path was being cleared for the arrival of a populist, maverick 
candidate such as Stan Tyminski80. 
An examination of Tyminski's electoral platform supports this 
argument. Tyminski was regarded as an establishment outsider; 
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untainted by association with either the despised old regime or 
the unpopular transition process. In addition, his personal 
financial success, achieved in the West was important. IDs 
attraction to a society which still nursed an idealistic conception 
of the West (regardless of its attitude to transition Poland) as a 
land of opportunity stood in contrast to the domestic economic 
hardship engendered by the Government-led transition. 
Ironically, as we have seen, the Polish intelligentsia had 
contributed significantly to this ideal vision of the West. 
Tyminski's campaign was vague and at times bizarre. Attacks on 
Mazowiecki and Balcerowicz accusing them of "treason" were 
mixed with accusation that foreign forces wanted to make Poland 
an "enclave of white slaves"81. Questions on his own political 
background (rumours of links with the communist security pOlice 
abounded) and his proposals for economic reform were either 
avoided or answered with references to the vague generalities 
contained in his book "Holy Dogs". Nevertheless Tyminski's 
electoral campaign stressed the candidate's credentials as an 
economic success in the West and an establishment outsider; both 
factors which appealed to the most disaffected sections of the 
Polish electorate. Tyminski's success was thus directly linked to 
the level of popular frustration with the transition process and 
society's alienation from the 'intelligentsia in power'. 
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An analysis of the votes garnered by Mazowiecki confirm that his 
appeal, his vision of the transition process, was limited to the 
intelligentsia constituency. As such an analysis of the vote can 
serve as a fitting conclusion to a Chapter 4 which have examined 
the isolation of the intelligentsia from other social groups in 
Polish society during the Mazowiecki period 
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(iv) Analysis of the Results of the Presidential Election 
The analysis of the results of the Presidential election which 
follows will illustrate the Mazowiecki camp's failure to appeal to 
an electorate outside it's natural intelligentsia constituency. The 
Walesa and Tyminski vote will be revealed as a much more 
articulate criticism of the conduct of the 'intelligentsia in power' 
than Mazowiecki's supporters conceded. 
The proceeding examination of the results of the 1990 Presidential 
elections is based primarily on information gathered on the day of 
the elections by OBOP in association with the German 
organisation INF AS and on Thomas Zukowski's analysis, 'The 
Results of the Presidential Voting: The Polish Political Map in 
Autumn 1990' in Dlaczego Tak Glosowano? p61-70. The 
examination shows the extent to which the Mazowiecki 
government alienated sections of Polish society. This alienation 
referred to specific regions and social groups. The high level of 
a bstention, the unexpected popularity of Tyminski and 
Mazowiecki's inability to challenge Walesa all paid testament to 
this. A close examination of the socio-economic and geographical 
background of the voters for Tyminski, Walesa and Mazowiecki 
points to the failure of the 'intelligentsia in power' to realise its 
project of civil society based on a broad societal front. 
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The actual results of the elections were as follows: 
25/11/90 - 1st Round of the elections - 16.7 million out of a 
possible 27.55 million voted - 60.6% 
Roman Bartoszcze: 
potential) 
1.1Bm (7.2% of actual votes, 4.3% of 
Wlodimierz Cimoszewicz: 1.15m (9.2% and 5.5%) 
2.97m (lB.l % and 10.8%) 
O.41m (2.5% and 1.5%) 
3.BOm (23.1% and 13.8%) 
6.57m (40.0% and 23.9%) 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki: 
Leszek Moczulski: 
Stanislaw Tyminski: 
Lech Walesa: 
9/12/90 - Second Round of the Elections - 14.65m people out of 
27.44m entitled voted (53.4%). 
Stanislaw Tyminski: 
Lech Walesa: 
Who Did Not Vote? 
3.6Bm (25.8% and 13.4%) 
10.62m (74.3% and 3B.7%) 
Around 10.8 million of the people entitled to vote in the first 
round of the Presidential election did not participate. A certain, 
rather small section of those were the result of spoiled papers or 
mistakes in electoral procedures. Others were people unable to 
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vote through illness or travel difficulties. However the vast 
majority consisted of those people who had made the conscious 
decision to stay at home on election day As such these can be 
regarded. as people alienated most from the electoral campaign 
and the politics of the transition period. 
Statistics reveal the abstentions were greatest in the villages 
(around 42%). This reflected the continued influence of the 
traditional rural/urban and intelligentsia/peasant dichotomies 
examined earlier82. Mapping the vote also confirms the depth of 
regional differences in transition Poland. Participation in the vote 
differed according to particular regions. This is to be expected if 
we remember that the regions were experiencing various levels of 
economic development and social cohesion at that time. Those 
regions which were suffering most from the consequences of 
economic reform, where the influence of Solidarity and the 
Catholic Church was weakest produced the lowest turn-outs. This 
pattern referred primarily to regions in the North and East of 
the country. On the other hand the turn-out was higher in the 
urban conurbation's of Central and Southern Poland. 
The proposition that a significant section of non-voters were 
registering their disaffection from the politics of the transition 
period is confirmed by research of public opinion. The results of 
pre-election research by OBOP showed that around 2/3 of those 
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who did not vote on the 25th November did not take part in the 
territorial elections either. In 1989-90 there thus emerged what 
one could call a IIsilent minorityll who as a rule did not vote. 
The Stanislaw Tyminski Vote 
Analysis of the Tyminski vote supports the argument that a 
significant section of Polish society had become estranged from the 
Solidarity and Mazowiecki-led transition process. Generally 
speaking, Tyminski's support came from those socio-economic and 
geographical areas where turn-out for the elections was lowest. 
People supporting Tyminski were least likely to have participated 
in the territorial elections (according to pre-election research by 
OBOP 2/5 of Tyminski's voters did not go to the local elections). 
This shows how the phenomenon of the mobilisation of a section 
of IIpassive and apoliticalll people by the presidential elections was 
Significantly related to the emergence of Tyminski. 
The profile of Tyminski's constituency matched those groups in 
Polish society which had lost most from the reforms and those 
which had traditionally been distant from the political elites and 
intelligentsia circles of Warsaw. Tyminski's vote was dominated by 
inhabitants of small and medium-sized towns (half of his voters 
lived in towns of 11-100,000 people). In the cities traditionally 
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associated with the intelligentsia - Warsaw and Cracow - he 
received less than 11% and 8% respectively. Tyminski was most 
often voted for in regions suffering from high unemployment. In 
regions where the Solidarity tradition was weak Tyminski 
received around 10-15 points more than in centres with a more 
pro-Solidarity outlook. 
Tyminski was popular amongst younger voters83 . People of 35 
years and below constituted 55% of his supporters, compared to 
35 % with Walesa and 40% with Mazowiecki. In terms of 
socio-economic background, the Tyminski voter again 
corresponded with those categories which had suffered most as a 
result of the transition. Workers accounted for 40% and poorly 
qualified white-collar workers 24% of his vote. He was least 
popular amongst the intelligentsia (5 %). This reflected the 
milieu1s disdain for Tyminski1s crude, populist campaign. 
If we combine regional variations with those regarding age and 
profession, then the disparities in Tyminski1s popularity and the 
social polarisation he profited from become clear. Amongst young 
workers in underdeveloped areas he obtained 40% of the vote, 
whereas amongst the intelligentsia from more developed regions 
he got less than 4%. 
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According to polls Tyminski's voters were mostly critical of 
Solidarity. They were against privatisation and the existence of 
unemployment. OnlY 23% of them approved of the Balcerowicz 
Plan. The majority of Tyminski's voters were opposed to the 
banning of abortion and compulsory religious education in 
schools. They also demanded a definite limitation of the role of the 
Church and priests in everyday life (around 70%). These were 
people for whom all of Solidarity's proposed models of civil society 
- the intelligentsia's 'community of European citizens', the Trade 
Union's vision of worker organisation, the CathOlic Church's 
'community of believers I - held no relevance84. 
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The Walesa Vote 
An analysis of the Walesa vote in the elections confirms the 
isolation of the intelligentsia within the Solidarity camp. While 
Walesa appealed to the worker, peasant and Catholic strands of 
the Solidarity tradition, Mazowiecki's popularity was limited to 
his own intelligentsia milieu. Although Walesa was able to draw 
on a variety of sources of support his was predominantly a 
Catholic, working-class constituency85. Around 40% of workers 
favoured him over the other six candidates. He was least popular 
amongst the intelligentsia (29%) as well as students (25%). 
While the Walesa vote generally traversed the urban/rural and 
Warsaw/provincial divides he was most often voted for in areas of 
the former Galicia, the Congress Kingdom and districts known for 
their Solidarity tradition (Gdansk, Wroclaw). These were regions 
of low criminality and a high level of religiosity, supporting 
Solidarity in the parliamentary elections of 1989 and the 
territorial elections of 1990. A positive link was discernible 
between voting for Walesa and declaring belief in God and 
regularly practising religion 
The opinion polls taken at election time illustrate the importance 
of the social, economic and political issues which have been 
presented in this thesis as catalysts for the split in the 'Solidarity' 
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camp. People voting for 'Walesa's way' combined a generally 
liberal vision of a "healthy economy" with a traditional, 
conservative vision of social life. They were most stridently 
opposed to abortion and supportive of religious education in 
schools. They supported a prominent role for the Solidarity trade 
union and were rather critical of the Mazowiecki government 
and the Balcerowicz Plan (only 41 % supported it). 
The relative unimportance of Walesa's electoral platform in 
comparison to his personal image was illustrated by the fact that 
his supporters rarelY referred to his program (which 
differentiated them from the followers of other candidates). It was 
most important to recognise him as a "true Pole" (37%). Thus the 
populist campaign run by the Walesa campaign succeeded in 
portraying him as a 'man of the people', in contrast to the 
disinterested Warsaw coterie of intellectuals. 
625 
The Tadeusz Mazowiecki Vote. 
While Walesa found popUlarity amongst broad sections of Polish 
society, the sources of support for Mazowiecki were limited in 
socio-economic and geographical terms to intelligentsia bases. This 
was symptomatic of the isolation of the Mazowiecki government 
as the 'intelligentsia in power' and the rejection of it's vision of 
the new Poland. 
The salience of the urban/rural, intelligentsia/peasant divide was 
illustrated by the fact that only 7% of the electorate in rural 
areas gave him support. As the size of town or city grew so did 
support for the Premier. Consequently support for Mazowiecki 
showed clear regional differentiation, with the more developed 
regions, which were benefiting most from the transition, tending 
to side with Mazowiecki. The Premier had most voters in the 
Western part of the country (the Recovered Territory, 
Wielkopolska), and above all in urban areas, particularly Warsaw. 
From analysis of the links between supporting Mazowiecki and 
the characteristics of territories and their communities one can 
say that this candidate was supported by the most affluent, 
urbanised, economically developed regions with substantial 
intelligentsia populations. 
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A study of the socio-economic background of the Mazowiecki vote 
clearly confirms him as the candidate of the intelligentsia (he 
took first place in the intelligentsia vote, receiving 42 % of the 
votes), the students (37%), private businessmen (25%) and 
white-collar workers (24%). His worst performance was amongst 
workers (11%) and farmers (only 5%). 
Research on the opinions of Mazowiecki's voters on social, pOlitical 
and economic issues also associated them strongly with the agenda 
of the intelligentsia established in this thesis. They were advocates 
of liberal economics (privatisation, acceptance of the inevitability 
of unemployment) and a moderately liberal vision of community 
life (they were against compulsory religious education in schools, 
they did not want a law prohibiting abortion, they were least 
likely of all electorates to support the death penalty). They were 
pro-Government and moderately pro-Solidarity. 
The socio-economic homogeneity of the Mazowiecki support led 
some sociologists to conclude that his voters represented the first 
social group in post-communist Poland to act politically in a 
'Western way' i.e. to vote in accordance with their social status 
and/or economic or social interests rather than vote for specific 
political figUres or according to general, nation-wide criteria such 
as religion, anti-communism etc.86. 
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This was encouraging for the intellectuals of the Mazowiecki 
government who were trying to build a Poland where competing 
interests were expressed within a unitary civil society. However, 
given the fact that the intelligentsia remained a narrow milieu in 
Poland, Mazowiecki's lack of support amongst the workers and 
peasants and his low popularity in certain regions proved fata187. 
In conclusion, analysis of the 1990 presidential elections supports 
the contention that the fall of the Mazowiecki government can be 
explained, at least partially, by the conflict between the 
'intelligentsia in power I and other social groups over the shape of 
post-communist Poland. The 'intelligentsia in power I was unable 
and unwilling to accommodate the different agendas apparent in 
Polish society in its attempt to lead the process of democratisation. 
Mazowiecki fought the campaign as an intellectual and his 
electorate was limited largely to the intelligentsia milieu. 
Walesa's defeat of Mazowiecki in the election had profound effects 
on the transition process. As anticipated, Walesa immediately 
attempted to strengthen presidential powers. This prompted 
conflicts with parliament and government and constitutional 
crisis (a danger referred to in our examination of presidential 
models). He demanded more power over domestic affairs over and 
above his extensive authority in the fields of defence and foreign 
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affairs. Walesa clashed several times with post-commumst 
governments and parliaments. He called for powers to dissolve the 
Sejm because of the perceived weakness of government coalitions. 
For instance, in early 1995 he claimed that the Pawlak-led 
SLD/PSL coalition was not moving fast enough on the issue of 
privatisation. This eventually led to the dismissal of Premier 
Pawlak88 . Conflict between government, legislature and president 
obviously hampered the establishment of a democratic polity. 
Walesa1s attempt to concentrate authority in his person ran 
contrary to the diffusion of political power which, I have argued, 
is central to the development of a democratic, civil society. Instead 
it suited the populist vision of a IGreat Manl fighting for basic, 
Polish values. 
In addition, the defeat of Mazowiecki signalled the end of the 
intelligentsia1s most concerted bid to exercise political control 
over the transition process. In the aftermath of the humiliating 
not just by Walesa but Tyminski, Mazowiecki handed in his 
government1s resignation. Typically the Premier and his 
supporters equated the election result as a defeat for democracy. 
After all, in the opinion of the Polish intelligentsia, it was the only 
native exponent of Western democracy. Mazowiecki handed in 
his government1s resignation as if, in the words of one 
commentator, IIhe had taken offence at the nation1s decision ll89. 
From his base in the Polish parliament Bronislaw Geremek 
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castigated the same society whose democratic impulses his 
colleagues had previously acclaimed90. 
Chapter 4 has charted the deterioration of state/society relations 
in Mazowiecki's Poland. The different, and often conflicting, 
political cultures within Polish society emerged fully onto the 
scene in 1990 when the country's post-communist destiny was 
being decided. The intelligentsia, far from being able to synthesise 
these differences into a unified, tolerant pOlitical culture was very 
much part of this process. The etatism of the milieu meant that it 
was unable to play the mediating role between state and society 
which in the West contributed to the rise of democratic civil 
societies. Instead the long-standing tension between state and 
society in Poland was magnified by the traditional hostilities 
between the intelligentsia and other social categories. 
The isolation of the milieu was manifested in the failure of its 
attempt to build an integrative ideology for post-communist 
Poland. The vision of Poland's Ireturn to Europe' served only to 
illustrate the gap between the "intelligentsia in power" and the 
rest of Polish society in 1990. In terms of the consolidation of 
democracy the gap between state and society was threatening to 
the consolidation of democracy in Poland. At best Polish society in 
1990 retained the political passivity of the communist period. This 
attitude obviously undermines the efficacy of political institutions, 
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regardless of how democratic their design. At worst, the gap could 
be exploited by populists to mobilise Poles in radical opposition to 
the state. Once again this type of political movement was inimical 
to the tolerance and plurality of Western-style civil societies. 
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Conclusion to Thesis: The. Post-C~mmunist _Intelligentsia ---.9-n<:t Civil 
~ociety 
The thesis set two, related tasks: to examine the dynamic of 
state/society relations in Poland's early transition period from 
communism to liberal democracy, and to evaluate the role of the 
'intelligentsia in power' in this process. We charted the changing 
relationship between state and society in early transition Poland 
from three perspectives. Firstly we were mindful of the 
consequences these processes held for the consolidation of 
democracy in that country. However we were also conscious of 
the influence Polish events had on broadly comparable situations 
elsewhere in post-communist East-Central Europe. The theSis was 
also concerned with the contribution the unprecedented events in 
Poland in 1989-90 had on contemporary, Western political theory. 
The fundamental question which united these three perspectives 
was simple: how can a balanced, democratic model of state/society 
relations be achieved? In other words, what is the glue that binds 
a community of citizens to its political rulers in a mutually 
beneficial way? The comparative historical approach to analysing 
democratisation served us well in this respect. It contends that 
studying the historical experience of given categories can provide 
insights into the democratisation process. Our examination of the 
historical development of state/society relations can explain many 
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of the most significant political events in the late communist and 
early transition period. 
This approach produced four possible solutions to our quest for 
an equitable model of modern citizenship: co-operative, neo-liberal, 
nationalist and republican. The co-operative solution holds that 
citizenship should be concerned solely with the individual's 
economic activity. The power of the state should be limited to 
guaranteeing workers freedom of production. Accord.in.g to Marx 
wider political issues and democratic values are only important so 
long as the struggle of labour for dominance continues. 
The experience of the Solidarity Trade Union provides an insight 
into the strengths and weaknesses of the co-operative model in 
terms of democratisation. On the one hand the anti-communist 
movement was based on the militancy of Polish workers and their 
desire to be rid of interference form the communist regime. 
Demands for self-government in the work-place were at the heart 
of Solidarity's republican model of self-government dealt with 
below91• The programme of Solidarity's first National Congress in 
1980 stated "Genuine self-management of employees will be the 
basis of the self-governing republic"92. 
However, in terms of constructing a modern, democratic model of 
citizenship the co-operative solution is also flawed. In complex, 
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contemporary societies it is unfeasible to limit the state to 
economic regulation and the presence of highly differentiated 
work-forces makes economic regulation without political conilict 
unrealistic. In practice states exercising power in the name of the 
workers (as the Polish communist regime did) rapidly move to 
the foreground and state regulation has superseded economic 
self-management. 
The co-operative model's preference for economic rather than civil 
rights was apparent in the Mazowiecki period. The Polish labour 
movement placed priority on paternalism, welfarism and social 
security. It demanded exclusive treatment from the state and 
struggled to come to terms with the fact that trade unions were 
just one type of association tryIDg to influence the 
decision-making process. The populist vision of workers and 
peasants, their subscription to the 'will of the people I undermined 
the role of state institutions in the development of democracy 
parties, parliaments and governments. The struggle of the labour 
movement to come to terms with the post-communist condition, 
particularly the introduction of the free market, was illustrated 
by strike activity, Solidarity's identity crisis93 and the 
marginalisation and radicalisation of its trade union splinter 
groups. The tensions between economic and political objectives 
and related clashes between worker and intelligentsia-based 
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strands of Solidarity have returned to prominence since the 
Solidarity/UW coalition government took office in 1997. 
Similar tensions were evident to varying degrees in East-Central 
Europe, although the tradition of worker radicalism was weaker 
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In Hungary tripartism between 
trade unions, employers associations and the government 
guaranteed the labour movement some say in the political process 
but reports suggest declining union membership and 
fragmentation as unemployment rises. In Czechoslovakia 
tripartism also eased Trade Union tensions created by the 
transition but even here the labour movement has become 
increasi.n.gly restive as the workers l standard of living declines. 
Thus the experience co-operative ideals in Poland and East-Central 
Europe contributed little to the resolution of worker 
egalitarianism into an acceptance of the conditions of modern 
liberal democracies. The harmonisation of liberal and egalitarian 
aspects of citizenship remains a challenge. 
The second potential solution to our quest for a democratic model 
of citizenship is provided by neoliberalism. This suggests that 
equitable stae/society relations can be achieved simply by 
ensuri.n.g the free play of market forces. Democratic freedom is 
equated with freedom of consumer choice and the state1s role is to 
guarantee this condition. This strand emerged in Poland in the 
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second half of the 1980s with the continued decline of the 
communist command economy, doubts over the efficacy of 
worker-led protests and the rise of neo-liberalist administrations 
in Britain and the United States. Elements of the technical or 
professional intelligentsia in the anti-communist movement and 
communist reform camps came to view the creation of free 
market conditions as vital to Poland1s future development. In the 
Mazowiecki period representatives of the neo-liberal strand (such 
as Balcerowicz) took up prominent pOlitical positions and with 
the plight of the economy worsening and pressure from Western 
institutions the economy was liberalised instantaneously. 
The deficiencies of neo-liberalism as the base of democratic 
citizenship were apparent in Poland from the outset. While 
freedom of consumer choice is a necessary aspect of democracy it 
is not inherently democratic. Consumers come to the market with 
unequal resources. If citizenship is based on the individual1s 
activity in the market-place alone then it follows that many will 
be excluded from full status. Moreover, as with the co-operative 
model - the power of the state is theoretically limited but 
practically increased by neo-liberalism. Market rules and 
regulations and provision for social welfare must be enforced by a 
strong central agency. This model of state/SOCiety relations does 
not make for healthy citizenship because individuals relate to 
political authority according to rational market criteria rather 
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than through moral obligation. Concentration on economic issues 
again neglects the multitude of social and pOlitical issues which 
influence contemporary societies. In Britain and the United States 
neo-liberal administrations alienated significant sections of their 
societies and sparked serious unrest. In transition Poland, where 
the distribution of resources was radically unequal tension on 
state/society relations contributed to the radicalisation of the 
political scene and threatened to destabilise the state. In Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia the pace of economic liberalisation also 
divided the reform camp and alienated citizens. The neo-liberal 
approach to transition was a major factor in the re-emergence of 
former communists. Under the banner of social democracy they 
promised to ease the pace and lessen the depredations of market 
liberalisation and became a significant political force at the 
expense of the former anti-communist oppositionists. 
The third solution to our quest for a new model of citizenship is 
nationalism. According to this a citizen's loyalty to the state is 
guaranteed by his or her membership of a historic, national 
community. Nationalism was historically linked to democratic 
aspirations, where the struggle for national freedoms and 
individual freedoms were united. This was certainly the case of 
Poland from partition times up to the late communist period. 
National sentiments were mobilised by the anti-communist 
opposition by portraying the authoritarian regime as an alien 
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I Asiatic I system imposed on Western, democratically-inclined 
Poland. 
However, in terms of the consolidation of democracy, the 
nationalist solution has obvious weaknesses. Once liberation is 
achieved nationalism does not define what type of state, society or 
economy should develop. What is worse, in times of hardship 
nationalism attempts to simplify the relationship between state 
and society according to the rule of the Iwill of the people l • 
Populist nationalism can be channelled against other nations and 
especially internal I enemies I and minorities. Again these dangers 
were apparent in transition POland. Economic austerity and 
pOlitical uncertainty mobilised the chauvinistic, anti-Semitic 
strand of Polish nationalism which sought to define the rights of 
citizenship in strictly limited terms. The Catholic Church1s 
emphasis of Poland1s national-Catholic identity threatened the 
freedom of ethnic, and religious minorities and limited the rights 
of women in transition Poland. 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary also witnessed the rise of populist 
nationalism and in both cases it threatened the establishment of 
liberal, democratic relations between state and society. The most 
dramatic illustration of this process was the break-up of the 
Czechoslovakian state in 1993. The separation of the Czech and 
Slovak lands occurred through the manipulation of nationalism 
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by Premiers Meciar and Klaus for political ends. Opinion polls at 
the time suggested that the majority of the population was 
committed to a common state but attempts at co-operation and 
political negotiation were overridden by the emotional intensity 
of nationalism. At the same time discussion about the split of 
Czechoslovakia dwarfed other pressing political and constitutional 
issues. Slovak nationalism subsequently developed increasing 
hostility towards Hun.garian and gypsy minorities and the 
influence of the Catholic Church in the public sphere was marked 
by the limitation of abortion rights. The rights of the Czech 
Republic's gypsy population also became the subject of 
controversy94. Although post-communist Hun.gary was ethnically 
homogeneous, the limitation of the rights of Hun.garian minorities 
in Slovakia and Romania meant that ethnic nationalism played a 
large part in the politics of the transition. The Hun.garian 
Democratic Forum, the dominant pOlitical force of the early 
transition period, included extreme, right-Wing nationalist 
elements (e.g. vice-president Istvan Csurka). 
The basic problem with all these proposed solutions to our quest 
for a democratic model of state/society relations - co-operative, 
neo-liberal and nationalist - is their exclusivity. Each is intolerant 
of other perspectives and this restricts their vision of citizenship. 
Complex, contemporary societies are comprised of men and 
women, acting as individuals or as part of associations. Their 
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activities can be motivated by a variety of overlapping social, 
political and economic issues and the modern, democratic state 
ought to be able to respond to them. 
This brings us to the last potential solution to our quest: the civil 
society argument. It suggests that democratic state/society 
relations ought to be based on civic or republican ideals - on the 
engagement of all citizens in the exercise of pOlitical power. This 
argument can be traced in the West from Aristotle to Rousseau's 
idea of the 'social contract' to contemporary demands by marginal 
groups in society (such as ethnic minorities, environmental 
groups and feminist organisations) for inclusion in the political 
process. The civic ideal is seen as a corrective to the 
fragmentation and disequilibria of modern society. One political 
vehicle of this neo-classical concept of citizenship is the 'new social 
movement' which unites individuals from a wide range of 
socio-economic backgrounds behind ethical issues such as 
feminism, environmentalism etc .. These movements encourage the 
participation of all members and are organised in a 
non-hierarchical way. 
Our examination of this argument in the Polish context is 
inextricably bound to the second basic task of this thesis which 
was to trace the influence of the Polish intelligentsia on the 
transition. Generally speaking, the intellectual idiom is seen as an 
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important social category in the development of democratic, civic 
aspirations95. As autonomous producers of culture they bring a 
universal perspective to critiques of state power and help shape 
and articulate the interests of society. As such they are a 
fundamental part of civil society, understood as a mediatory 
realm between a responsive, representative state and a pluralist, 
consensual society. The 'civil society project' in Poland can thus be 
seen as a project of the intelligentsia. 
There was a strong civic element to the anti-communist 
opposition in Poland. The regime reversed the republican ideal 
and called on Poles to defer from political activity outside that 
sanctioned and controlled by the state. From the mid-1970s 
attempts were made to build new social movements in defence of 
basic human rights and in opposition to communist 
authoritarianism. The rise of grass-roots environmental and peace 
movements in the West in the 1970s COincided with the 
emergence of oppositional movements in East-Central Europe. 
Growing concern with basic human rights in the West may have 
influenced the work of Westward-looking intellectuals in 
East-Central Europe who sought to create some 'social space' for 
the civic aspirations of the communist opposition. 
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Polish society gradually disengaged from the party-state and the 
regime's distorted version of republicanism and deserted the 
public sphere. The series of popular, anti-state outbursts, evident 
from the late 1950s onward, signalled this move. By the late 1970s 
substantial parts of Polish society had demonstrated their 
tendency to regard the state with at best sullen indifference and 
at worst outright hostility: workers I protests demanded the right 
to organise non-state trade unions, peasants maintained their 
traditional hostility to state institutions, the Catholic hierarchy 
resolutely defended its unique status as an independent social 
institution in communist Poland and the intelligentsia's calls for 
freedom of expression were repeated with increasing regularity. 
The state, constrained by external pressure from the Soviet 
Union, presiding over a collapsing economy and bereft of 
ideological legitimacy was unable to halt this process. 
This was the background of the new model of I self -organisingl 
republicanism introduced by the anti-communist intelligentsia. 
It presented an alternative arena for Poles to participate as 
'citizens': to play an active part in influencing decisions which 
effected their lives. The project united a myriad of underground 
Solidarity groups, trade unions, the unofficial press, intellectual 
and CathOlic discussion groups of all shades. The official, public 
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sphere was shunned and the civic aspirations it denied were 
allowed expression in an 'underground state'. 
The republican element of the anti-communist opposition in 
Poland was openly referred to by its leading intellectuals. J acek 
Kuron and Adam Michnik referred to as the I self-organising I or 
I self-governing I Republic. Michnik stated that liThe leading idea of 
Solidarity is to achieve a Self-Governing Republic and not to seize 
power"96. This 'self-limiting' or 'antipolitical' project of the late 
communist period was successful as an attempt to unite Polish 
society in opposition to the state. It demonstrated to both state 
and society that Poles were willing and able to organise 
themselves outside the control of a regime which, theoretically, 
laid claim to all social initiatives. 
It may have seemed to observers that in communist Poland the 
'people' were participating as citizens to a greater degree than in 
the jaded West. However the issues at the heart of modern 
citizenship and democracy - how the myriad, fragmented 
experiences and interests of contemporary society can be welded 
into a consensual, democratic model of state/society relations -
were not addressed. Opposition to the communist state was 
enough. 
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Solidarity was not a new social movement in the Western sense of 
the term. Internal contradictions were apparent from the outset. 
The movement meant different things to its various 
constituencies: to the intelligentsia it was an expression of Polish 
society1s republican, democratic tendencies, to workers and to a 
lesser degree peasants it was primarily a trade union to be used 
in negotiations with the state, to the Catholic Church it was an 
expression of the nation1s inherent piety. Each strand had its own 
vision of citizenship and state/society relations and these political 
tensions were apparent from Solidarity1s inception. The clash 
between the Warsaw-based intelligentsia who wanted to create a 
more centralised body and regional leaders who clung to the ideal 
of local, grass-roots activism was emblematic of Solidarity1s 
ongoing identity crisis97. 
Moreover, despite the rhetoric, the liberal, Western model of 
citizenship which emphasises the rights of individuals and the 
duty of the state to guarantee them was absent. The model of the 
Iself-governing Republic I was forged in opposition to the 
party-state. The state remained the ascendant power in this social 
contract as Polish society continued to regard it as a dominant 
force to protest against rather than as an equal partner to 
interact with. 
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The divisions within the opposition and the traditional dichotomy 
between state and society in Poland influenced the civic solution 
to the concept of citizenship in 1990. The Mazowiecki 
government's attempt to continue this model of republicanism 
and the anti-communist Inew social movement I model into the 
transition period reflected its intelligentsia pedigree and 
illustrated its weaknesses. Civic enthusiasm was only one of 
several undercurrents in 'Solidarity' and an idealistic and 
theoretical one at that. 
The belief that Polish society had been mobilised solely by the 
desire to become more politically free and active and that this 
feeling could be used as a motivating force for the balancing of 
state/society relations was unrealistic. No state is fully answerable 
to the political activity of its individual citizens. The size and 
complexity of modern polities means that even in a liberal 
democratic system the state cannot act solely in response to the 
political activity of the people. 
The republican solution can be criticised for neglecting the 
myriad interests of the modern citizen. Political activity has to 
compete with economic and social functions that are at least as 
important to the individual. There is a type of intellectual 
utopianism and elitism apparent here. From Aristotle onward 
citizenship was an exclusionary category - only those capable of 
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appreciating the rights and fulfilling the duties of citizenship 
rationally were worthy of the status. 
Intellectual elitism was evident in the anti-communist movement 
in Poland. The level of political activity of the engaged intellectual 
who could spend a lot of time in the dissemination of samizdat or 
the organisation of underground meetings could not be matched 
by workers or peasants whose occupations did not overlap with 
opposition activity. The roots of Solidarity were and are the 
subject of fierce debate. However, it is safe to say that the Polish 
intelligentsia did not solely initiate and lead anti-state protests in 
Poland from the outset. Rather, representatives of the milieu 
gradually rose to the forefront of a society-wide process of 
estrangement from the communist state and self -organisation. 
That the intelligentsia should interpret its role as of paramount 
importance in organising opposition is a direct legacy of its 
historical experience. The 'life-world' of representatives of the 
milieu is based on a feeling of national mission, a certain life-style 
which stresses self-sacrifice and moral as well as intellectual 
rigour. From this comes an assumption of social superiority (the 
no ble roots of the milieu notwithstanding) which demands the 
role of leadership. 
The elitist, exclusionary republicanism fashioned by the Polish 
intelligentsia was evident in 1990. The Mazowiecki government 
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presented the post-communist model of Polish citizenship in terms 
of a cultured appreciation of the 'democratic West '. This certainly 
excluded many Poles who were uncertain of or felt hostile toward 
Western influence on the transition process. The 'intelligentsia in 
power l attempted to appropriate the organisational structures 
and, at least as importantly, the symbolic weight of 'Solidarity'. 
Reference to the intelligentsia's own 'Solidarity ethos I of civic, 
democratic idealism privileged intellectuals over the rest of 
society. Moral and theoretical discourses are the stock in trade of 
the political intellectual98. Participation in public discourse was 
limited to a narrow social and political elite. 
Moreover, the intellectual elite, ideologically heterogeneous as 
always, was itself divided over what the 'Solidarity ethos I 
represented. In a manner reminiscent of the inter-war period 
Solidarity (and the OKP in particular) began to disintegrate into 
bickering political clubs of intellectuals. The dividing lines of the 
emergent political scene tended to involve the personal conflict 
between cosmopolitan and populist intellectuals, between virulent, 
anti-communist and moderate intellectuals with a revisionist past, 
between Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals and so on99. In this 
way the gap between the agendas of the 'intelligentsia in power l 
and the rest of Polish society widened. 
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It is important to note that those intellectuals who now took up 
roles in the state apparatus were immersed in this adversarial 
model of state/society relations. As far as the new rulin.g elite was 
concerned, the state was the dominant, if not the sole instrument 
of democratisation. The condition of Poland in 1989 meant that 
there was little alternative to an overwhelmin.gly state-led 
transition. Above all it is important to keep in mind the 
international and geopolitical context of the Mazowiecki era. 
Mazowiecki took office at a time of great political flux and its 
activities were constrained by circumstances. 
Soviet power was still evident throughout East-Central Europe 
and in Poland itself. The countryl s army and security services, not 
to mention its bureaucracy, were still dominated by communists. 
The intentions of the Soviet Union regarding Poland and her 
neighbours remained uncertain. In these circumstances, and given 
Poland1s doleful recent history, there was a strong belief that the 
nation1s survival was at stake. Poland1s new government had to 
make a Ifait accomplil; it had to take an irrevocable step into the 
post-communist future. As the first country in the region to take 
this path Poland was, as ever, aware of the importance of its fate 
for East-Central Europe. Thus the radical introduction of a 
market economy and the desire of the lintelligentsia in powerl to 
keep a tight grip on state power can be explained at least 
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partially by the uncertain atmosphere of the early transition 
period. 
However, the Mazowiecki government's approach to the 
transition also reflected the traditional etatism of the 
intelligentsia milieu. Our study of the historical journey of the 
Polish intelligentsia revealed it as an ideologically diverse milieu 
united by a desire to lead Poland into the modern age through the 
instrument of the state rather than through mere criticism of 
state power. Each ideological strand (socialist, nationalist, secular, 
clerical etc.) regards itself as the rightful incumbent of state office 
and seeks to mould society as a single body according to its vision. 
Society could be mobilised as patriotic Poles against foreign forces, 
peasants against landowners, Catholics against non-CathOlics, 
rightists versus leftists, communists against anti-communists, 
'Europeans' against 'chauvinists' etc .. 
The sole aim of political activity was control of the state rather 
than the representation of specifiC values and interests on behalf 
of society. This model of pOlitical action is contrary to the 
interests of liberal democracy because it fails to represent the 
true interests and values of society to the state. Instead the 
political scene is fragmented and radicalised by an internecine 
battle between rival intellectual elites. 
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Moreover, given the regular periods of profound socio-economic 
trauma and flux in recent Polish history it also gave rise to the 
possibility that populist forces may lead a reaction against the 
processes of Modernity. Sections of the intelligentsia unhappy 
with the direction of progress and their own role in it could 
mo bilise frustrated social forces in Polish society to reverse 
progress and hark back nostalgically and unrealistically to an 
Edenic past. Polish populism can contain a vision of a religiously 
and ethnically pure Poland which is intolerant of the pluralism 
associated with modern democracies. 
In this way the experiences of the lIintelligentsia in power ll 
confirm the dangers to democracy when individuals or groups 
become politically active as intellectuals. During its term of office 
the Mazowiecki administration came close to contradicting 
Shelley1s belief that Ipoets are the unofficial legislators of the 
world I as vital posts in government and parliament were occupied 
by historians, journalists, academics and the like. 
Exercising political power on account of Iknowing what is best I is 
not conducive to liberal democratic procedures. In times of 
upheaval intellectuals feel the responsibility to Ichoose a road l for 
their societies. They produce and criticise ideas which mayor may 
not perform a significant ideological function in a changing 
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society. However, for democracy to flourish, these ideas cannot be 
imposed through the instrument of the state. The political rule of 
intellectuals instead results in the rise of a new, etatist regime. 
This is undemocratic, even if the ultimate aim is the development 
of democracy. Democracy cannot be imposed. Civil society develops 
gradually through the interaction of a responsive state and an 
autonomous society. The intellectual has a vital role in this 
process as a prominent defender of societal autonomy and critic of 
the state and must thus renounce the attempt to build empires, 
even the lempire of civilisation'lOo. 
Thus this intelligentsia-led, I civic I solution to our quest for a 
democratic model of state/society relations is flawed. As with the 
other solutions democracy is undermined by exclusiveness and a 
refusal to tolerate the complexity of human, civil society. We have 
already stated that 'civil society' is a vague, problematic concept. 
However, this vagueness is caused by its attempt to incorporate 
the myriad, complex activities and associations (politicaL social 
and economic) in modern society. The inclusiveness implicit in 
this attempt is valuable in itself and suggests that the 'civil 
society' solution is at least a good starting point in our ongoing 
search for a democratic model of state/society relations: liThe civil 
society argument ... challenges [other models'] singularity, but it has 
no singularity of its own"101. 
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In general, one can conclude that the involvement of the 
intelligentsia in the state during the Mazowiecki period lessened 
the chances for the achievement of a democratic, civil society in 
the short-term at least. Of course democratisation requires 
institutional and elite, state-level change. But for institutions to be 
truly democratic society must be mobilised to participate in them 
in a democratic way102. Social as well as political democracy must 
be developed. This was especially the case in a society with deep, 
unresolved political, economic and cultural cleavages (based on 
the different historical experiences of workers, peasants and the 
intelligentsia and their varying relationships with the Catholic 
Church). Thus, in terms of the development of a democratic, civil 
society the ethos of the Polish intelligentsia was ambiguous. On 
the one hand the milieu's roots in the European intellectual idiom 
guaranteed a basic commitment to individual freedoms and the 
ideals of modern citizenship associated with Western liberal 
democracies. On the other hand, its sense of superiority and 
disparagement of POlish society's democratic tendencies convinced 
it that democracy had to be introduced in an etatist, elitist 
manner. Such an approach obviously contradicts the pluralist 
essence of a democratic, civil society. 
The practical consequences of this flawed model of republicanism 
were apparent in the disintegration of Solidarity, the low level of 
electoral turnouts and the fragmentation, polarisation and 
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weakness of the party political scene. The activities of 
non-government organisations associated with civil society in the 
thesis (such as political parties, professional associations and trade 
unions, feminist organisations etc.) were frequentlY ignored by 
the post-communist state. New political leaders took the 
republican ideal to its extreme and defined democratic legitimacy 
in terms of national election results rather than taking into 
account the varied interests of modern societies. Clashes between 
the state and society-based organisations often culminated in 
radical questioning of the legitimacy of state institutions and the 
Mazowiecki government 103. This paid testament to the continued 
pathological condition of state/society relations in Mazowiecki's 
Poland. In the liberal, post-communist age, when political rule is 
supposed to be exercised through consensus rather than coercion, 
this situation weakens the Polish state. 
Amidst the socio-economic turmoil of 1990, the elitism of the 
Mazowiecki government, the rise of populism and the 
disintegration of the Solidarity movement ensured that the 
project of the 'intelligentsia in power I to introduce democracy 
lasted just over 12 months. The Polish intelligentsia can be seen as 
a revolutionary milieu which became the first victims of the 
revolution. Those attributes which served it so well in mobilising 
society against the state (commitment to Itotal', moral categories) 
were not suited to the messy business of everyday 'politicking' in 
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a democracylo4. This was particularly apparent in the presidential 
elections where the style and substance of the Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki campaign failed to mobilise any sector of Polish 
society outside the Premier's natural intelligentsia constituency. 
Joanna Kurczewska depicts the plight of representatives of the 
Mazowiecki government as caught between the categories of 
intellectual and politician. They could not be classed as 
intellectuals because they were exercising political power and 
they were not politicians because they were guided in their 
actions by moralising, utopian considerations rather than 
pragmatism105• The political pre-occupations of the intellectual 
luminaries of the former opposition (Poland's 'European heritage', 
the importance of maintaining truth, morality and dignity in 
public life etc.) were seen as anachronistic in a post-communist 
country making the myriad adjustments necessary with the 
advent of a market economy and democratic pOlity 106. 
The fate of republican idealism in Poland was mirrored to varying 
degrees elsewhere in East-Central Europe. In communist 
Czechoslovakia Charter 77, led by Vaclav Havel called for 
opposition through reference to civic rights. Havel's vision was, if 
anything, more idealistic than Polish opposition intellectuals'. 
Individuals were to act as much as possible as self-sufficient 
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citizens and live according to their own norms without the 
support of social institutions which existed in Poland. However, 
Civic Forum and its sister organisation in Slovakia 'Public Against 
Violence, the transition period representatives of this democratic, 
republican strand, soon divided and dissolved over political and 
socio-economic issues. As with Solidarity, the alliances which made 
up Civic Forum were too heterogeneous to foster consensus and 
unity. Havel, though elected President, was powerless to halt this 
process of polarisation which led to the break-up of the state itself. 
In Hungary the old opposition included elements of the general 
'self-organising' or 'anti-political' strategy of its Polish and 
Czechoslovak counterparts. Awareness of the rights and duties of 
citizenship was to be promoted in society to express Hungarians' 
separation from the party-state and/or exercise pressure on the 
regime. However, after the collapse of communism, civic solidarity 
gave way to political fragmentation and polarisation and voter 
alienation. The former opposition quickly split into competing 
factions, some of which questioned the concept of liberal 
democracy outlined by the old Hungarian opposition. The core of 
intellectuals behind the 'civic' aspect of the old opposition (such as 
Kis and Konrad) was associated with the Alliance of Free 
Democrats which was marginalised soon after the collapse of 
communism. The more successful offshoot of the opposition the 
Democratic Forum subscribed to a more conservative, restrictive 
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vision of civil rights. The situation was such that in 1991 liberal 
and left wing intellectuals attempted to revive the civic spirit of 
the 1980s through the Democratic Charter which specified 
seventeen criteria for democracy. It renewed the call for social 
self-organisation. This could be seen as a return of the critical; 
intelligentsia to its pre-transition role. However it returned in 
drastically changed circumstances, having failed in its efforts to 
shape the transition through the state. It was also now competing 
for public attention with proliferating social interests: IIHaving 
made its excursion into professional politics, the intelligentsia 
returns to the sites of the politics of 'movements' but its voice will 
not be decisive any more: it will be lost in the noise of the social 
interest conflicts of the new democracyll107. 
Having outlined the weaknesses and failures of the intelligentsia's 
brief experience of political rule, one must acknowledge the 
substantial achievements of the period. We have already stated 
that the accomplishments of the Mazowiecki period were 
fundamental to the achievement of a relatively healthy market 
economy and relatively stable democracy in the long-term. In the 
period 1989-90 the 'intelligentsia in power' enjoyed a unique level 
of broad societal support, of the sort accorded in Poland to 
representatives of the traditional intelligentsia. Although this 
'honeymoon period' was short-lived it was long enough for the 
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Mazowiecki government to lay down the framework for the 
development of a market economy and a democratic pOlitical 
system108. One truth that has emerged from our examination of 
transition politics is that the consolidation of democracy in Poland 
and East-Central Europe in general will be a fraught, long-term 
process. One decade after the dramatic events of 1989-90 allows a 
clearer perspective on the merits of the rule of the Ibest and 
brightest I but the further passage of time will clarify its 
achievements and failures. 
What can be said is that, after all the tragic events of modern 
Polish history, the lIintelligentsia in power" at last came to 
understand that the rule of law rather than revolutionary or 
utopian fervour was all important. Non-violence was a basic tenet 
of the anti-communist intelligentsia in Poland and East-Central 
Europe as a whole. The commitment to peaceful protest is 
fundamental to the development of a tolerant, consensual 
democracy. Despite the etatism of the milieu the Mazowiecki 
government held to the laws of the democratic game. It was 
openly contemptuous of the results of the presidential elections 
but it accepted them. One must recognise the moderation and 
commitment to the rule of law of the lIintelligentsia in power ll in a 
time of radical change 109. 
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The question remains over the future of the intelligentsia as a 
milieu in Polish society. Chapter 3 examined the identity crisis of 
the intelligentsia in the conditions of a market economy and 
liberal democracy. A crisis of identity was caused by the technical 
intelligentsia's potential transformation into a Western-style 
managerial class and the creative intelligentsia's political 
marginalisation and economic impoverishmentllo. Ironically, the 
reforms introduced by the 'intelligentsia in power I undermined 
the status of the milieulll. 
However, given the framework of the intellectual's role in 
Western civil societies, the professionalisation of the technical 
intelligentsia and the retiral of the creative intelligentsia from the 
pursuit of state power can be seen as positive developments. As 
we have seen, in the West intellectuals function as disinterested 
critics of state power and societal opinion makers. They are active 
in civil society as mediators between state and society. In 
Mazowiecki's Poland the intelligentsia was associated with the 
state and could not perform this bridging role. Instead it 
attempted to legislate a democratic, civil society from the state 
down. This was an unrealistic aim. 
Zygmunt Bauman lists three choices for the post-commurnst 
intelligentsia - the independent intellectual, the organic 
intellectual representing the interests of specific social interests or 
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the professional or technocrat1l2. The technical intelligentsia as 
professionals and managers can swell the ranks of the emergent 
middle social strata. As stated in Chapter One, the presence of an 
established, stable middle class is recognised by most political 
scientists and sociologists as important to the consolidation and 
maintenance of democracy. 
The involvement of the creative intelligentsia within the state is 
not necessarily conducive to the consolidation of democracy; it is 
much more important that such intellectuals playa mediating 
role between state and society. Having performed its 
revolutionary, state-focused function, the Polish intellectual could 
retreat into the types of occupation associated with the category 
in the West. 
Although the future facing the creative intelligentsia in 1990 may 
have appeared bleak, the gradual development of middle-strata in 
society provides potential markets for cultural consumption and 
the integration of the milieu. We have already noted the ongoing 
identity crisis in the Western intellectual idiom caused by its 
isolation from the structures of political power and dependence 
on the state, industries or academia. The similar tensions felt by 
the politically marginalised creative Polish intelligentsia (the 
feeling that they are now addressing a Significantly reduced 
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public) in the post-communist period can, paradoxically, be seen as 
a sign that their country is becomirlg more IW esternll13 . 
In the meantime I would argue that there is perhaps one last 
project for the Polish intelligentsia. Despite the progress made in 
Poland and throughout East-Central Europe since 1990 down the 
path of democratic consolidation we have already established that 
it is a long term process. So long as there is a need for the 
reinforcement of democratic principles in Polish society, a gap will 
exist for the intellectuals to playa leadirlg role as the country1s 
foremost exponents of these values. Intellectuals are also bound to 
have a prominent role in a country still tryirlg to express its 
national identity in the post-communist period.1l4. 
In this context, Poland1s prospective integration into the 
European Union could be Significant. As we have seen, in 1990 
the vision of Poland1s Ireturn to Europel played a significant part 
in the alienation of the lintelligentsia in powerl from the rest of 
Polish society. At that time the workers, peasants and Catholic 
Church feared the intrusion of European economic and cultural 
interests on Poland. However, in the current atmosphere of 
relative prosperity and stability, and with the prospect of 
integration with the European Union within the next decade, 
there is an opportunity for the intelligentsia to mobilise Polish 
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society behind the 'return to Europe'. A 'pro-European' ideology 
could appeal to workers who see a new labour market in the EU 
and to farmers and the emergent bourgeoisie who see in it an 
enlarged market for their goods and services. Thus there is a 
greater chance that the 'Europeannism' of the intelligentsia can 
help consolidate a unified, democratic culture in Poland. 
The prospect certainly unites the technical and creative strands 
of the intelligentsia. The need for a new level of bureaucracy and 
administration offers the technical intelligentsia increased job 
opportunities and status. Poland's integration into the European 
Union can be seen as the logical culmination of the creative 
intelligentsia's journey home to the 'democratic West'llB. 
In this context, it is interesting to note the recent work of Ivan 
Szelenyi, a prominent observer of the historical journey of the 
East-Central European intelligentsias. In the 1970s he and George 
Konrad wrote a critique of the state socialist order, The 
Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, which charted the rise of 
the intelligentsia to power within the system based on the merger 
of communist bureaucrats and the technical intelligentsia. 
Szelenyi subsequentlY revised some of his conclusions, taking into 
account the intransigence of the communist bureaucracy. 
However, in the post-communist period he sees a new alliance 
between the technical intelligentsia who are involved in rUIlIling 
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the state and the creative intelligentsia which help legitimise the 
rule of technocracy through shaping public opinion1l6. The cause 
of European integration can be seen as binding force in this new 
alliance. The recent elections in Poland where the archetypal 
technocrat Leszek Balcerowicz was appointed Finance Minister 
and the equally archetypal traditional, creative intellectual 
Bronislaw Geremek became Foreign Minister is emblematic of this 
post-communist alliance. The issue of European union, currently 
high on Poland's political agenda can thus be seen as, perhaps, the 
Polish intelligentsia's final mission to reform the Polish state in 
line with the practices of Western liberal democracies and 
mobilise Polish society behind a European perspective; to 
consolidate democratisation and reinforce the structures of Polish 
civil society by integrating them with the civil societies of Europe. 
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liAs the nations of East Central Europe engage in their 
transition to democracy, the type of political regime chosen 
becomes of paramount importance. In this respect the 
relationship between the executive and legislature is 
probably the most important institutional problem facing 
any political system ll (Crawford p278). 
for instance, see Robert D. Greyed. Democratic Theory and 
Post-Communist Change Prentice-Hall New Jersey 1997 p36 
and Crawford p281 and Tomasz Merta 'Which Presidency 
does Poland need?' Res Publica 6/90 p35. 
see Scott Mainwaring 'Presidentialisrn, Mult ip art ism, and 
Democracy: The Difficult Combination' Comparitive Political 
Studies 26 1992 pp198-228. 
IIShould Poland adopt a parliamentary or preSidential 
system .. .8ince most empirical studies are limited to the OECD 
countries and most consider institutional features one at a 
time, we do not yet know enough to make such 
recommendations ll (Przeworski (b) p46). 
see lInter-war Society' Chapter 2 p175. 
see 'The Weakness of the Party Political Scenel Chapter 3 
p349. 
see 'The Communist Statel Chapter 2 p209. 
see Jacek Kuron Moja Zupa p11. 
Bronislaw Geremek, from the Solidarity side, stated: lilt is not 
our intention to limit the President's authority, but we 
think that there is no need to give him a veto with the 
force of law ... We feel that the Senate veto that requires a 
2/3 Sejm majority to over-rule is enough. We don't consider 
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10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
the Presidential veto an appropriate law" (K. Dubinski 
IMagdalenka - Transakcja Epokr published in Polityka 
29/9/90 p7) 
Ibid .. p8. 
Those who took part in the 1989 negotiations have conceded 
that they countenanced a degree of confusion in the Round 
Table agreement1s provisions on Presidential powers, the 
better to curb the President1s ability to control future 
events. In so doing, however, the opposition did not 
anticipate how quickly Communist control would collapse, 
and soon they were to find themselves heir to an untidy 
political structure (see Dick Howard IConstitutional Reform I 
in R.F. Starr ed. Transition to Democracy in Poland 
New York 1993). 
see IPopulism l Chapter 1 p107. 
"I am not an advocate of classical presidential concepts, 
French, Italian or American. I want to surprise everyone II 
(quoted in IWhy I will not vote for Lech Walesa l Gazeta 
ytyborcza 27-28/10/90). 
Slawomir Siwek, a prominent supporter of Walesa and 
member of PC called for IIA strong, self-limiting president ... 11 
('Centre Alliance - Let1s Discuss l Polityka 28/7/90 p7). 
see Gazeta Wyborcza 20/6/90 p2. 
IIThis understanding of the state and constitutionalism was 
the logical product of Poland1s modern history ... a history 
created not by capitalism but by the intelligentsia elite, 
descended from the declasse nobility and attempting to 
retrieve their lost authority and influence over the political 
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17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
scene ll CThere is no School for Democracyl Polityka 5/5/90 
p3). 
see Chapter 2 p191. 
see Zubek (c) p598. 
see IThe Walesa Factorl Chapter 4 p480. 
IIHe wants to be a president lwith an axel who will govern 
by decree ... Walesa was always a charismatic leader and he 
never respected statutes or programmes. He has acted as if 
he does not understand the basics of democratic procedure" 
CWhy I will not vote for Lech Walesal Gazeta Wyborcza 
27-28/10/90)' 
Zbigniew Bujak, one of the leaders of ROAD stated liThe 
presidential office remains important and it must be given 
suitably strong powers. However we are opposed to a 
president who can freely decide the composition of the 
Government. We ought to strive doggedly for the strong 
position of Parliament and itls best that a majority of 
Parliament forms a strong Cabinet. Thus we are for a 
president with a potentially significant influence on political 
stability in the country and, above all, on international 
relations ll CWest of Centrel Polityka 28/7/90 p5). 
see Diagram 3.12 Chapter 3 p413. 
for instance, see the tortuous passage of privatisation 
legislation in the Sejm Chapter 4 p468. 
As Krzeminski and Wladyka commented at the time: liThe 
emerging conflict over the Presidency goes deeper than a 
row concerning the person of Walesa ll CStyle and Rightsl 
Poli~yka 7/7/90 pI) 
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26 
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28 
29 
30 
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32 
33 
for a detailed profile of the six main candidates see 
Appendix II p757. 
e.g. polls in Stanislaw Kwiatkowski 'Mixed Feelings' 
Polityka 7/7/90 p6 
see PC and ROAD sections in Appendix L p680 and 685. 
see Kwiatkowski "Mixed Feelings" Polityka 7/7/90 p6. 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski, one of the founders of the Centre 
Agreement stated that "PC is an attempt ... to organise 
political activity amongst members of citizens' committees, 
political parties and people who up to now have not been 
associated with organised interests" (Kaczynski, J, 'Hatchet 
or Program?' Tygodnik Solidarnosc 29/6/90 p3). 
Quoted in Louise Vinton 'Centre Alliance and ROAD' RFE 
Vol.l No.38 21/9/90 p15. 
For instance, Stefan Kurowski, while admitting that his 
"major assumptions did not contradict Balcerowicz's 
programme" nonetheless stated: "Unfortunately Balcerowicz 
is not a leading privatiser. He is a leading monetarist, but 
for us large-scale privatisation is necessary" (,Hatchet or 
Program?' Tygodnik Solidarnosc 29/6/90 p3). 
"Mazowiecki intended to carry out a revolution without 
revolutionary symbols and acts of revolutionary 
vengeance ... This approach had above all to lay history aside, 
since each form of appeal to the past was dangerous II (Krol 
M 'Evolution, restoration, amnesia' in Res Publica Year 5 
NO.5 1991 p23). 
see Chapter 3 p396. 
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Quoted in ICentre Alliance and ROAD I RFE Vol.l No.38 
21/9/90 p15. 
IIUnfortunately, as a result of the current conditions, a 
fusion has been carried out, at least partially, between the 
Iredsl of the old political elite and the Ipinksl of the new one. 
The most vivid manifestation of this is the creation of a 
Byzantine structure of privileges, favouring the old 
Communist nomenklatura, and today the Ihybridl 
nomenklatura (set apart, given better health services, 
resorts at home and abroad, access to scarce goods and 
privileged pension schemes ll (Glapinski, A, IWhat Does Walesa 
Want?1 Tygodnik Solidarnosc 31/8/90 p5). 
IIThere appears to be a contradiction between the Centre 
Agreement1s commitment to radical economic measures as 
the key to a successful transition to capitalism and the way 
in which the 'acceleration' programme is being presented to 
the public by Kaczynski etc.1I (Louise Vinton 'Centre Alliance 
and ROAD1 RFE Vol.1 No.38 21/9/90 p15). 
see 'Formation of Centre Alliance and ROAD Chapter 3 p415. 
IIA stable parliamentary democracy and political pluralism; 
the rule of law, civil liberties, equal rights for citizens 
regardless of religion, philosophy or extraction; limiting the 
role of the state; rebuilding local self-government; creating a 
social, market economy of the Western type ll (Founding 
Declaration of ROAD 16/7/90 Information Bulletin in 
Programy partii i ugrupowan parlamentarnych 1989-91 
Vol.l p212). 
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40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
liThe Mazowiecki government has accomplished much .. It is 
realising the transition program, but we see it's weaknesses 
and the need for corrections ll (Ibid. p212). 
liThe pro-governmental ROAD decided to imitate both the 
ideology, and for the most part, the organisational structure 
of it's opponents ... the most blatant imitative aspect was the 
open acceptance of Walesa's concept of accelerationll (Zubek 
(c) p595). 
see Chapter 2 p177 and 251. 
see Jasiewicz K Wybory parlamentarne 1991 i 1993 Instytut 
Studiow Politycznych Warsaw 1995 p69. 
see Hockenos, Paul Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in 
Post-Communist Eastern Europe London Routledge 1993 
p292-3. 
IIDear Jews, do not talk with us from a position of a nation 
raised above all others and do not dictate terms that are 
impossible to fulfil. Don't you see, esteemed Jews that openlY 
opposing the Carmelite nuns hurts the feelings of all Poles 
and violates our hard-won sovereignty. Your power is in the 
mass media, at your immediate disposal in many countries. 
Do not use it to spread anti-Polonism ... If there is no 
anti-Polonism there will be no anti-Semitism here ll (see 'The 
row over nuns at Auschwitz I The Economist 2/9/89 p46). 
see Interview with J. Kaczynski in Toranska p90. 
see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 1 p124. 
see 'Pre-election Poland' The Economist 17/11/90 p74. 
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"Today anti-Semitism is the language of nostalgia, of 
resentment, of feeling victimised, and of economic wishful 
thinking" (Gross p147). 
see lInter-war Society' Chapter 2 p177. 
see Davies (b)p252. 
see Ibid. p266. 
see 'Populism in Poland' Chapter 1 p124 and the 'polish 
Society Under Communism Chapter 2 p251. 
"Anti-Semitism . .is a part of pOliticallife ... directed against 
Jews, of course, but also against intellectual, political and 
economic elites who are "nominated" to be J ews" 
(Gross p147). 
"Look at 'Solidarity" they are Jews ... those who are taking 
over the government ... Bronislaw Geremek? .. He is a Jew and 
a Stalinist. He wrote his doctorate on Parisian womanisers. 
A Pole would not do that. Tadeusz Mazowiecki is certainly a 
Jew but still manages to imitate a Catholic. Adam Michnik is 
the grandson of a rabbi from Lwow and the brother of a 
Stalinist murderer. Jacek Kuron is a fanatical communist 
and personal enemy of Primate Wyszynski ... " (Tomasz Jerx 
INiedziela w Oswiecimiu l Kultura Nr 10/505 1989 p85). 
"People of Jewish extraction ought not to conceal this fact. I 
would like this issue to be clarified so that anti-Semitic 
slogans stop appearing on walls. Jews are great patriots, 
they have contributed much to culture, but the moment 
they conceal their J ewishness they provoke an anti-Semitic 
reaction" Cw krajul Polityka 4/8/90 p2). 
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see II Have Given Proof That I Am Not An Anti-Semite I in 
Gazeta Gdanska 11/9/90, cited Zubek (a) p79. 
reported in 'Walesa Elected Once Againl Dziennik 
Zwiazkowy 23/4/90 pl. 
see IPast and President I in The Economist 17/11/90 p74. 
"Express:ing nonsense about "egg-heads" and divid:ing people 
accord:ing to racial criteria into Jews and non-Jews, 
encourages the adherents of anti-intellectual populism and 
anti-Semitic phobia. These people will now support Walesa's 
ambitions to the Presidency. Walesa says "I am a true Pole, 
born here". It seems that there are some kind of "unclean 
Poles" ('Why I will not Vote for Lech Walesa' Gazeta 
]Y;yborcza 27-28/10/90 pI). 
see "Mazowiecki Government and the Church" p518. 
"With regard to Poland, it is too early to say what the 
consequences of Glemp's attitude will be for relations 
between the Catholics and remain:ing Jews there. The least 
one can say is that the immediate impact of Glemp's words 
has been to reinforce the latent distrust between specific 
social groups, to facilitate disputes about religious and 
spiritual issues, and to damage Poland's image abroad in a 
situation in which the country is desperately in need of 
Western support and aid" (Jande Weydenthal 'The 
Auschwitz Convent Controversy' RFE 6/9/89). 
"Today ... when anti-Semitic opinions are expressed in Poland, 
Jews are not the issue. The question is whether or not there 
will be a Polish democracy" (cited in Hockenos, Paul Free to 
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Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern 
Europe London Routeledge 1993 p271-272). 
see IWest of Centre l in Polityka 28/7/90 pI. 
quoted in Anna Uhlig IIrnages of the Presidential Candidates 
in the Course of the 1990 Electoral Campaign' in Dlaczego 
Tak Glosowano op. cit. p127. 
Adamski notes a : IIcommon sense of being wronged in the 
past by both the East and the Westll (Adamski p164). 
IIThose same intellectual dissidents who were most 
outspokenly IEuropean' in their pronouncements and ideas 
are now multiply discredited with the local electoratell 
(Tony Judt IThe end of which European Era?' Daedalus 
Summer 1994 p3, henceforth Judt). 
Zubek notes how the IEuropeanness l of the Mazowiecki 
campaign "was met with admiring understanding within the 
intelligentsia milieu, it hardly advanced the broader political 
cause of the governing elite in the campaignll (Zubek (c) 
p597). 
see IThe Intelligentsia in Inter-war Poland l Chapter 2 p191. 
see 'The Tyminski Phenomenon' Chapter 4 p614. 
see IPrezydencka kampania wyborcza w telewizji 
konstruowame (auto) portretow kandydatow' in Gebethner 
and J asiewicz p144. 
IIAt every opportunity the montage sequence showed Walesa 
amongst the crowds - as the leader of a mass social 
movement II (Bralczyk and Mrosowski p155). 
Ibid. p155. 
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"It seemed that the Walesa faction had stumbled upon a 
pattern of political competition very similar to that 
characterising most electoral campaigns in the West. 
Discussion of the merits of certain socio-economic issues was 
intertwined with Ifeel-goodl messages that involved rosy, 
over-optimistic promises .. While in the West such campaigning 
has it1s devoted critics in academic and intellectual circles, 
few political campaigns are mounted without incorporating 
these elements" (Zubek (c) p597). 
"Mazowiecki and his supporters presented the future as 
difficult, entailing a strenuous examination for society. Blood 
would not be shed, but sweat and tears - yes. The electorate -
wise, mature, responsible, impervious to populism - ought to 
accept his program" (Bralczyk and Mrosowski p162). 
"unconvincing, uncomfortable .. .Illonotonous and lengthy 
statements, an anxious facial expression, forced smiles, 
avoiding eye contact with the audience ... everything gave the 
impression of weak commitment to the campaign and lack of 
will to win" (Bralczyk and Mrosowski p164). 
see IThe Elections: Don1t Let1s be Shockedl Gazeta Wyborcza 
3/10/91 p3. 
"Although intellectuals usually have a wide knowledge of 
realities, which allows them to behave as politicians ... it has a 
rather theoretical character. This type of knowledge is not 
usually suited to taking decisions, argumentative skills, 
convincing less educated people. It is seldom accompanied by 
a genius for public speaking" (Anna Radziwill Tntellectuals 
in Politics I in Res Publica 2/1990 p137). 
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"People and organisations standing for the political 
philosophy of Mazowiecki are incapable of organising action, 
preferring talk rather than action. The PC on the other 
hand, while energetic, does not have a programme and is 
suspected of attracting hidden, radical Rightist groups whose 
battles are only beginning to emerge ... creating a 
brutalisation of political culture" ('Style and Rights 1 Polityka 
7/7/90 pI). 
"Tyminski1s popularity was provoked by the clear rivalry 
between the two Solidarity candidates. It weakened the 
influence of the Solidarity campsl symbol as an integrating 
force in society. It convinced a good part of society that the 
Government and it1s Premier were ineffective and Walesa 
and his side unsuitable - thus all of them were incompetent" 
('Wyniki glosowana: mapa polityczna polski jesienia 19901 in 
Dlaczego Tak Glosowano p76). 
"Analysing this information from the perspective of the 
Presidential elections one can conclude that even then - in 
the first 1/4 of 1990 - this was an early incubation period 
for that which emerged in the form of the Stan Tyminski 
phenomenon ll (The Genesis and POlitico-Systemic Background 
of the Presidential Electionsl in Dlaczego Tak Glosowano 
p34). 
see Bralczyk and Mrozowski in Dlaczego Tak Glosowano 
p159. 
see IThe Mazowiecki Government and the Peasantry 
Chapter 4 p500. 
what Zubek terms "impressionable provincial youth II 
(Zubek (a) p82) 
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IIFrom the aforementioned data it is clear that treating the 
'Tyminski campi as a group of IIdeviantsll (as was often the 
case in the post-election publicity) is unjustified. It was 
rather a group generally understood as II out sidersll, people 
finding themselves - because of a tangle of social, political, 
psychological and cultural factors - as it were lion the 
out side II of the process of systemic transition being carried 
out by the Solidarity camp (Tomasz Zukowski in Gebethner 
and J asiewicz p67). 
IIWalesa was the only candidate who had significant support 
amongst every social and demographic group ... he was first 
and foremost a candidate of the workers II CDlaczego Tak 
Glosowano?' p63). 
IIFor sociologists, the electorate of Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
became a new arena in the political arena of Poland ... the 
first social group where a political position was defined by 
social position and interests, not by value system and 
symbols II (Weclawowicz pl18). 
Zukowski observes that IIThese statistics give the impression 
that the working class element of the electorate located itself 
almost entirely outside the Premier's camp. This must have 
led to the defeat of the candidatell (Gebethner and Jasiewicz 
p68). Zubek agrees that liThe inability to appeal to voters 
outside the native intelligentsia milieu was the ROAD 
Achilles I heel" (Zubek (c) p597). 
IIWalesa was by far the most interventionist President in the 
region and provoked constitutional crises on a number of 
occasions to have his way - for example, in his dismissal of 
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individual ministers or premiers with whom he was 
displeasedll (Crawford p296). 
see 'Poland's Peculiar Election' The Economist 1/12/90 p74. 
IIPoles are not adult enough for democracyll he told Polish 
television. (Quoted in Ibid. p74). 
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Notes to Conclusion of Thesis 
see Conclusion to Thesis p642 
quoted in Raina, P Poland 1981: Towards Social Renewal 
London Allen and Unwin 1981 p347 
see 'The Rise of Populism and the Disintegration of 
Solidarity' Chapter 3 p393. 
see Mares, Musil Land Rabusic L 'Values and the welfare 
state in Czechoslovakia' in Bryant and Mokrzycki p91. 
see 'Western intellectuals' Chapter 1 p88. 
see Michnik (c) p90. 
see Chapter 2 p264. 
"Moralizing politics give an advantage to political 
intellectuals over party pOliticians, the language used is 
more familiar to them as a pOlitical discourse is their true 
field" A. Bozoki "Intellectuals in a New Democracy: The 
Democratic Charter in Hungary" East European Politics and 
Societies Vol. 10 No.2 Spring 1996 p207, henceforth Bozoki. 
see Mingiu p334. 
see Evert van der Zweerde, "Civil Society and Ideology: A 
Matter of Freedom" in Studies in East European Thought 
Vo1.48 Nos 2-4 Sep 1996. 
see Walzer M 'The Civil Society Argument' in Beiner R 
Theorising Citizenship State University Press, New York 
1995 p162. 
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"Eastern Europe has already demonstrated that importing 
free political parties, parliaments, and presses cannot 
establish a democratic civil society; imposing a free market 
may even have the opposite effect. Democracy grows from 
the bottom up and cannot be imposed from the top down. 
Civil society has to be built from the inside out. The 
institutional superstructure comes last". (BB. Barber, 'Jihad 
vs. McWorld\ The Atlantic, Vol.269, No.3 1992 pp53-63, cited 
in G. Ekiert 'Peculiarities of Post-Communist POlitics: The 
Case of Poland" Studies in Comparative Communism Vol. 
XXV, No.4, December 1992 p361). 
For instance, see the frustration of womens l representatives 
and feminist associations in the abortion debate. 
"Generally speaking, the intelligentsia is departing from the 
social and public stage because the organizational and 
symbolic context required for its existence and for the 
carrying out of its self-appointed tasks has come to an end 
(the state now belongs to us, we are fully independent from 
a foreign power)" Joanna Kurczewska IThe Polish 
Intelligentsia: Retiring from the Stage l The Polish Sociological 
Bulletin No.2 1992 p154 henceforth Kurczewska)' 
see Ibid. p152. 
"They are perceived as culturally marginal and an 
embarrassment, a reminder of the time when most of their 
audience did not wish to associate with them and an 
annoying prolongation of the dissident conscience with 
which most Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and others 
had, and still have, little in common" (Judt p3). 
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Bozoki A, IDemocrats against Democracy?1 Civil Protest in 
Hungary Since 19901 pp23-24, cited in Bryant and 
Mokrzycki p142. 
IIIn Poland, the 85 to 90% approval rating that Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki1s government enjoyed during the first several 
months of the post--communist transition allowed crucial 
economic reforms to be enacted. Those reforms withstood 
the subsequent turmoil in Polish politics, and enough time 
passed by 1993 to enable the informal norms of Polish 
society to adjust at least partly to a free-market economyll 
(M. Kramer IBlue Collar Workers and the Post-Communist 
Transitions in Poland, Russia and Ukraine 1 Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies Vol.28 No.1 1995 pl0). 
IIWe have to recognise that the whole process was in the 
hands of exceptionally moderate people. We should be 
grateful to them ... This may offend the theoreticians of 
revolution., the seekers of revenge, and utopias, but it is 
more likely to produce long-term, successful change II (Daniel 
Chirot IThe Lessons of 1989: Comments on Janos Kisl East 
European Politics and Societies Vol. 12 No. 2 Spring 
1998 p389). 
see IThe IntelligentSia in Power and Economic Reform 1 
Chapter 3 p309. 
liThe Ipost-Solidarityl intelligentsia itself undermined the 
basic distinguishing features of the ethos, features that had 
set it apart from other social groupsll (Kurczewska p154). 
see Zygmunt Bauman Legislators and Interpreters: On 
Modernity, Postmodernity and Intellectuals Oxford: Polity 
Press 1987. 
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liThe diversity of political leaders [since 1989] is suggestive of 
a decline in the status of intellectuals. As with Polonia 
Reconstituta in 1918, intellectuals who had struggled 
alongside other social groups for an independent country 
seem to have been marginalized once the task was 
accomplished. Dissident intellectuals were seen as pOlitical 
amateurs, and new leaders, less well known, needed only a 
respectable past to launch a pOlitical career. But that is not 
so different from the situation in established democratic 
systems - an important sign that democratic politics in 
Poland are normalll (Raymond Taras Consolidating 
Democracy in Poland Oxford 1995 p180). 
IIUntil there is an unquestioned consensus in society that 
democracy has no alternative, intellectuals in Central and 
Eastern Europe will have a chance to play another gig as 
IIcivil magicians of democracy or as nationalistic 
counterpoints to itll (Bozoki p207). 
liThe European Community, the construction of a new 
administrative level above states, offers the next great 
opportunity for the intellectuals' claim to power. It provides 
a new site for intellectuals' employment, in the 
administrative and regulatory commissions that become 
available. But perhaps even more dramatically, it gives 
intellectuals a new kind of power in the opportunity to 
legislate a new community of nations and individuals. I 
believe too that this is probably the intelligentsia class 
project that will most facilitate the retention, or expansion, 
of democracy ... 11 (Kennedy (b) p75). 
IIHere is the most obvious representation of the class 
compromise at the apex of the post-communist social 
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structure: the new I avant-garde I of the technocratic 
dominant fraction, the financial managers, use their 
specialized knowledge about tax loopholes to allocate funds 
to the new lavant gardel of the dominated fraction, most 
notably, the media. In this way, the loyalty of humanistic 
intellectuals is gainedll (Gil Eyal, Ivan SzelenyL Eleanor 
Townsley IThe Theory of Post-Communist Managerialisml 
New Left Review No.222 March/April 1997 p81). 
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Appendix I: Guide to Parties and Organisations Involved in 
Thesis. 
Contents 
Introduction 
1. Anti-Communist Organisations: KOR p684 
ROPCiO 
2. Solidarity Organisations: NSZZ 'Solidarity p687 
KO 'Solidarity 
OKP 
NSZZ ill 'Solidarity' 
PSL 'Solidarity' 
3. Post-Solidarity Organisations: PC p698 
ROAD/UD/ UW 
4. Communist and 'Satellite' Organisations: PZPR p709 
ZSL/PSL 'Odrodzenie' 
SD 
OPZZ/ RLP 
PAX 
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5. Post-Communist Organisations: SdRP 
USdRP/ PUS 
6. Reactivated Flistoric Organisations: PSL 
PPS 
SP 
7. Radical New Parties: K-LP UPR 
ZChN 
KPN 
p717 
p722 
p735 
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Introduction 
The purpose of the following guide is to give some impression of 
the roots, characteristics, leading cadre and policies of parties 
which feature in this thesis and were prominent in the early 
transition period. Although concerned with each organisation's 
role in the 'Mazowiecki era' the post-1990 experiences of some of 
the more influential ones are also included. The major sources for 
this guide are: Krystyny A. Paskiewicz ed. Polskie partie 
polityczne: charakterystiki dokumenty Official publication 
Wroclaw 1996 (henceforth Paskiewicz) and Inka Slodkowska ed. 
Programy partii i ugrupowan parlamentarnych 1989-91 Vol.2 
Official publication Warsaw 1995, (henceforth Slodkowska). 
Italicised names feature in Appendix II 'Profile of Prominent 
Political Figures' 
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1. Pre- 'Solidarity' Anti-communist Organisations 
KOR: Committee for the Defence of Workers and 
KSS-KOR: Committee for Social Self-Defence 
Founded in 1976 as a response by a wide range of Polish 
intellectuals to communist persecution of protesting workers. 
Among its most prominent founders were Jan Jozef Lipski, 
Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik. The committee worked quite 
openly (although not officiallY and legallY) gathering and 
co-ordinating money and information to use in the defence of 
persecuted and imprisoned protesters. This stimulated the 
development of a substantial underground press. From 1977 
onward it gradually widened its activities to the whole field of 
human rights, a move which illustrated the Polish intelligentsia's 
civic, rather than purely working-class perspective (the 
organisation's name was changed to the 'Committee for Social 
Self-Defence'). The founding of KOR is regarded by most observers 
as a turning point in Polish society's opposition to communism. It 
was the first time intellectuals and workers had united in the 
pursuit of a common goal and from this moment one could talk of 
an organised, nation-wide opposition. Despite this KOR was 
continually prone to internal divisions over ideological outlook 
and tactics. Dissolved in 1980 as a response to the legalis at ion of 
the 'Solidarity' Trade Union and also as a result of deepening 
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internal divisions. Nevertheless KOR members such as Kuron and 
Michnik went on to become prominent in the Round Table 
negotiations, Mazowiecki administration. Some remain noted 
figures in Polish politics, for instance as members of UW which is 
part of the 1997 governing coalition. 
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ROPCiO: Movement in Defence of Oivil and Human Rights 
Founded in 1977 by intellectuals including Andrzej Ozuma and 
Leszek Mo(]zulski as an alternative opposition organisation to 
KOR. It emphasised its patriotism and opposed communist rule 
more radically than KOR. Typically its members were more 
Catholic-oriented and/or economically liberal than the core of KOR 
intellectuals. Suffered more from communist repression and 
deeper splits. In 1979 Moczulski left to form the radical, 
nationalist KPN and Aleksdander Hall left to form the 
Ohristian-Democratic IYOung Poland Movement I effectively 
splitting the organisation. 
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2. Solidarity Organisations 
NSZZ 'Solidarity': Independent Self-Governing Trade Union 
'Solidarity' 
Created in 1980 after increased food prices sparked strikes on 
Poland's Baltic coast and elsewhere. The government accepted the 
twenty-one demands of strikers in Gdansk led by Leah Walesa, 
including free trade unions. Solidarity realised the main aims of 
the Gdansk Agreement (signed 31/8/80). With the advice of 
anti-communist intellectuals such as Adam Mianik, Jaaek Kuron 
and Tadeusz Mazowieaki, it organised the free trade unions into 
regional structures and presented the communist authorities with 
the first mass opposition movement (in 1981 it had around 10 
million members). In September and October 1981 the 1st National 
Assembly of NSZZ 'S' Delegates took place, at which Lech Walesa 
was elected to the leadership. After the introduction of Martial 
Law (13/12/81) the Union was delegalised by statutes introduced 
8/10/82. Some Union structures carried out illegal, underground 
opposition activities although in a state of dispersal. Most leading 
activists were interned and imprisoned. The underground work of 
the Union was based on its baSic structures: directed by the 
Provisional Co-ordinating commission (TKK). After the 1986 
amnesty for political prisoners, Lech Walesa founded the 
Provisional Council of Solidarity (26/8/86) composed of Bogdan 
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Boruszewicz, Zbigniew Bujak, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk and others. On 
25/10/87 the national Executive Commission was founded to take 
on the powers and functions of these bodies. Its leader was Lech 
Walesa. After the Round Table talks and the ratification by the 
Sejm of the IILaws concernin.g associations II (7/4/89 referring to 
lIunion pluralismll ), Solidarity was reregistered (17/4/89). The 
Union played the main role in the organisation of the citizens 
committees for the June 1989 elections and leading the electoral 
campaign of the Solidarity-opposition candidates for the Sejm and 
Senate. After the elections, in August 1989, Lech Walesa 
accomplished the creation of the OKP-ZSL-SD coalition, ending the 
post-war monopoly of the PZPR authorities. At the 2nd National 
Congress of Delegates in Gdansk (19-25/4/90, attended by 451 
delegates) Lech Walesa was again elected Union leader (with 
75.5% of the vote) Leah Kaczynski and Stefan Jurczak were 
elected deputy leaders. The Assembly decided that IISolidarity ll had 
a twofold character: a trade union and social movement. It 
decided that it was possible to participate in elections and 
represent the Union in parliament. Despite the settlements 
reached these issues persisted within the Union e.g. on the theme 
of politicisation or trade union representation. Walesa resigned 
from the leadership at the end of 1990 when he was elected 
President of the Republic. In February 1991 Marian Krzaklewski 
defeated Lech Kaczynski in the contest to replace Walesa as 
chairman. 'Solidarity' remains important in contemporary Polish 
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politics. The first three administrations in post-communist Poland 
were formed under its name. The victory of 'Solidarity Electoral 
Action' CAWS) in the 1997 parliamentary elections demonstrates 
its continued influence. 
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KO 'Solidarity': Citizens' Committee 'Solidarity' 
The Citizens Committee was created as an informal group of 
around 60 NSZZ "Solidarity" activists and intellectual advisers 
(Adam Miahnik, Jaaek Kuron, Tadeusz Mazowieaji, Bronislaw 
Geremek etc.) as well as members of NSZZ RI IS' and 
representatives of creative and artistic opposition groups. As such 
it represented organisational recognition of the increasing 
importance of the intelligentsia strand to the post-Martial Law 
Solidarity movement. They met for the first time in May 1987 at 
the invitation of Leah Walesa who believed that the approaching 
negotiations of the Solidarity movement with the communist 
authorities was best left to intellectualsl. In December 1988 it 
took the name: the Citizens' Committee by the leader of NSZZ 
"Solidarity" (with around 130 members). The aim of the 
Committee was to "present the independent opinions of social 
groups, the expression of social needs and interests and the 
introduction of programmes of action"2. Henryk Wujea was 
appointed Secretary of the Committee. Members of the Committee 
were participants and advisers of the Solidarity-opposition side at 
the Round Table talks. After the conclusion of the Round Table 
the National Executive Commission of NSZZ "Solidarity" instructed 
that the body be transformed into the Citizens' Committee 
"Solidarity" (8/4/89). Its task then was to select candidates for the 
Sejm and Senate, to organise and lead the National Electoral 
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Bureau and the election campaign, and to co-ordinate activities in 
the emerging territorial and local citizens' committees throughout 
the country. After the elections of 4/6/89 the Committee reverted 
to its old name (22/6/89). However with the appointment of the 
first 'Solidarity government " different opinions emerged amongst 
members and union activists concerning its political role and 
duties (although point 3 of the resolution issued by the 
Committee (7/10/89) stateci "The Committee, as an inspirational, 
advisory and subservient body definitely does not claim authority, 
and likewise it cannot take the role of a co-ordinating centre for 
political organisations and associations"). There was a 
manifestation of these disputes, for example, at the Conference on 
the Solidarity Ethos (8-9/12/89). After Lech Walesa appointed his 
supporter and union activist Zdislaw Najder to the Committee 
leadership (22/2/90), he widened KO membership to include more 
of his supporters and removed Henryk Wujec from the post of 
secretary (1/6/90). The dispute deepened in the Committee itself 
and in the local citizens' committees. It was complicated by 
personal issues and the "War at the Top" between Mazowiecki and 
Walesa supporters. After a series of meetings called by Najder and 
Wujec (e.g. 31/3/90, 29/4/90, 13/5/90, 17,24,30/6/90) a group of 
KO members associated with the latter left the Citizens' 
Committee together with a section of the local citizens committees. 
From 31/3/90 the composition of the KO widened to include 
representatives of (mostly pro-Walesa) groups such as ChDSP, UPR, 
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KLD, ZChN, RPP etc. 27/10/90 it changed its name to the Citizens' 
Committee by Lech Walesa (leader - Zdislaw Najder). Announced 
its support for Walesa in the presidential election (14/10/90). 
Some Sejm deputies continued to sit as the rump Solidarity 
Citizens' Committee, campaigning to reduce the social costs of 
reform. It earned a place in the Sejm in the period 1991-93 but 
lost all its Sejm seats in the general elections of 1993. 
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OKP: Citizens I Parliamentary Club 
Constituted 23/6/89 as the Parliamentary club of the 
opposition-8olidarity side. Made up of 161 MP's and 99 Senators. 
Led by Bronisia w Geremek. Initially at least the OKP provided 
Solidarity's political representation. In the first half of 1990 the 
first group and political divisions appeared within the OKP. 
Despite internal conflicts the OKP managed to maintain some level 
of formal unity and parliamentary co-operation up to the 
presidential elections of December 1990. 
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NSZZ RI 'Solidarity': Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union 
of Individual Farmers 'Solidarityl. 
Organised in 1980-81 after a wave of peasant strikes (e.g. in 
Ustrzyki Dolne, Rzeszow); registered 12/5/81. Delegalised and 
broken up during Martial law (its leader, Jan Kulaj, co-operated 
with the Martial Law authorities). In March 1987 the Provisional 
National Council of NSZZ RI lSI was set up and it decided to work 
publicly. Its new leader was Josef Slisz, who was re-elected in 
March 1989. At that time the Union was joined by "Rural 
Solidarity" which was led by Jan Kozlowski. NSZZ RI lSI joined the 
opposition-Solidarity side at the time of the Round Table talks and 
June 1989 elections. Jozef Slisz became an OKP Senator and 
Vice-Speaker of the Senate and around 50 members were OKP 
Senators and MFs. The 4th National Congress of NSZZ RI lSI took 
place 15-17 December 1989 at which Gabriel Janowski was elected 
to take the place of J ozef Slisz as leader. Janowski was considered 
more "economically minded" and more radical vis a vis the 
Mazowiecki government. In the course of 1990 the new leadership 
conducted discussions with the government about making 
corrections to agricultural policies. However, the more radical 
outlook of the Union meant that this was combined with other 
types of pressure, such as road blockades (e.g. 11/7/90). In May 
1990 the National Council of the Union acknowledged the 
necessity of behaving with pOlitical neutrality if unity was to be 
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achieved in the countryside. On the 16/10/90 rejected the earlier 
proposition of the presidium that support should be given to the 
leader of the union, Gabriel Janowski, as a presidential candidate. 
Instead the Union's support was given to Lech Walesa. 
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PSL 'Solidarity': The Polish Peasant Party of Solidarity 
Founded in September 1989. At an OKP meeting 21/9/88 NSZZ RI 
'S' leader Jozef Slisz announced its creation as a party political 
extension to the Solidarity trade union, organising the political 
representation of the countryside. Over time the Union and its 
party became divided concerning relations with the Mazowiecki 
government. This split within Solidarity's peasant organisations 
was emblematic of the general process of estrangement occurring 
at that time between the purely Trade Union members of the 
movement and those who wanted Solidarity to playa more 
political role as supporters of the Mazowiecki government. The 
first sign of this came when Slisz lost the ballot for the 
chairmanship of NSZZ RI 'S' to Janowski. In February 1990 the 
Provisional Executive committee was elected, under the leadership 
of Slisz. The committee, in the name of the party, rejected the 
proposition that it participate in the Congress of United Peasants 
Movements, though a section of its membership did attend .. PSL 'S' 
shared NSZZ RI 'S' disillusionment with the treatment of the 
peasants by the Balcerowicz Plan. It looked for changes in the 
agricultural policy of the government, above all concerning the 
restructuring of agriculture. However it was more conciliatory to 
the government than NSZZ RI 'S' and did not take part in the 
protests of other peasant organisations. Nevertheless PSL 'S' was 
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angry with the government for choosing only one of its members 
to join the Mazowiecki government while the compromised ZSL 
enjoyed a high representation in the Cabinet. Favoured cultural 
and material integration of Poland1s rural and urban areas. 
Although it identified its constituency as lithe peasant stratumll it 
added the qualification IIWe do not think that a party 
representing peasant interests has to be an exclusively peasant 
party, It ought to have a nation-wide character ll3. 
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3. Post-Solidarity Organisations 
pc: Centre Agreement 
Ideological/Organisational Roots 
The roots of this organisation lie in the ISolidarityl movement. It 
was formed 12/5/90 in Warsaw and registered as a party in 
March 1991. It was one of the products of the IWar at the Topl -
the disintegration of the Solidarity camp. This process was 
initiated by groups under the leadership of J arosla w Kaczynski. 
These groups concentrated around Lech Walesa and his candidacy 
for the Presidency. The intention of Kaczynski was the 
pluralisation of political life, the avoidance of complete Solidarity 
unity and the ending of the dominance of the so-called 
Ipost-Solidarity Left I. 
To begin with PC was an incohesive, many-stranded movement. It 
had four basic currents: Christian democrat, liberal, unionist and 
peasant. Amongst its signatories was a group of MPs and Senators 
of the OKP, citizens I committee activists, members of KLD, PSL lSI 
and representatives of extra-Parliamentary groups such as 
democratic groups (e.g. SD, Centrum Demokratyczne, Ruch 
W olnych Demokratow) and Christian Democratic organisations 
(e.g. the Union of Christian Democratic Parties, the Christian 
Democrats, the Christian Labour Party). 
698 
After its transformation into a unified party it situated itself on 
the centre-right with the characteristics of Polish Christian 
Democracy (chadecja): "We subscribe to Christian ethics and are 
convinced that Poland requires a strong political force in the 
centre"4. It had the ambition of joining the current of the West 
European strand of Christian Democracy (particularly the 
German CDU) : IIWe formed as a synthetic party, uniting 
conservative-liberal and Christian-Democratic elements5. 
Constitutional Policy 
PCls declared base is natural law and Christian values and the 
social teaching of the Catholic Church which stresses freedom, 
human dignity and private property. The basic political aim for 
the PC is the creation of a modern, strong state based on 
traditional values: "The overriding issue is Polandls rights of state. 
We believe that neither wealth, freedom nor justice will be 
attained for citizens without strengthening the authority of the 
Polish state"6. Strengthening state authority included a call for a 
strong President: IIWe believe that Poland needs a President who is 
an actual co-author of change. The person of the President should 
represent a trustworthy guarantee of the introduction of 
democratic, systemic reform"7. Of course this also suited the PCs 
support for Walesals presidential ambitions. 
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The Christian Democratic side of PC appears particularly in the 
recognition of the authority of the Church. However it stopped 
short of calling for constitutional recognition of this power. PC 
supported the ratification by the Sejm of a concordat between 
Poland and the Vatican as quickly as possible. In abortion 
discussions it was definitely for restrictive legislation and against 
the organisation of a general referendum on the issue (most 
opinion polls show Polish society's consistent support for liberal 
abortion laws). 
Economic POliQY 
The economic programme of PC is based on private property and 
a free-market economy. It demands significant limitation of state 
interventiOn, permissible only in the period of systemic 
transformation. Economic reform ought to be in keeping with the 
rapid distribution of property to society through universal 
privatisation using a variety of methods (including worker-owned 
and general offering). PC appreciated some of the Mazowiecki 
government's economic reforms - halting inflatiOn, introducing 
market mechanisms, making prices realistic, making the zloty 
transferable. However it condemned the Balcerowicz Plan for 
failing to realise 'democratic capitalism'. Instead of giving equal 
chances of riches to all it allowed the financial elite to prosper at 
the expense of ordinary Poles with deep recession, fall in real 
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wages and unemployment tak:ing their toll. These criticisms were 
linked to PCls vague policy of 'acceleration' of reform. 
Foreign Policy 
In the field of foreign policy the main PC objective was POland's 
entry into the process of European integration as quickly as 
possible. Full membership of the European Union and NATO is 
seen as a vital step in ending Poland's submission to Russia: liThe 
main political vector in Polish politics is a pro-European 
orientation. This aspect demands entrance to a united Europe 
with the European Union at its heart"8. 
Political Fortunes 
In practice PC in the early transition period was a vociferous, 
anti-communist force. It called for immediate 'decommunisation 
and the removal of the old 'nomenklatura' political elite. PC 
launched a sustained attack on the Mazowiecki government's 
policy of the 'thick line I drawn under the communist pasts of 
many politically influential people. For instance it strongly 
criticised the fact that the government tolerated the continued 
practice of Inomenklatura privatisation': "We warn that Poland's 
meagre financial reserves, which are being freed by the market 
system, are concentrated in the hands of foreign investors and the 
Polish financial elite whose finances are the product of the 
corrupt economic system of the past"9. 
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During the Mazowiecki period 41 MPls and 12 Senators belonged 
to the PC Circle in the OKP. PC activists who organised the 
Presidential campaign of Lech Walesa, such as Jaroslaw Kaczynski, 
Teresa Liszcz, Slawomir Siwek and Jacek Maziarski took up 
positions as Secretaries of State in the Chancellery of the 
President. However in 1991 Kaczynski and Walesa fell out when 
the Olszewski government, of which PC was a coalition partner 
criticised the President. Up to the parliamentary elections of 1993 
representatives of PC sat in the Sejm and participated in the 
coalition governments, particularly that of Jan Olszewski. 
However Kaczynski failed in his attempts to strengthen the base 
of this Centre-Right, Catholic identity and failed to secure 
executive roles for PC members. After 1993 PC left for 
extra-parliamentary opposition. Characteristic of the PC and 
particularly its leadership is a tendency to spectacular fall-outs 
resulting in the resignation of many well-known activists e.g. 
Christian Democratic politicians under leadership of Olszewski left 
to form Forum of Christian Democratic Thought. PC is also 
plagued by corruption scandals surrounding some of its 
prominent members. However it has returned to the parliament 
with around 20 MPs, including Jaroslaw Kaczynski winnirlg seats 
in the 1997 elections as part of the electoral coalition 'Solidarity 
Electoral Action' CAWS). During the Mazowiecki period the PC 
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press organs were IITygodnik Solidarnosc ll and IITygodnik 
Centrum ll • 
ROAD: Citizens' Movement - Democratic Action 
(subsequently UD: Democratic Union and UW: Freedom Union) 
Ideological/Organisational Roots 
Organisations whose roots lay in the intelligentsia cadre of KOR 
and the Solidarity movement. Its membership included people of 
Solidarity origins and well known opposition names Tadeusz 
Mazowieaki, Jaaek Kuron, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk and Bronislaw 
Geremek. On the 10th June 1990 sections of MP's and Senators 
from the OKP, groups of activists from Citizens' Committees and 
Catholic circles were invited by J erzy Turowicz to a meeting in 
Krakow, at which the Democratic Alliance (SnrD) was founded. 
This was an informal structure which supported the Mazowiecki 
government and opposed the PC. However its role was quickly 
taken over by ROAD, founded 16/7/90 in Warsaw (amongst the 
101 founding signatories of the new group one could find the 
majority of Alliance signatories, supported, among others, by 
leading 'Solidarity' intellectuals such as Adam Miahnik and union 
activists from the citizens' committee movement such as Zbigniew 
Bujak and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk. These had not accepted the 
conception of the movement proposed by the group centred 
around Zdiszlaw Najder and Lech Walesa). On 30/9/90 the 
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Founding Council of ROAD officially supported the candidacy of 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki for the Presidential Office, and his electoral 
campaign was organised by members of ROAD. After Mazowieckils 
defeat in the Presidential elections ROAD members helped form 
the Democratic Union (UD). Registered as a party 11-12/5/91 with 
Mazowiecki as leader and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Aleksander Hall 
and Jacek Kuron as deputy leaders. The parliamentary club of UD 
was formed in January 1991 with Bronislaw Geremek as its 
leader. On 23/4/94, as a result of defeat of the post-Solidarity 
camp in the 1993 parliamentary elections and the rise to power 
of the ex-communists of SLD, the UD transformed itself into the 
Freedom Union (UW). 
The ROAD - UD - UW strand suffered from the type of internal 
ideological disputes which plagued the Solidarity movement 
during the transition period. A major cause of this problem was 
the attempt of its political leadership to form a Icatch alll party, a 
legacy of its roots in the elitist, intelligentsia milieu which 
traditionally appealed to all citizens rather than specific social 
constituencies. It situated itself on the political spectrum between 
the moderate Left and Centre-Right. The pragmatic party Centre, 
represented by Bronislaw Geremek, Andrzej Wielowiejski and 
Leszek Baieerowiez among others, looked to unite all 
post-Solidarity forces, regardless of programmatic differences. This 
created problems concerning the creation of a clear vision 
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because both party fringes pulled in different directions. The Left, 
represented by figures such as Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik 
wanted a social-democratic character while consistently 
supporting radical, neo-liberal economic reform initiated by the 
Balcerowicz Plan. It saw the party as a 'catch-all' Centrist 
organisation with a primarily economic orientation (supporting 
the development of small and medium sized businesses). Political 
opponents of UW suspected this strand of wanting to form an 
alliance with the post-Communists. On the other hand the Right 
flank, represented by Jan Maria Rokita, wanted the party to 
become a Christian-Democratic-Conservative organisation. After 
the 1995 elections the UW Right called for a UW-ZChN-Solidarity 
alliance. This strand was suspected by the Left of having clerical 
tendencies. Controversies between these strands resulted in a 
failure to create a single party vision. Nevertheless there were 
some identifiable policies. 
Constitutional Policy 
It called for a parliamentary system of government with limited 
presidential powers: "UD sees parliament as the fundamental 
institution of a democratic system ... The president ought to be 
answerable to the state and not responsible for specifiC policies"lO. 
Although there were clear ideological differences between the 
secular Left of the party and the more traditional, CathOliC Right 
over Church/state relations it generally emphasised the need for 
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Poland to have a secular state with a clear separation of Church 
and state institutions: "We support the autonomy and explicit 
independence of the state and the Catholic Church"ll. 
Economic Policy 
In terms of economic policy the goal was the institution of a 
market economy of the type envisaged by the Balcerowicz Plan: 
"The road to prosperity leads through long-term systematic efforts 
to improve the organisation and SOlidity of labour and build 
market institutions, achieve a stable currency, privatisation of 
the Polish economy and opening it to the outside world"12. 
Foreign Policy 
Poland's close participation in the process of European integration 
was a fundamental policy of this strand, in keeping with the 
pro-European attitude of the traditional Polish intelligentsia: "The 
fundamental aim of foreign policy is the integration of Poland 
into the political and economic structures of Western Europe"13. 
Political Fortunes 
Generally speaking, the electoral performance of these 
organisations has been disappointing. Despite the consistent 
presence of a nationally well-known, knowledgeable, essentially 
pragmatic elite it has not established itself as a dominant force. 
The internal ideological splits mentioned above have contributed 
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to this. Moreover, in the face of the clear dominance of the Polish 
scene by the extreme emotions of the 
post-commumst/anti-commumst dichotomy the centrist, 
moderation and intellectual pragmatism of UW caused a decline in 
its political influence. Finally, it was identified from 1989-93 as 
the strand held responsible for the costs of economic transition (a 
significant part of Polish society still views the Balcerowicz Plan 
negatively). The zenith of this strand in terms of pOlitical power 
was clearly the first six months of the Mazowiecki administration 
when many of its most prominent future members controlled 
parliament and government. The ROAD circle in Parliament 
numbered 25 MFs and 23 Senators. UD was the winner of the 
parliamentary election of 1991. However the modest scale of the 
victory and the success of the ex-commumst SLD in second place 
dealt severe blows to the party's ambition to become the 
dominant political force in the country. The 
Christian-democratic-Catholic Olszewski government coalition 
distanced the secular forces in UD. The party returned to 
prominence after the former Solidarity parties managed to unite 
and form a coalition under UD member Hanna Suchocka. Her 
government pursued the economic and pOlitical reform initiated 
under Mazowiecki. However it fell foul of internal splits as moral 
and ideological issues such as Church/state relatiOns, abortion and 
de-communisation dominated political life. After the rise of the 
SLD/PSL coalition in 1993 it fell from power. In the Presidential 
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campaign of 1995 these differences manifested themselves. In the 
course of the campaign the UW candidate Jacek Kuron, from the 
Left of the party, was publicly criticised by the Right of the party. 
As a result the Right camp was dismissed by the party authorities. 
Leszek Balcerowicz was elected to the leadership in April 1995, 
replacing Mazowiecki. That change was related to internal 
arguments over the party's future. The programme of the new 
leadership is geared toward pragmatism and strengthening party 
discipline. The culmination of this process was UW's securing of 
third place in the 1997 elections with 13.37% of the vote and its 
entrance into a governing coalition with 'Solidarity Electoral 
Action'. Balcerowicz and Geremek have been appointed to top 
posts in the new administration. The UW electorate is mainly the 
intelligentsia, financial circles, inhabitants of large towns and 
cities, advocates of reform and pro-European Poles. Its press organ 
remains 'Gazeta Wyborcza'. 
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4. Communist and Communist 'Satellite' Organisations 
PZPR: Polish United Workers Party 
The communist party, vassal of the USSR, formed 15/12/48 as the 
product of the union of the Polish Workers Party (PPR) and the 
so-called IILubelskili (pro-Soviet Union) part of the Polish Socialist 
Party. The ruling party in Poland 1944-89 (in 1976 articles 
concerning the 1I1eading rolell of the PZPR were added to the Polish 
constitution). It created an authoritarian system of goverrnnent 
and a centralised party-state apparatus behind the facade of a 
three party system with the SD and ZSL. The most recent First 
Secretaries were Wojciech Jaruzelski and Mieczyslaw Rakowski. 
Its main press organs were IITrybuna Ludull and IINowe Drogill. 
Tadeusz Fiszbach a PZPR member was vice-Speaker in the Sejm 
after the June 1989 elections. At the 12th Plenum of the PZPR 
(28-29/7/89) Jaruzelski resigned as First Secretary (he had just 
been elected President of the People's Republic of Poland by the 
National Assembly). His position was taken by Rakowski. At the 
16th Plenum of the PZPR (6/1/90) plans to institute a new 
left-wing party were ratified. The final PZPR Congress took place 
27-30/1/90. 1636 delegates took part, elected by over 1,132,000 
PZPR members. They passed the resolution concerning the 
self-liquidation of the party and the transformation of the 
Congress into the founding Congress of a new left-wing party. 
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1196 delegates declared themselves for the institution of the SdRP 
and elected Aleksander Kwasniewski to its executive council. It 
also decided to take possession of the PZPR's substantial 
properties. Over 140 delegates decided to institute the USdRP, 
electing Tadeusz Fiszbach as leader. It decided to renounce the 
property and legacy of the PZPR. 
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ZSL and PSL 'Odrodzenie': United Peasant Party and Polish 
Peasant Party 'Rebirth'. 
The ZSL was created in 1949 in Warsaw after the pro-communist 
People's Party absorbed the remnants of the traditional Polish 
Peasant Party (PSL). Basically it filled a subservient role as a 
satellite peasant party of the PZPR. One can however point to 
certain independent activities (e.g. participation, from April 1989 
onwards in the All Poland Social Committee for the Rebirth of the 
Peasant Movement). At this point one must also bear in mind the 
urban/rural divide in Poland, evident even under communism. 
This allowed the ZSL to build its own sizeable membership in the 
countryside, gain considerable wealth and develop its own lively 
press. After the June 1989 elections the ZSL co-operated with 
NSZZ 'Solidarity' and was part of the unsuccessful attempt to 
form a governing coalition around the PZPR. Instead in August 
1989 a Solidarity-ZSL-8D coalition was created. The ZSL's 
participation in the coalition ensured that its members were 
prominent in government posts and parliamentary positions. In 
the Mazowiecki government Czeslaw Janicki was vice-Premier 
and Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Food (until 6/5/90). 
Minister of Justice was Aleksander Bentowski, Minister of Health 
and Social Welfare was Andrzej Kosniak-Kamysz and Bronislaw 
Kaminski was Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural 
Resources. The ZSL had 76 members in the Sejm including the 
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Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz. This situation sparked the protests 
of emergent peasant organisations who pointed to the ZSVs 
compromised past. However the ZSL was attempting to distance 
itself from its communist satellite period by becoming a Ihistoric l 
party; stressing its roots in the pre-war PSL and claiIning to be 
the leading representative of the Polish peasantry. On llth 
September 1989 Roman Milanowski, the leader of the ZSL in 
communist times and a symbol of the party1s subordination under 
communism (he was also head of the Society for Polish-8oviet 
Friendship), resigned. Dominik. Ludwiczak was elected in his place 
by the party1s 9th Plenum. On 26/11/89 an extraordinary 
congress of the Z8L took piace which transformed it into l?SL 
IOdrodzenie l • Kazirnierz Olesiak was eiected leacier, Chairman of 
the Governing Council waS J ozef Zych ~nci honbrary ·l?resident 
was Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. The press orgaihs of biie party Were 
IIDziennik Ludowyll and IIZielony SztandArll. ~artidbatetl. i1i the 
unification of the peasant movement in 1990. 
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SD: Democratic Party 
Founded in 1939. The SD had been a satellite organisation of the 
communists, fuJiilling, in part, the role of representative of 
business or Iprivate initiatives I. In 1990 it claimed its 
constituency to be "individual businessmen and the free trades"14. 
The leader of the SD, J erzy Jozwiak (who had replaced Tadeusz 
Mlynczak at the parties 14th Congress 17-20th April 1989) 
together with Lech Wales a and Roman Wilanowski made possible 
the first non-communist governing coalition (17th August 1989). 
In the Mazowiecki Government Jan Janicki from the SD was 
vice-Premier, and Aleksander Mackiewicz was Minister for the 
domestic market. In the Sejm Teresa Dobielinska-Eliszewska from 
the SD was a vice-Marshall. In October 1989, an all-party 
referendum elected to retain the party1s name. This was 
acknowledged by some as a defeat for the reformers and the 
wasting of a chance to gain some credibility in society. The 
decision initiated a further disintegration and re-organisation of 
the party. Although generally supportive of the Government 
(with the exception of the liberal economic policies of 
Balcerowicz) the instability and constantly changing membership 
and leadership of the SD made it hard to ascertain its true 
orientation. For instance, while the SD was largely critical of the 
Balcerowicz Plan a number of its MPs had been known to defend 
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it in the Sejm. However it definitely favoured more state 
interventionism and the welfare state. 
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OPZZ: All-Poland Trade Union Alliance and 
RLP: Working People's Movement 
The OPZZ was created 24/2/84 as an organisation uniting the 
so-called 'neo-unions' (trade unions created after the introduction 
of Martial Law and delegalisation of unions active under the 
Solidarity banner). Its leader was Alfred Miodowicz who, from 
1987, was a member of the political bureau of the PZPR. From the 
beginning the OPZZ played an important political role as a rival 
to NSZZ 'Solidarity'. During the Round table talks it was often a 
fiercer opponent of the Solidarity-opposition side than more 
pragmatic members of the govern.ing coalition side. In the 
Parliament formed after the June 1989 elections 11 MPls affiliated 
to the OPZZ were elected. Miodowicz was rejected in the elections 
along with the rest of the PZPR membership. The RLP was 
organised by Miodowicz (10-11/10/89) as a "left-wing political 
forum II representing the emerging political aims of the OPZZ. The 
Union decided to support both Wlodzimierz Cimoszewiez and 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the Presidential elections. 
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PAX 
Created as a political group in 1945 from an initiative by 
Boleslaw Piasecki, it was closely linked to the weekly newspaper 
"Dzis i Jutro". Served as an instrument of the PZPR to rival and 
undermine the authority of the Catholic Church. In 1952 it was 
granted the status of association. From 1947 onwards it had a 
small representation of MPs in successive Sejms all of whom 
co-operated with the PZPR. PAX participated in the June 1989 
elections as part of the gover:ning coalition and obtained 10 
mandates. Leader Zenon Komender resigned his position 11/8/89 
and Maciej Wreszcza was elected in his place. Supported Lech 
Walesa in the presidential elections. Its press organs were "Slowo 
Powszechnell and "Zorzall. 
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5. Post Communist Organisations 
SdRP: Social Democrats of the Polish Republic. 
Ideological/Organisational Roots 
Founded in February 1990. The major product of the 
disintegration of the PZPR. Abandoned democratic centralism and 
the dictatorship of the proletariat and embraced parliamentary 
democracy and the mixed economy, although critics suspected 
that its rank and file were still radical leftists. It identified its 
new constituency as lithe I middle I class. This is a base which will 
be much broader than in the case of PZPRII15. In its founding 
declaration16 it stated: IIWe are for civil society ... parliamentary 
democracy and a multi-party system ll • It was keen to represent 
itself as part of Poland's social-democratic as opposed to the 
Marxist tradition which suffered from its communist links: 1I0ur 
ideas are linked to the Polish socialist tradition, with the common 
goals of the Polish Left and with the common heritage of 
international socialismll • In economic terms its outlook was similar 
to West European social-democracy. It presented itself as a party 
of moderation and technical competence. 
Constitutional Policy 
SdRP preferred a parliamentary system of government with a 
single house of parliament and a strong Prime Minister or 
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Chancellor. Presidential powers were to be strictly proscribed.: 
liThe Sejm is the highest state organ in terms of legislationll17 It 
was avowedly secular: uWe stand for the division of Church from 
State in relation to the religious beliefs of citizens II 18. 
Economic Policy 
Social-democratic. It supported the introduction of the free 
market but with state intervention in certain areas of the 
economy to guarantee social welfare: IIWe are for a market 
economy together with elements of interventionism and social 
responsibility on the part of the state ll19. It called for the 
involvement of workers in the privatisation process and distanced 
itself from the much criticised Inomenklatura privatisation l 
process conducted by other former PZPR members: lilt is vital that 
laws for employees to jointly decide over ownership 
transformation ... Transformation of state property carmot 
degenerate into speculation over national assets ll (Ibid. p97). 
Foreign Policy 
SdBP recognisised the necessity of co-operation with NATO, ED and 
particularly Poland1s immediate neighbours: IIPoland should base 
its security on building European structures of co-operation and 
integrationll20. 
718 
Political Fortunes 
On 31/1/90 the old Jv.[p1s Club of the PZPR transformed itself into 
the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left (PKLD) which 
included 22 SdRP Jv.[p1s, 30 from the USdRP and 116 ex-PZPR 
members who were not affiliated to any party. Wlodzjemjerz 
Gimoszewjez became leader of the Club 23/3/90. The leadership of 
the SdRP in this period was: Aleksa,nder Kwa,snjewskj -leader of 
the Executive Council, deputy leader was Tomasz N alecz, general 
secretary was Leszek Miller. The party's fortunes can be divided 
into two periods. The first, which lasted up to the parliamentary 
elections of 1993 was one of political isolation. In 1991 the 
post-communist organisations formed an electoral alliance - the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) which won 60 seats in the Sejm 
and four in the Senate. This period was spent in opposition to the 
various 'Solidarity governments'. SLD criticised the negative 
effects of economic transition., the tightening of abortion 
legislation and the return of religious education. The second 
period began with the victory of SLD in the 1993 elections where 
it won 171 seats in the Sejm and 38 in the Senate. The result was 
seen as Polish society's reaction against the Solidarity 
governments whose rule had been marked with economic 
austerity and constant internal wrangling. Together with PSL, 
SLD formed a governing coalition under Pawlak of PSL. From 
there SLD general continued in the direction of reforms made by 
previous governments, though it re-opened debates on abortion 
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and the proposed concordat with the Vatican. In 1995 a vote of 
no confidence replaced Pawlak with SLDls Jozef Oleksy which 
effectively put more power in this camp. In 1995 SdRP candidate 
Aleksander Kwasniewski was elected President of the Republic, 
leaving the camp in an extremelY powerful political position. 
However accusations that Oleksy was an agent of USSR, made by 
Walesa1s presidential campaign team in 1995 damaged the 
government. In the 1997 parliamentary elections SLD suffered a 
surprising reverse. Despite actually improving its electoral 
performance on 1993 SLD came second to ISolidarity Electoral 
Actionl. The ability of the Solidarity camp to unite in a way it 
failed to in 1993 contributed to this as did the fact that some 
voters continue to vent their discontent with economic difficulties 
on the ruling party. The anti-communism of the Solidarity camp 
ruled out a coalition with SLD and it formed one with the 
post-Solidarity UW instead. This consigned the post-cornrnunist to 
pOlitical opposition once again., though Kwasniewski will be 
President until the year 2000 at least. The press organ for this 
camp is IITrybuna ll • 
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USdRP: The Social-Democratic Union of the Republic of Poland and 
PUS: Social Democratic Union of Poland 
The other off-shoot of the defunct PZPR. A smaller but prominent 
and more trUly reformed group led by Tadeusz Fiszbach. At the 
time of the founding congress of the USdRP (7/4/90) the decision 
was taken to change its name to PUS. Its leader was Tadeusz 
Fiszbach, deputy leaders were Kazimierz Kik, Jacek Wodz and 
Wieslawa Ziolkowska. Earlier at a session of the Sejm 
(23-24/3/90) instituted the Parliamentary Club of the PUS under 
the leadership of Wieslawa Ziolkowska (members had previously 
been affiliated to the PKLD). Claimed its main constituency was 
"the technical and humanistic intelligentsia and highly qualified 
workers" (Mariusz Janicki 'Polish Political Panorama' Polityka 
4/8/90 p4). Its press organ was "Gazeta W spolna". 
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6. Reactivated Historic Organisations 
PSL: Polish Peasantsl Party 
Ideological/Organisational Roots 
Reactivated peasant organisation. The first steps taken in 
rebuilding the pre-WWII POlish Peasant Party were: the formation 
of the Independent Peasant I Movement of 'Solidarity' (by Hanna 
Chorazyna, Michal Bartoszcze, J ozef Taliga), declaration of the 
reactivation of the historic PSL (10/6/88 by a group around 
Henryk Baka) and the first Congress of the Independent Peasants I 
Movement (25/6/89) and subsequent meeting (held in Wilanow 
15/8/89) of the old activists of the pre-war PSL, veterans of the 
war time Peasantsl Battalions, representatives of NSZZ RI lSI, 
Peasant Youth Union etc. at which decision was taken to resume 
activities of PSL (F. Kaminski, former Commandant of the 
Peasantsl Battalions became honorary President and a 24-person 
Chief Executive Committee was chosen). In September 1989 four 
PSL MPs formed the Circle of PSL MPs together with four MPs 
who had left ZSL. The circle was led by Roman Bartoszoze. A 
series of meetings in Spring 1990 by representatives of Solidarity, 
ex-ZSL and pre-communist peasant representatives culminated in 
the Congress of the United Peasantsl Movement which took place 
on 5th May 1990. The unified PSL was created. (leader of the 
Governing Council - Roman J agielinski, leader of the Chief 
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Executive Council - Roman Bartoszcze, honorary president 
Franciszek Kaminski). 
PSL saw its roots in the traditions and beliefs of the peasantry: 
the Peasant Party CSL) created in 1895, the Peasant Battalions, 
the ideas and programmes of the peasant movement, particularly 
Wincenty Witos and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. It took 
neo-agrarianism as a basic programme, the social doctrine of the 
Catholic Church and also recognised selected elements of socialism 
and so-called 'democratic socialism'. Its major concerns are "acting 
for the security and political and economic sovereignty of 
Poland ... introducing appropriate socio-economic rules and 
defending the rights of citizens and the interests of the peasant 
class in society "21. 
Constitutional Policy 
In systemic questions PSL advocated a parliamentary-cabinet 
system of government: "Parliament has to be the highest form of 
government in the sovereign state". The traditional bases of PSL 
power lie in the rural, provincial areas and this was reflected in 
the party's call for a strong local tier of government with 
tax-raising powers and representation in Warsaw: "PSL is for 
authentic self-government in rural areas and villages we must 
strengthen and regenerate the districts and provinces"22. PSL saw 
all institutions and associations as autonomous, including Church 
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and state. Though referring to Christian ethics it proposed the 
separation of these bodies. 
Economic Policy 
In economic terms PSL supports a regulated market economy 
with broad state intervention and a closely controlled process of 
modernisation: IIPSL believes that a market system must be 
related to designated state interventionll23. It regards the basis of 
Polish agriculture in strong family farms and demands 
guaranteed minimum prices for agricultural products from the 
state as well as a limitation on the import of goods which could be 
produced and exported in Poland: liThe state has to guarantee the 
profitability of agricultural production. To achieve this aim it 
should employ methods used all over the world (grants, credits, 
taxes) and a minimum pricing system for productsll . It also calls 
for the strengthening of the rural infrastructure. In general 
terms PSL also calls for social welfare provisions (the right to free 
education, medical treatment, subsidised prescriptions, nurseries 
and cultural institutions, unemployment benefit and above all 
benefits for large families and pensioners). 
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Foreign Policy 
In foreign affairs it supports a certain degree of integration into 
EU and NATO, but with protection of state sovereignty. From this 
point of view it called on the government to renegotiate Poland's 
association with EU. This was in keeping with the peasantry's 
fears of unfair competition with the economies of more developed 
Western states. 
Political Fortunes 
PSL is a very important party in the post-communist political 
system. It has support amongst the majority of village inhabitants 
but also has bases in the primary professions and unqualified 
workers. Mter 1989 it played a prominent part in all 
parliamentary elections and in the creation of successive 
governments. As a coalition partner it was 'acceptable' to the 
right and the left, to anti-communists and ex-communists. Taking 
advantage of this situation it held its coalition partner SLD in 
check during the Pawlak administration because PSL offered it 
the only opportunity to take part in government. PSL (and 
previously ZSL) had representatives in the Mazowiecki, BieliCki, 
Olszewski, Suchocka. PaWlak and Oleksy administrations. Speaker 
of the Sejm under Mazowiecki was Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, at that 
time the most popular PSL activist in Poland. In the Presidential 
election of 1990 Bartoszcze was its candidate. In July 1991 
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Bartoszcze was ousted at an acrimonious congress and replaced 
by the former state farm manager Waldemar Pawlak. PSL was a 
junior partner in the 1991 Olszewski government and Pawlak was 
briefly Prime Minister in 1992 (however he failed to build a 
coalition). PSL emerged from the 1993 elections as the second 
largest party in parliament, behind SLD. It formed a coalition 
government with Pawlak as Prime Minister. Although PSL 
exercised substantial political power during this period the 
coalition suffered from a lack of unified attitudes on many issues, 
particularly economic reform where the more interventionist PSL 
line was contrary to SLD's basic commitment to a free market 
system. After a vote of no-confidence Pawlak was replaced by 
SLD's Oleksy as Premier. Pawlak ran against Kwasniewski in the 
1995 presidential elections but attracted onlY 4.3% of the vote. In 
the 1997 elections PSL suffered from its attempts in the past to 
play king-maker. It came in fourth place with 7.31% of the vote 
and 27 seats in the Sejm. PSL's association with the SLD served it 
poorly and it was not invited to become part of the ruling 
A WS-UW coalition. 
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PPS: Polish Socialist Party 
Ideological/Organisational Roots 
Reactivated in November 1987 as a continuation of the pre-war 
party of the same name which was founded in Paris in 1892. It 
saw its roots in party1s tradition of the left-wing, independent 
emigration and in the leftist democratic opposition of the 
communist period24. Declared itself as a party of the left, of the 
workers. Leader of its governing council was Jan Jozef Lipski. 
The press organ of the party was IIRo botnikll. 
In 1988 the party experienced a series of splits over attitudes to 
the Round Table process. Younger, more radical elements rejected 
the agreement. Thus three groups participated in the June 1989 
elections claiming the tradition of the PPS. 
1. The so-called Inon-adjectival~ PPS: under the leadership of Jan 
Jozef Lipski. After the June 1989 elections Lipski became an OKP 
Senator and Kazimierz Blaszczyk and Henryk Michalak became 
OKP MPs. It had several hundred members, including several 
pre-war socialists. 
2. PPS - RD: Rejected the agreements reached at the Round Table 
talks. Acted together with radical groups such as IIFighting 
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Solidarityll or IIFreedom and Peacell (was at two congresses of the 
Anti-Systemic Opposition held in February and May 1989). The 1st 
National Congress of the PPS - RD took place in December 1989, 
where Piotr Ikonowicz, Artur Smolko and J ozef Pinior were 
elected to the party leadership. 
3. TKK PPS - created by the most radical young members of the 
PPS (linked to the editors of some party journals such as 
IIWarszawiankili . Protested against lithe impotence and weakness of 
political partiesll: its leader was Grzegorz Illka. 
At the begin.ning of 1990 lengthy discussions led to the unification 
of these three factions into a Unified Electoral Block for the 
territorial elections. Subsequently the 25th Congress of the PPS 
(27-29/10/90) was attended by members of all the factions. Lidia 
Ciolkoszowa became Honorary President and Jan J ozef Lipski 
leader of the Governing Council. In the Presidential elections the 
PPS did not support any candidate, maintaining that 
parliamentary elections should be given priority. 
Constitutional Policy 
In systemic matters it supported a parliamentary-cabinet system: 
liThe highest legislative authority is the parliament 1125. The 
President was to act as an arbiter between different branches of 
government. It called for a strong local-government tier with 
representation in parliament as a state organ which has 
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legislative initiative in socio-economic issues. The party put 
emphasis on referenda as a means to express public opinion. 
On the issue of Church-state relations PPS is radically secular. 
According to its members religious belief was a private matter 
and not part of the political arena. It calls for a definite 
separation of Church and state: liThe constitution must guarantee 
the division of Church from state ll26. It criticised the return of 
religious education to public schools. 
Economic Policy 
In economic terms PPS advocates a market economy but gives the 
govermnent the right and duty to intervene in its operation for 
the good of the people. Each individual has the inalienable right to 
work and it is the duty of the state to shape the free market to 
favour the workers. It supports ownership transformation in 
accordance with the wishes of workers, and the creation of 
co-operatives, local govermnent enterprises and workers I councils. 
It opposes the repurchasing at a very low price of existing 
industries by foreign capital, fearing that Western interests may 
I colonise I the Polish economy. PPS noted lithe tendency [of foreign 
capital] to take advantage of our difficult economic situation to 
dominate the Polish economy to the detriment of Polish society "27. 
Foreign investment is to be encouraged while guaranteeing the 
rights and participation of trade unions and workers I councils. 
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PPS demands heavy state intervention to rebuild the 
infrastructure of Poland's rural areas. It looks for consistent, long 
term government support through credits, the encouragement of 
new technology and a policy of guaranteed minimum prices for 
agricultural products. 
Foreign Policy 
In terms of foreign policy, PPS calls for close links with other 
post-communist countries which have similar socio-economic 
problems. Although generally favouring Poland's place in the 
process of European integration, the aforementioned fears of 
'economic imperialism' by the strong economic forces of European 
Union countries made PPS cautious. 
Political Fortunes 
Despite a populist program, promising society that it will take 
care of its sufferings, PPS has not gained many members. This can 
be explained by several factors. The traditional weakness of PPS 
as a predOminately emigre organisation made up of a small elite of 
activists did not lend itself to the post-communist development of 
a mass organisation. PPS likewise suffers from the 'nostalgia' party 
syndrome. Reliance on the ideology of an organisation which has 
been defunct during four decades of radical change can be 
anachronistic. Finally the negative influence of the communist 
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period on the fortunes of the left in post-communist Poland is 
obvious. Apart from PZPR-successor parties PPS was the only 
organisation willing to place itself on the left in 1990 (see Chart). 
The damage done to left-wing ideology by communist rule not 
only undermined PPS social popUlarity but caused internal splits. 
The traditional hostility of the PPS to Communism was 
increasingly opposed by pragmatic members who sought closer 
ties with post-PZPR parties. A decisive moment came in the 1993 
elections where a group of PPS members joined the 
post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). Three members of 
this group became MPs. By the 1995 elections PPS declared its 
support for the SLD candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski. 
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SP: The Labour Party (subsequently ChD SP: Christian 
Democratic Labour Party) 
Organisational/Ideological Roots 
Party of nostalgia revived 12th February 1989 as a continuation 
of the pre-war Christian Democrat (chadecja) organisation of the 
same name. In a bulletin in 1989 it emphasised it1s pre-communist 
roots, and six of its resolutions were taken from the programme 
of the SP in 1945. Closely linked with the Christian Democratic 
Club of Political Thought. Both groups were led by Wladyslaw 
Sila-Novicki a prominent lawyer who had represented many 
persecuted workers and opposition activists under communism. 
Backed by the still influential ZNAK movement which comprised 
several dozen Catholic Clubs of the Intelligentsia (KIK), the 
influential weekly newspaper ITygodnik Powszechnyl and the 
IZnakl monthly. Its program emphasised values similar to Western 
European Christian Democracy. 
Constitutional Policy 
Christian values were to form the framework of Polish life but 
not in an institutional way. While close to the ZChN on most 
issues, SP placed more stress on Catholic social teaching. 
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Economic Policy 
Although in favour of privatisation it supported a limited role for 
the state in the economy and espoused social services and welfare 
systems. 
Political Fortunes 
In 1989 the SP made it clear that it hoped to initiate the 
foundation of a wider Christian-democratic movement in Poland .. 
At the 3rd Congress of the SP (28-29th April and 2nd June 1990) 
a new name was chosen: The Christian democratic Labour party 
(ChD SP). Wladyslaw Sila Nowicki became leader of the Main 
Council. In September 1990 the ChDSP appealed to all Polish 
Christian-Democrat groups. As a result of inter-party friction 
(related, for instance, to Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki being put up as a 
candidate for the Presidency) the majority of members of youth 
groups (such as the Young Christian Democrats) left the ChDSP. 
They were followed by a group of activists who then founded the 
"United" Christian-Democratic Party (ChDS "Z"). SP activists 
questioned the representative character of the 
opposition-Solidarity side at the Round Table talks and the June 
'89 elections. OnlY two of its proposed candidates had been 
accepted into Solidarity's citizens committees: Walerian Piotrowski 
(who became an OKP Senator) and Marek Rusakiewiez (who 
obtained a mandate as an MP in the OKP) and this increased its 
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opposition to the Mazowiecki government. Not prominent in 
terms of pOlitical power but still influential. 
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7. Radical new parties 
K-LP UPR: The Conservative - Liberal Party IIUnion of 'Realpolitik'll 
Ideological/Organisational Roots 
Registered as a party 6th December 1990. Related personally and 
ideologically with the Movement for Realpolitik (RPR). Founders 
of the UPR were, among others, Janusz Korwin-Mikke Stefan 
Kisielewski, Stanislaw Michalkiewicz, Tomasz Gabis and 
Aleksander Jedraszczyk. Led by Janusz Korwin-Mikke who was a 
member of SD 1968-82 and adviser to NSZZ 'Solidarity' in the 
1980s. 
As its name suggested the organisation was politically right wing 
and conservative with radically liberal economic pOlicies. Its 
programme was largely based on the British Conservative Party's 
from the 1980s. Its roots lay in the emergence of neo-liberal 
economists in the early 1980s. In the aftermath of Martial Law 
they saw the diSintegrating economy as the biggest threat to 
Poland's future and attempted to propose socio-economic change 
without necessarily challenging the political status quo. Poland's 
economic plight was seen as the result not only of the communist 
system but also of the heavy demands of the Solidarity Trade 
Union for workers I rights and privileges. 
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At the very begin.ning of the Mazowiecki period UPR was an 
association which co-operated with similar organisations, holding 
conferences or participating in other liberal and Centre-Right 
groups. This changed after the introduction of the Balcerowicz 
Plan and the first few months of the Mazowiecki government. In 
March 1990, during a ISymposium of the Centre-Right in Polandl 
held in Poznan, Korwin-Mikke called the government and its 
supporters lithe Left, masking the propertied nomenklatura - that 
is NSZZ ISolidarityl, OKP and Citizens I Committees ll • UPR came to 
espouse a much more radical programme which called on the 
Right to reject the new political order. At a ICongress of the Polish 
Right I held in June 1990 the UPR criticised other liberals for 
co-operating with the Mazowiecki government and ISolidarityl. 
Two UPR members, Senator Andrzej Michalski and MP Andrzej 
Za wislak who had entered parliament under the aegis of 
Solidarity, resigned after being criticised for participating in the 
work of OKP, Centre Alliance (PC) and Congress of Liberal 
Democrats CK-LD). 
Constitutional Policy 
Democracy was not the priority of UPR. Its basic aim was to find 
the best way to realise its economic programme. Members of the 
party stressed that it was not important who introduced its 
policies, a tyrant or a representative of the majority, so long as 
they are introduced. The freedom of the citizen could be limited 
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only when the life, freedom or property of other people were 
threatened. The basic function of the state was the protection of 
freedom and property. With this in mind it proposed a radical 
change in trade union legislation. It wanted Poland1s withdrawal 
from the International Labour Organisation, compulsory 
transformation of trade unions into lIordinary associations II and 
the IIremoval of all additional privileges for unions and their 
members ll28. This explains its hostility to the first ISolidarityl 
government as an administration unduly influenced by the trade 
union movement. 
In January 1990 it issued an appeal to President Jaruzelski to 
dissolve Parliament and hold new elections. When this was refused 
it began to collect signatures for a referendum on the need for 
immediate and radical changes. It called for institutional reform 
with a reduction in the number of lVIPs to 120 and the 
appointment of a Council of State which had the right to veto 
legislation and a strengthening of Presidential powers29. 
Its traditional aspect was reflected in a call for Christian (though 
not specifically Catholic) values to be the moral base of Polish 
society and the Constitution. Thus Church and state were to be 
clearly separated30. 
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Economic Policy 
UPR called for the immediate introduction of a completely free 
market economy, extreme reduction of the state role and 
abolishment of social benefits: "Each part of the economy has to 
carry full responsibility for its activities - to take the profits or 
suffer the 10sses"31. Similarly privatisation was to be carried out 
as rapidly as possible regardless of any controversies surrounding 
nomenklatura' privatisation or the rights of employees. It called 
for "Privatisation of the means of production as quickly as 
possible and without any limits". UPR wanted a significant limit in 
taxation and the future introduction of a "general, equal basic 
rate". 
Foreign Policy 
In terms of foreign affairs UPR did not want Poland to join the 
European Union or international economic organisations because 
they were too bureaucratic. Membership would limit the flow of 
commodities and capital: "UPR perceives a threat in the form of 
the bureaucratic model of European integration, it being an 
attempt to impose socialist solutions on the nations of Europe at a 
supra-national leveL.attempts at supranational economic 
regulation and protectiOnism are threatening to Poland's 
development II 32. However it supported Poland's membership of 
NATO in the interests of national security. 
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Political Fortunes 
In the June 1989 elections Janusz Korwin-Mikke failed to win a 
mandate as a Senator for Wroclaw. In October 1990 he 
announced his candidacy for the Office of President but failed to 
get enough signatories. His ambitions initiated a split within the 
party. In the 1991 elections UPR won 2.26% of the votes and 
three seats in the Sejm. In 1992 UPR was particularly prominent 
in the heated debate on decommunisation. In 1993 it increased its 
share of the vote to 3.4% but failed to clear the 5% threshold for 
parliamentary representation. Korwin-Mikke ran for the 
presidency again in 1995 but got only 2.4% of the vote. This led to 
further splits in the party as fOllowers of Lech Walesa left to 
found the Party of Realpolitic (SPR) in January 1996. UPR 
continues to be a vociferous advocate of tax limits. It recently 
helped register the Association for the Defence of Tax-payers 
(STOP). 
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ZGhN: Christian Nationalist Union 
Ideological/Organisational Roots 
The founding Congress of ZChN took place 28/10/89, attended by 
around 300 representatives of 20 formations and informal 
groups. It was registered as a party in December 1990, led by 
Professor Wieslaw Crzanowski. It described itself as a party of the 
Right, on some questions Centre-Right, with a conservative rather 
than Christian Democratic character. Only people of the Roman 
Catholic faith could join the party. It saw itself as a new political 
party, but drawing on different currents from the past: 
independent, nationalist, Christian-nationalist and Christian 
sections of the peasant and worker movements and generally to 
the tradition of conservative thought. As a Catholic-Nationalist 
party ZChN was influenced by the traditions of the National 
Democratic Party (endecja) which dominated the Polish Right 
from the mid 19th century until 1945, its most distinguished 
leader being Roman Dmowski. 
In terms of organisational antecedents ZChN has roots in the 
opposition movements of the 1970 l s ROPCiO and the Young Poland 
Movement (RMP). These organisations split in the 1980 l s into 
groups such as The Political Club 1I0rder and Freedomll (leader 
Marek Jurek), The Political Society Young Poland (associated 
with Government Minister Aleksander Hall), The Polish Politics 
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Movement (led by another old Rl\IIP activist Tomasz W olek), The 
Political Olub IIFreedom and Solidarityll (led by Antoni 
Macierewicz, founder member of KOR, editor of 'Glos'). However 
the founding of ZChN began to reunite many of these old groups 
and one of its basic aims was the creation of a broad movement of 
Catholic Poles. Its founders emphasised that the group unified on 
the grounds of a common experience of the struggle with the 
communist system. This gave the party a decidedly 
anti-communist aspect. 
ZChN declarations could be grouped under two headings: the 
nation and the Catholic religion. Ideas such as the Icommon good', 
freedom, solidarity, state welfare, the family, the national 
community, independence and private property were all 
prominent. Its founding declaration outlined the National/Oatholic 
orientation of its policies: IIZ0hN appeals to everyone who 
supports state independence, stands for the interests of the nation 
and basing public life on the principles of Catholic ethicsll 33. 
Constitutional Policy 
In the political sphere ZChN saw pluralisation as vital and 
criticised the Mazowiecki government's attempts to stifle the 
process: IIRepressing the emergence of parties with an opposition 
pedigree can strengthen the transformed parties of the old 
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communist coalition"34. The Catholic, moral outlook adopted by 
ZChN led to a radical approach to Idecommunisationl. People and 
organisations contaminated with a communist past were to be 
removed from power and brought to justice as quickly as possible. 
The President is regarded as the highest political authority in the 
state, appointed by general election and with extensive legislative 
powers. ZChN also called for the strengthening of the local tier of 
government. 
ZChN wanted Poland1s Catholic identity reflected in public life: 
liThe Catholic religion is an expression of truth, which is 
obligatory in personal and public life ". In the transition period 
this included the revision of all laws made under the rule of the 
latheisticl communists: IILaws and institutions aiming to destroy 
the Christian outlook of our social life, attacking Catholic ethics, 
the rights of unborn children, the rights of the family and church 
ought to be changed"35. In Parliament it pressed for the 
ratification of laws protecting the rights of the unborn child. It 
was also prominent in the debates on religious education. 
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Economic Policy 
The party's approach to economic reform was informed by 
nationalism, Catholic social teaching and hostility to communists. 
It favoured a free market model, particularly its emphasis on 
individual enterprise but advocated government intervention in 
the economy for the duration of the transition process, in order 
to protect Polish interests It demanded far-reaching privatisation 
to take property from communist hands and give it to as many 
ordinary Poles as possible. IDtimately ZChN saw its constituency 
as a new, propertied class. 
Foreign Policy 
In terms of foreign relations defence of the newly attained Polish 
independence and sovereignty was the first priority and ZChN 
was thus wary of complete commitment to the EU. Nevertheless it 
supported closer links with other Central European countries. 
Political Fortunes 
The ZChN circle in the OKP had 8 MP's and Senators, including 
Marek Jurek, Stefan Niesiolowski and Jan Lopuszanski. Members 
of the ZChN were involved in the citizens committee movement 
and other self-governing local initiatives, such as the Lodz Citizens 
Alliance, the Citizens' Democratic and Pluralist Alliance, the Union 
of Catholic Laity and the Christian Citizens'. In the presidential 
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elections the ZChN supported the candidacy of Lech Walesa. After 
the October 1991 parliamentary elections ZChN was prominent in 
the Catholic-led coalition government of Jan Olszewski. ZChN's 
fundamental, Catholic outlook contributed to the moral and 
ideological conflicts (e.g. over separation of Church and state, 
abortion and de-communisation) which plagued the two 
subsequent Solidarity coalition governments. After the defeat of 
the Solidarity coalition in 1993 ZChN was removed from 
government structures. It then began to split into two internal 
strands: very pragmatic (represented by Ryszard Czarnecki, 
Stefan Niesolowski and others) and unswervingly 
Nationalist-Christian-Fundamentalist (Jan Lopuszanski and Marek 
Jurek). Different conceptions of the party's relations with Lech 
Walesa contributed to the split. In the presidential elections of 
1995 the party publicised its own candidate - Hanna 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz - but Lopuszanski and others supported Walesa. 
However it has returned to political prominence as one of the 
largest parties in 'Solidarity Electoral Alliance I (AWS) which won 
power in the 1997 parliamentary elections. Around 20 ZChN 
members have entered parliament under the auspices of AWS. 
The press organs of the ZChN are "Wiadomosci Dnia" and "Glos" 
and "Sprawa Polska". 
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KPN: Confederation of Independent Poland 
Ideological/Organisational Roots 
Founded on 1st September 1979 in Warsaw as a conspirational 
independence organisation, registered publicly as a party 21/8/90. 
Founder and leader was Leszek Moazulski who along with other 
KPN activists split from ROPCiO opposition organisation in 1979. 
Several members been arrested many times during the 
communist period. Moczulski was also Chief Commander of the 
Rifle Club, a youth group associated with the KPN which had been 
revived 6/8/89). It claimed to represent lithe young intelligentsia, 
private businessmen and the 'combatant' intelligent sia" 36. 
A nationalist, populist party, it drew on the Polish tradition, 
exemplified by Pilsudski, which set the achievement of Polish 
independence above all other targets and blamed most of the 
nation's ills on external factors. However, in keeping with 
Pilsudski's multi-ethnic vision, the nationalism of KPN did not 
include ethnocentrism or anti-Semitism. Radically anti-communist 
and anti-Soviet, it regarded the communist state as alien and set 
the achievement of complete independence as it's most important 
goal.. As a result it opposed the Solidarity moderates who were 
involved in the Round Table talks, remaining outside the 
Solidarity part of the opposition. In March 1990 it published its 
IProgramme for the Reconstruction of the Independent State of 
the Third Republic '. The main thrust of this was a refusal to 
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accept the legitimacy of the communist state and the laws and 
institutions of the communist period. Importantly the KPN 
regarded the forthcoming Presidential elections of December 1990 
as the founding moment of the post-communist era - liThe first act 
of the newly-born Third Republic"37. This implicitly questioned 
the legitimacy of the Round Table agreement and the authority of 
the Mazowiecki government. 
Constitutional Policy 
This radical attitude was also reflected in KPNls approach to 
institutional reform. It saw a desperate need for immediate and 
far-reaching reform of the state because the procedures and 
personnel of the old system were still in position, acting as an 
impediment to reform: IIRetaining the old state system must lead 
to complete catastrophe for the state ll 38. KPN thus called for the 
immediate introduction of a completely new constitution and 
parliamentary elections. It also demanded a strengthe:n.ing of 
political power at regional and local levels. This reflected the fact 
that KPN enjoyed strong grass roots support in certain areas 
traditionally associated with militant, anti-communist resistance 
and protests, particularly Cracow, Lodz, Upper Silesia, Poznan 
(where commemorations of the Red Army massacre of officers at 
Katyn were regularly organised with the involvement of KPN 
members in the 1980s) and Szczecin. 
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Economic Policy 
Its economic priorities were to build up the state treasury, to 
initiate fair privatisation, to revise the tax system, to equalise 
conditions of development for all sectors. To emerge from 
recession KPN advocated the use of cheap credits for economic 
investment. State intervention in social life was to be limited and 
the administrative structures of the state reduced. The system of 
pension, health and social assistance benefits had to be divided 
from the budget. Payments for the relief of the unemployed must 
be recompensed by work in public services. 
Foreign Policy 
In international politics KPN saw Poland in a leading role 
between East and West in terms of economic contacts and 
integration. However its nationalism was evident in its view of 
union as a IEurope of fatherlands I . 
Political Fortunes 
In the June elections KPN put up 16 candidates as MPls and 5 as 
Senators. However only one member of the KPN made it to 
parliament, the OKP Senator Andrzej Fenrych (who ran as a 
member of Solidarity1s national list). At the beginning of 1990 the 
KPN took up a position of opposition to the government. In the 
territorial elections of May 1990 120 KPN members were elected 
to councils. Leszek Moczulski ran as a candidate for the 
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Presidency (receiving around 2.5% of the vote), with the support, 
for instance, of ISolidarity 801• In the period 1989-91 the KPN 
organised many protest actions e.g. in support of freedom for 
Lithuania from the USSR, the removal of the Red Army from 
Poland, justice for those persecuted under Martial Law, 
liquidation of PZPR (members occupied PZPR premises). In 1989 it 
formed the IRifle Clubl preparing the young to defend the 
fatherland. The KPN was thus suspected of having undemocratic, 
chauvinistic tendencies. Differences existed within KPN between 
those who wanted to adopt an explicitly Rightist identity and 
those (including Leszek Moczulski) who wanted it to remain 
committed to Polish independence and the fight against 
Communism and its legacy. In the 1991 elections it campaigned on 
a radical anti-establishment platform, directed against the former 
system and Solidarity and won 7.5 % of the vote. During the third 
party congress in March 1989 and again in 1994 members 
resigned, accusing Moczulski of being too dictatorial. In 1991 KPN 
won 46 places in the Sejm and 4 in the Senate. However it did 
not enter the Olszewski coalition because of disagreements over 
its proposed policy of decommunisation. In 1993 it won 22 places 
in the Sejm. In 1995 it joined a Patriotic camp with supporters of 
Walesals candidacy. This camp went on to become part of 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) which won the 1997 elections 
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and thus gained some limited access to political power. Its press 
organs are IIDroga ll , IIGazeta Polska ll and 1I0p inia ll • 
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Introduction 
The following section lists the biographical details of some of the 
most important actors in the politics of the transition period. The 
intention is to illustrate the ideological diversity of the Polish 
intelligentsia milieu and identify these figures with the various 
social and political bases established in the thesis. Although some 
personalities were not of obvious political influence at the time 
they are included as a representative of a particular ideological 
strand. The profiles draw on information from a variety of 
sources, particularly Hanna Malarecka-Simbierowicz et aI., Nasi 
w sejmie i senacie (Warsaw: Volumen 1990) and Roger East 
and J olyon Pontin Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Pinter Great Britain 1997). 
Information on political organizations mentioned here in italics 
can be found in Appendix I IGuide to Political Organizations I 
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1. The Lay Left 
Adam Michnik 
Born 14/10/46 into an intelligentsia family with Jewish and 
communist backgrounds. His father was a well-known communist 
party activist before the war, spending eight years in prison. In 
1961 Michnik was co-founded the discussion group 'The Club In 
Search of Contradictions'. As a student of history at Warsaw 
University he twice protested for students' rights. In March 1965 
he protested as part of Kuron and Modzelewski's Open Letter to 
the Membership of the PZPR (he was sentenced to two months in 
jail). In March 1968 he was expelled from college for his part in 
the student protests against state censorship. He was arrested 
shortly afterwards and sentenced to three years imprisonment. 
Freed under the 1969 amnesty, he worked for two years worked 
as a welder in the Rosa Luxembourg Steelworks, an experience 
many observers regard as vital to his own and the intelligentsia's 
strengthening links with the industrial workers. In 1975 he 
completed his studies as an extern student at the History Faculty 
of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. He was a member 
of KOR (1977-80), joint-founder and lecturer in the Association of 
Educational Courses (TKN, 'The FlyIDg University'). From 1977 he 
edited a series of independent publications (Information Bulletin, 
'Zapis', 'Krytyka'). In 1980-81 he was an adviser to NSZZ 
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'Solidarity's' Mazowsze Regional Body, and to the Solidarity 
Commission for Steelworkers in the Lenin Steelworks in Nowa 
Huta. He was interned after the declaration of Martial Law in 
December 1981, charged with attempting to overthrow the system. 
He was freed in the amnesty of 1984. Michnik was arrested again 
in February 1985 and sentenced to three years imprisonment. 
Freed in 1986 amnesty. Adviser to KKW (National Executive 
Committee of Solidarity) and was a member of the KG (Citizens' 
Committee). He participated in the plenary debates of the Round 
Table (the 'Magdalenka') and in the group negotiations dealing 
with political reform and the sub-group dealing with the mass 
media. From May 1989 he was editor in chief of Solidarity's 
electoral newspaper "Gazeta Wyborcza". Elected to the Sejm 
4/6/89 as Jv.IP for Bytom (with 70.19% of the vote). Michnik was 
member of the Sejm Commissions on Culture and the Mass Media, 
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution. He is an historian, essayist, 
political journalist, author of many articles and books, amomg 
others, liThe Church, The Left, A Dialogue" (1977), liThe Chances of 
Polish Democracy" (1984), "Such Times .. Concerning 
Compromise II (1985 ), "polish Questions"(1987) etc .. 
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Bronislaw Geremek 
Born 6/3/32 in Warsaw into an intelligentsia family. During the 
period of occupation he studied in secret, and after the war in the 
grammar school in W schow and in the pre-University B. 
Lirnanowski College in Warsaw. He studied history at the 
University of Warsaw. From 1956-58 he continued his studies at 
the Sorbonne. He worked in the History Institude of PAN (Polish 
Academy of Sciences), where in 1960 he received his doctorate. 
From 1962-65 he was Director of the Centre for Polish Culture at 
the University of Paris and lecturer of Polish History at the 
Sorbonne. In 1970 became assitant professor at the History 
Institute of PAN, he headed the Study of the History of Polish 
Culture in the Middle Ages. He lectured at many Universities 
abroad. In 1985 he was dismissed from his work at PAN for 
political reasons. He was reinstated in 1989 and apPointed 
assistant professor. Honourary doctor of Utrecht, Tours and 
Columbia University (New York), A. Jurzykowski laureat winner, 
member of the Polish and French PEN Club, Polish Historical 
Society and the Association of European Culture. 
1948-1950 Geremek was a member of the ZMP (Zwiazek 
Mlodziezy Polskiej: Polish Youth Union) - the communist youth 
organisation. He was a member of PZPR from 1950-1968 when he 
resigned after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. From 1978-80 
755 
lecturer of the TKN (the underground 'The Flying University'). In 
August 1980 he joined the group of experts in the MKS 
(Inter-Factory Strike Committee) in Gdansk. He was then one of 
the principal advisers of KK NSZZ tgo]idarityl (National 
Committee of the Trade Union 'Solidarity'). He was interned after 
Martial Law and released in 1982. After bei:ng released he was 
adviser to the TKK (Provisional Co-ordinati:ng Commission of the 
Trade Union 'Solidarity') and Lech Walesa. Arrested in May 1983, 
he was freed under the amnesty of July that year, then he 
became adviser to KKW (National Executive Commission of 
Solidarity) and leader of the commission for political reform in 
the KG (Citizens' Committee). Participated in the plenary debates 
of the Round Table (the 'Magdalenka') and was joint chairman of 
the group dealing with political reforms. Elected to the Sejm 
4/6/89 as MP for Suwalki (75% of the votes). Chairman of the 
Sejm Commission on Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the Sejm 
Constitutional Commission, Chairman of the OKP. After the 
Mazowiecki period Geremek became a prominent member of un 
and UW After the latter's success in the 1997 general elections he 
was appointed Foreign Minister in the A WS-UW coalition 
government. 
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Jacek Kuron 
Born 3/3/34 in Lwow into an intelligentsia family. After 
secondary school he studied history at Warsaw University. In 
March 1953 he joined the PZPB as a student and became a 
dissident, liberal voice in the party. He was expelled a year later 
for refusing to stop his criticisms. From 1954 to 1961 he 
established a party, the IIWalterows ll (the so-called Red Scouts). In 
1956 worked jointly with workers councils in Zerania and took 
part in the reform movement at Warsaw University. Rejoined the 
communist party, from which he was finally expelled in 1964 and 
arrested for writing, together with Karol Modzelewski, the 10pen 
Letter to Members of the PZPR' (he was imprisoned for three 
years). Arrested again 8/3/68 accused of inspiring the so-called 
'March Events' (he was imprisoned for three and a half years). In 
1975 he was co-author of the 'Letter of 591 - a protest against the 
preface of the Constitution of the People's Republic where the 
'leading role ' of the PZPR and Poland's alliance with the USSR 
were emphasised. A year later he was one of the creators of KGB 
and one of it's most active members. He was a lecturer for the 
underground 'Flying University'. He was arrested in August 1980 
together with other opposition activists but freed under the 
Gdansk Agreement. In 1980 he was adviser to NSZZ ~olidarityl ( 
Solidarity Trade Union's National Committee). Interned after 
Martial Law, charged with trying to overthrow the system. Freed 
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as a result of the amnesty in 1984, he was active in Solidarity's 
underground activities. Member of the KG and participant in the 
'Magdalenka' discussions. At the Round Table he worked on the 
political reforms group and in the working group for electoral 
law. Elected to the Sejm as lVIP for Warsaw-Zoliborz (65.88% of the 
vote) Regarded as a possible prime minister, he instead became 
Minister of Labour and Social Politics in the Mazowiecki 
Government. Also member of the Sejm Commissions of 
Administration and Foreign Affairs Kuron has subsequently 
become respected as one of Poland's elder statesmen. His 
popularity is regularly recorded in opinion polls. However he 
received only 9% of the vote in the 1995 presidential election 
where he ran as the candidate of the UW Historian, author of 
articles collected and issued by the independent press: "Politics and 
Responsibility" (1984), "To Win over the Silent Majority" (1988), 
"My Soup"(1990), describing his experiences of the transition 
period. 
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Henryk Wujec 
Born 1/1/41 in Bilgoraj into a peasant famiJy. He studied at 
mathematics and physics at Warsaw University, finishing in 1970. 
From 1968-78 he worked in the Tewa Selmifabricates factory in 
Warsaw. From 1962 he was a member of the Warsaw Catholic 
Club of the Intelligentsia (KIK). While a student he took part in 
the so-called March events of 1968. He was co-organiser of help for 
the workers of Radom and Ursus in July 1976, and a KOR 
activist. In 1977 he became a member of KSS 'KOR' and was one 
of the founders and editors of 'Ro botnik'. One year later he was 
dismissed from work at 'Tewa'. He worked for the 'Flying 
University' and organised independent workers groups. From 
August 1980 active in the formation of the trade union 
movement. In 1980 he joined the preSidium of the Regional 
Authority of the NSZZ Solidarity and was then head of trade 
union education and university workers, he organised workers 
self-government. He was interned after Martial Law, charged with 
trying to overthrow the system. 13/8/84 freed under amnesty. 
Imprisoned again from 1/6/86 to 13/9/86. He remained active in 
Solidarity's underground structures. He participated in the Round 
Table negotiations as a member of the group dealing with the 
pluralism of the union. Elected to the Sejm as MP for Zamosc, 
member of the Sejm Commissions on Political Economy, the Budget 
and Finances. Secretary of the Solidarity Parliamentary Caucus 
(OKP). 
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2. Andrzej Stelmachowski - Liberal Catholic 
Born 28/1/25 in Poznan. His father was a professor at Poznan 
University and judge at the High Court, imprisoned by the Soviet 
authorities in Brzesc. It is thought that he was killed in the 
Katyn massacre of Polish officers by the Russian Army. In the 
war years Andrzej was a soldier of the AK. In 1947 he completed 
his studies of law at Poznan University and in 1950 recieved a 
doctorate in legal studies. In 1957 he took up a position in the 
judicature for the representation of workers pilgrimages to 
Czestochowa. From 1962 he was professor at Wroclaw University 
and from 1969 at Warsaw University. He also lectured at the 
Academy of Catholic Theology. 1972-1975 was leader of the 
Council of the Polish Teachers' Trade Union at Warsaw 
University. From 1975 he was a member of the Primate's Council 
for Church Building and for several years a member of the 
Episcopal Commission "Lustitia et Pax" and from 1979 the 
Episcopal Commission for the ministry to the Farmers. 1987-90 
leader of the Warsaw Catholic Club of the Intelligentsia (KIK). In 
August 1980 he was an adviser to the MKS in Gdansk Shipyard. 
1980-1 was an expert in the Centre for Socio-Professional Work at 
the KK NSZZ 'Solidarity' and adviser to NSZZ RI 'Solidarity 
Remained a Solidarity adviser during Martial Law. He played a 
prominent role in the advent of the Round Table talks and 
particiapted in the 'Magdalenka'. At the Round Table he was 
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co-leader of the agriculture discussion group and member of the 
working group on private farmers trade union legislation. 
Elected as Senator for Bialystok. Chosen as Speaker of the Senate 
he could thus lead debates in the house and oversee proceedings. 
He was prominent in the early transition period as an advocate 
of anti-abortion legislation. 
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3. Jan Jozef Lipski - Socialist 
Born 25/5/26 into intelligentsia family with tradition of patriotic 
resistance. His father Roman Lipski was deported to Russia after 
the school strike of 1905. During the Nazi occupation Jan Jozef 
studied at the clandestine study groups. In 1942 became involved 
in Polish resistance movement and in 1943 was a soldier in the 
'Baszta' regiment of the AK (Polish underground army). Took part 
in the Warsaw Uprising. 1946-1953 he studied the philology of 
Poland at Warsaw University, working simultaneously in book 
publishing. From 1961 worked at the Institute of Literary 
Research PAN (Polish Academy of Sciences)., received a doctorate. 
1956-57. He became editor and head of the cultural department of 
the weekly newspaper "Po Prostu" which had a tradition of 
independence from the communist authorities. 1957-1959 leader 
of the Crooked Circle Club (KKK). In 1964 he was co-organiser of 
the 'Letter of 341, then co-initiator and signatory of numerous 
protests, eg in 1975 against the preface of the Constitution of the 
People's Republic which dealt with the leading role of the PZPR 
and the alliance with the Soviet Union. In 1968 he helped 
organise support for persecuted students and academics. In 
September 1976 he was one of the founders of KOB. He was put 
under arrest from May-June 1977. Active in 1980 in NSZZ 
~olidaI'jty~ among other things, as a member of the Mazowsze 
Regional Leadership and delegate to the first National Congress in 
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Gdansk. After the introduction of Martial Law he got into the 
IIUrsusll works and participated in protest strikes. Arrested in 
January 1982 charged with leading the strikes. He was absent 
from the trial because of poor health, and stayed in hospital 
under the guard of the SE (secret police). He was released 
conditionally in May 1982 and went to London for health 
treatment. After returning to Poland he was arrested again for 
his activities in Solidarity's underground structures, then freed 
under amnesty. In 1987 co-founder of the recreated PPS (Polish 
Socialist Party), he became head of it's Governing Council. Elected 
Senator for Radom province 4/6/89. Leader of the informal 
Parliamentary 'Group for the Defence of Workers Interests' which 
had ties with the PPS. He wrote liThe Committee for the Defence of 
Workers - the Committee for Social Self-Defence 'KOR'" and "Two 
Fatherlands - Two Patriotismsll. 
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4. J arosla w Kaczynski 
Born 18/6/49 in Warsaw into an intelligentsia family. Father was 
a soldier in the AK. In 1967 took his degree and in 1971 finished 
the Law Course at Warsaw University. In 1967 he received a 
doctorate from the University's Law Faculty. After his studies he 
worked in the Institute of Political Science, Learning and Higher 
Education. He published a few educational works. From 1976 he 
was a member of KOR, he helped repressed workers in Plock, he 
was then a member of the Interventionist Bureau of KSS 'KOR', 
the part of the Committee which organised relief efforts for 
persecuted workers. Member of the editorial team of the 
independent magazine 'Glos'. In 1980 he helped the strike in 
Wroclaw and then he became leader of the Legal section of the 
Centre for Social Research in NSZZ Solidarityts Mazowsze 
Regional Base. After the introduction of Martial Law he returned 
to the editorship of 'Glos'. In 1982 he became a member of the 
Helsinki Committee in Poland, and continued to be active in 
underground Solidarity. He took part in the Round Table 
negotiations in the Group dealing with political reforms and the 
Group for legal and judicial reforms. Elected as a Senator 
representing Elblag province (on the Baltic Coast, near Gdansk). 
This reflected his power base which was closer to Lech Walesa's 
constituency than that of the Warsaw-based intelligentsia which 
dominated the Mazowiecki government. Member of the Sejm 
765 
commissions on Human Rights and Law and Order and the 
Constitutional Commission. From October 1989 was editor in chief 
of ITygodnik Solidarityll. One of the main organisers of PC and 
appointed its leader in May 1990. 
766 
5. Marek Jurek - Nationalist Catholic 
Born 28/6/60 in Gorzow Wielkopolski to a working class family. 
His grandfather on his mother's side was a volunteer on the 
Polish/Bolshevik war of 1920 and a soldier in the AK. He attended 
secondary school in Gorzow Wielkopolski and then studied history 
at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan (finished in 1983). 
After his studies at elementary school he wrote for Catholic and 
oppposition periodicals. In 1989 member of the editorship of "Signs 
of the Times" in Rome. In 1978 became active in ROPGiG (The 
Movement for the Defence of Human and Citizens I Rights in 
Poland). In 1979 one of the founding group of the RMP (Young 
Poland Movement) and member of it's governing council. In 1980 
he entered NZS (Union of Independent Students). At the same 
time he and his colleagues founded in Poznan the academic 
organisation "Pro Patria" of which he was leader. After the 
proclamation of Martial Law he went into hiding and then 
became member of the editorial staff of "polish Politics", around 
which was concentrated the activities of RMP. In 1987 co-founder 
and leader of the Wielkopolski Political Club "Order and Freedom". 
4/6/89 elected to the Sejm as MP for Leszno. In 1989 he joined the 
leadership of ZGhN Member of the Sejm Commission on Foreign 
Affairs. 
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6. Neo-Liberals 
Leszek Balcerowicz 
Born 1947 in Lipno. He is a professor of economic science. He 
studied at the Faculty of Foreign Trade at the Main School of 
Plann:ing and Statistics in Warsaw as well as St John's University 
in New York. He was a member of PZPR but left the party after 
the delegalisation of Solidarity in 1981. He then worked as an 
adviser to NSZZ Solidarity From September 1989 to December 
1991 vice-Premier and Minister of Finance in the Mazowiecki and 
then Bielicki governments. He was the architect of the politically 
risky Balcerowicz Plan, the first and most radical pro-market 
reform programme in post-communist East-Oentral Europe. He 
was sacrificed for political reasons with the appointment of the 
Olszewski government in 1991. He joined UWon its formation in 
1994 and was elected leader the following year. After UW's success 
in 1997 general elections he returned as Finance Minister and 
deputy Prime Minister. 
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Andrzej Zawislak 
Born 15/3/37 in Warsaw to an intelligentsia family. Studied at the 
Faculty of Political Economy at Warsaw University unti 1963. In 
1967 he studied abroad through a Ford Foundation grant at 
Columbia University. Worked in the Economic Research Institute's 
Planning Commission for the Council of Ministers. In this period 
he took a doctorate in the main school of Planning and Statistics 
in 1971. In 1974 he studied at the Wharton Shool of Commerce in 
New York. He then worked in the Faculty of Management at 
Warsaw Univerity. In 1979 he qualified as a professor. He also 
worked at the Catholic University in LUblin. Lectured at many 
foreign universities, including Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Istambul, 
Budapest and Oxford. In the second half of the 1970s he was 
member of the Seminar group "Experience and Future: a group 
of intellectuals and activists who tried to forge links with 
reformers in the PZPR, such as Mieczyslaw Rakowski and Andrzej 
Wasilewski, on the basis of the need for liberal economic reform 
rather than pOlitical transformation. In 1980 he was member of 
the Independent Self-governing Trade Union of Scientists, 
Technicians and Education workers and then a member of the 
Schools Commission of NSZZ 'Solidarityl at Warsaw University. 
Long-term consultant of the 'Solidarity' leadership on economic 
matters. Founding member of the 'Industrial Society and 
Economic Action', a liberal lobby propagating the ideas of 
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free-marketism, connected with Solidarity, although critical of its 
pro-labour tendencies. Activist of liberal groups, participant and 
signatory of 'National Congress of Liberals'. Member of UPR in 
1989 but expelled in 1990 for fostering close links with PC 
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7. Aleksander Kwasniewski: Former Communist 
Born 1954. A member of thePZPR from 1977 to its demise in 
1989-90. Graduated from the University of Gdansk as a Transport 
Economist. Journalist on 'Standard of Youth'. A member of the 
governments of the latter half of the 1980s, he was responsible for 
Youth and Sport. President of the Polish Olympic Committee 
(1988-92), chaired the Social Political Committee under Rakowski. 
Participant in the government side at the 'Magdalenka'. With the 
demise of PZPR in 1990 he became President of SdRP and leader 
of the leftist electoral block it dominated SLD. In 1991 he was 
elected to the Sejm. 1993-5 he served as Chair of the National 
Assembly (combining Sejm and Senate) commission charged with 
drafting a new constitution. Elected President in 1995 where he 
presented himself as a moderate, pragmatiC politician and 
attracted a crucial part of the floating vote. 
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8. Andrzej Fenrych: Radical Nationalist 
Born 7/11/22 in Poznan. IDs father was a farmer, mother a 
teacher. IDs father was an artillery commander in the 
Wielkopolska Uprising who fought as a volunteer in September 
1939, was taken prisoner by the Red Army and was subsequently 
listed as missing. During the war Andrzej and his family were 
forcibly moved from Wielkopolska to Tarnow. He worked in the 
timber industry and on a farm estate. In 1944 he fought in the 
ranks of the Home Army CAK). He was injured in one of its 
operations. After the war he returned to Poznan He studied at 
the Economics IDgh School in Krakow while still working. From 
1950 he worked in a high school in Tarnow as deputy director of 
the economics department. He recieved a distintinction of the first 
order from the Minister of Education for outstanding work in 
education. In 1979 he took early retirement as a war invalid. 
From 1979 he headed the Tarnow branch of the Union of War 
Invalids. In 1980 he joined NSZZ 'Solidarity'. He was a co-founder 
of the Circle of Combatants in Tarnow. He took part in the first 
National Rally of Combatants belonging to Solidarity in October 
1981. During Martial Law he participated in the independent life 
of Tarnow, he wrote articles in the underground press, organised 
annual commemorations of the war-time Katyn massacre of Polish 
soldiers by the Red Army. He worked in the Church1s Ministry for 
working people. In 1988 he became cheif of the Tarnow branch of 
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the KPN In 1989 was elected Senator for Tarnow and was 
member of the Commissions of Culture, Media, Science and 
Education and Local Self-government. 
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9. Czeslaw Milosz - Traditional Liberal Intelligentsia 
Born 30/6/11 in Szetejnie, Lithuania (then Tsarist Russia), to part 
Polish, part Lithuanian parents. ills father was an engineer. ills 
family was constanlY on the move because of work. He was 
educated in Wilno (Vilnius) at the Zygmunt August Gimnazjum 
and at the King Stefan Batory University where he graduated 
with a degree in law. During his studies he participated in the 
work of the University Polish Studies Group. In 1935 he received 
the Diplome Superieur d'Etudes Francaises Modernes from the 
Alliance Francaise in Paris. Was active in the Warsaw 
Underground during WWll. Between 1946 and 1951 he served as 
a member of the Polish Foreign Service as a cultural attache in 
New York, Washington and Paris. Despite his initial sympathies 
for radical change he broke with the communist regime and 
became a pOlitical exile. A celebrated poet, essayist and translator 
he recieved Nobel Prize for Literature in 1980. "The Captive 
Mind", a depiction of the plight of the intellectual in communist 
Eastern Europe, is regarded as one of his most influential works. 
However his works were not officially published in commuist 
Poland. Towards the end of the communist era he visited Poland 
and met with students and intellectuals. 
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10. Presidential Candidates of 1990 
Roman Bartoszcze 
Born 1946 into a peasant family in Lubelszczyzn. His father was 
beaten up by the communist Citizens' Militia (MO) in 1981 during 
protests. His brother Piotr, a NSZZ RI 'Solidarity' member died in 
mysterious circumstances. Roman is a private farm owner. He led 
a national peasant strike in 1981. In 1981 he became a member of 
the national presidium of NSZZ RI ISolida,rityl and leader of of 
the Union's Bydgoszcz Regional Council. He was interned in 1982. 
Member of the Citizens I Committee (KO). In 1989 became MP in 
the Sejm under the mandate of the Citizen's Committee, 
nominated as a candidate by PSL. From November 1989, one of 
the leadsers of the reactivated PSL. Elected as its leader in March 
1990. Ran for President in the elections of 1990. In the campaign 
he presented himself as a representative of the peasant 
movement, linking himself to its century-old traditional 
programme. Was obviously supported by the PSL, but also the 
Voluntary Fire Brigade, the Peasant Youth Movement and the 
Peasant Women1s l Guild and the Union of Agricultural 
Co-operatives and Organisations. These organisations nominally 
accounted for three million members. He also drew support from 
nationalist circles and, towards the end of the campaign he 
received the backing of "Solidarity 80", The Christian-Democratic 
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Labour Party and it's leader Jan Sila-Nowicki. Bartoszcze had to 
prove that the PSL was completely transformed from the ZSL and 
done this through propagating the conservative-nationalist values 
of the traditional peasants' movement. He came fifth in the first 
round of voting with 7.2% of the vote. In 1991 he was ousted 
from the PSL leadership at an acrimonious Oongress and replaced 
by the ex-ZSL member Waldemar Pawlak. 
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Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz 
Born 1950 in Warsaw, from an intelligentsia family, graduate of 
the Law Faculty of Warsaw University. Doctor of Law and bursar 
of the Fullbright Fund (1980/81). Owned private farming 
enterprise. In 1990 he was MP in the Sejm as a member of the 
now defunct PZPR, Chairman of the Parliamentary Klub of the 
Democratic Left (PKLD). Only one of the six major candidates not 
to be interned or imprisoned during Martial Law. Represented 
that part of the democratic left with an anti-Solidarity 
orientation. His candidature was regarded as part of the attempt 
of this group to resist political exclusion. For many of his 
potential voters ,however, he still I smelt I too much of the PZPR. He 
was supported by PKLD, SdRp, Women1s l Democratic Union (UDK), 
the Union of Co-operatives (US), the Union of Polish Socialist 
Youth (ZSMP), the Council of Social-democratic Youth (RMS) as 
well as part of the OPZZ. The candidacy of Cimoszewicz was 
announced in and supported by the daily newspaper "Trybuna". 
Came fourth in the first round of voting with 9.2% of the vote. 
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Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
Born 1927 in Plock, a descendent of a traditional, landed 
intelligentsia family. Graduate of the Law Faculty of Warsaw 
University and prominent journalist. Initially linked to PAX but 
from 1957-71 MP in the Sejm as a member of the more 
independent and critical Catholic Parliamentary group ZNAK. 
Active in the Warsaw Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK) 
where eventually he became vice-Chairman under Andrzej 
Stelmahowski. Founder and long-time editor of the Catholic 
monthly "WIEZ". In 1980 adviser to the Inter-Factory Strike 
Committee in Gdansk and subsequently to NSZZ 'Solidarity/. 
Interned during Martial Law. Then became editor of the 
Solidarity newspaper ITygodnik Solidarniscl. One of the major 
negotiators from the Solidarity camp at the IMagdalenkal and the 
Round Table talks themselves. From September 1989 he was 
Premier at the head of the first non-communist government in 
Eastern Europe in 43 years. His support for Ishock therapyl - the 
radical programme of economic reform - was strongly opposed by 
Walesa and the labour movement. The subsequent IWar at the 
Topl led directly to Presidential contest between Mazowiecki and 
Walesa. Mazowiecki1s candidacy was supported by those groups 
espousing the ISolidarity ethosl of pro-government unity and 
opposing the election of Lech Walesa. These included ROAD, FPD, 
and the Krakow Democratic Alliance (which was linked with the 
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Catholic-oriented daily paper IITygodnik Powszechnyll). Also had 
the support of a few local citizens' committees and a section of 
MPs and senators in the OKP. His candidacy was announced in 
and supported by the newspaper IIGazeta Wyborcza". However he 
came a humiliating third behind Walesa and Tyminski with only 
18.1 % of the vote. His government immediately resigned. 
Mazowiecki became leader of un in 1991 and its led its successor 
party UW from 1994-5. From 1992-5 Mazowiecki was UN Special 
Envoy on Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia, responsible for 
investigating war crimes. 
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Leszek Moczulski 
Born in 1930 in Warsaw. A lawyer and graduate of the Law 
Faculty of Warsaw University as well as it's Academy of Political 
science. Joined the PZPR during his studies and was also active in 
the Polish Youth Movement (ZMP) (1948-56). Author of the book 
liThe Polish War, 1939" (pub. 1972) as well as "Revolution Without 
Revolution" (pub 1979) which contained his programme of how 
Poland could regain it's independence. In the second half of the 
1950's he engaged in illegal, pro-independence organisations. 
Moczulski was regarded with suspicion by some dissident 
intellectuals due to his involvement with General Moczar's 
chauvinistic-militaristic PZPR camp in the late 1960s. Moczulski 
and others had written articles critical of the 'revisionist ' student 
and intellectual protests of 1968. In 1977 he was co-founder and 
spokesman of ROPGiQ. In 1979 he founded the radical, 
pro-independence KPN, of which he was chairman. Harassed by 
the authorities throughout the late 1970's, arrested in August 
1981 and released in 1986. Received only 2.5% of the vote in 1990. 
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Stanislaw Tyminski 
Born in 1948 in Pruszkow (outside Warsaw) into a blue-collar 
family. Had a technical secondary school education. Left Poland in 
1969, emigrating for economic purposes. As well as Polish, he holds 
Canadian and Peruvian citizenship. In 1990 he presented himself 
as a self-made man. According to the official version of his life, he 
was head of Transduction Ltd. which owned cable television in 
Peru and agricultural land in Canada. Suspicions were raised over 
his background during the campaign.. He was also leader of a 
marginal party in Canada (the Libertarian Party). He published a 
book "Holy Dogs" in Poland which initially was supposed to 
provide advice on how to build a business. It later became the 
vehicle for the candidate1s political and economic platform. He 
financed the campaign. himself. He arrived in the country at the 
beginning of the campaign. process and presented himself as an 
independent candidate, drawing on his popular image as an 
establishment outsider. These tactics, in the context of the 
government-led programme of austerity and the ongoing 
diSintegration of Solidarity earned him second place in the first 
round of voting with 23.1 % of the vote. Lost to Walesa in the 
second round of voting. 
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Lech Walesa 
Born in 1943 in Popowo on the Baltic coast near Gdansk into a 
peasant family. Had a basic technical education. From 1967 he 
worked as an electrician in the Gdansk Shipyard. One of the 
leaders of the workers' protests during the December 1970 unrest. 
Sacked for criticising the official trade unions in 1976. In 1978 he 
was co-organiser of the Free Trade Unions. In August 1980 he 
stood at the forefront of the historic Gdansk Shipyard strike. 
From Spring 1980 he was Chairman of NSZZ Solidarity After the 
introduction of Martial Law he was interned and lived in 
seclusion for eleven months. Returned to work in the Gdansk 
Shipyard under permanent surveillance from the SB (secret 
police). He maintained unbroken contacts with the leaders of the 
underground structures of NSZZ Solidarity and performed his 
duties as Chairman of the Union. In 1983 he was honoured with 
the No bel peace Prize. In 1986 he created the Provisional Council 
of Solidarity, and in 1987 he founded the National Executive 
Commission. During this period he incessantly called for dialogue 
and the preservation of peaceful methods in battling for reforms 
and systemic change. Despite attempts by the state's propaganda 
to discredit him and isolate him from the opposition, he remained 
the unquestioned leader of Solidarity. He partiCipated in the 
Magdalenka and Round Table Talks, though giving deference to 
the intellectual elite of the movement durig the negotiat;l9'W' ll,::l 
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the Parliamentary elections of 1989 he was not a candidate for 
either of the Chambers of Parliament. He instead gave his support 
to all of the candidates rUIlIling under the auspices of KG. After 
the elections he was the actual creator of the formal coalitions 
(Solidarity with the ZSL and SD) which made possible the 
formation of the Mazowiecki government. In April 1990, at the 
second Congress of NSZZ Solidarity, he was re-elected as the 
Union's Chairman. The congress also proposed his candidacy for 
the Presidency. Dissatisfied with the direction of reform under 
Mazowiecki and his own pOlitical isolation, he announced his 
intention to run for the presidency. Lech Walesa stood, beyond all 
doubt, as a symbol of the whole Solidarity movement, which had 
made a great contribution to the overthrowing of the regime and, 
indeed, the demise of communism in Eastern Europe as a whole. 
The election of Lech Walesa to the position of President was 
supported not only by NSZZ Solidarity but by the majority of 
local citizens' committees. In October 1990, the conference of the 
citizens' committees formally gave it's support to his candidacy. 
He also found support in several Polish intelligentsia and 
intellectual circles. Amongst the emergent political parties, he was 
supported by pc, KL-D, ZGhN, PSL ~olidarjty~ part of KPN, PAX 
etc .. He was also backed by the majority of the OKP and by the 
weekly newspaper IITygodnik SolidarnoscII. Won the elections and 
became President. He left Solidarity in order to appear to stand 
above politics, but had already alienated many of his Solidarity 
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allies, particularly amonst the movement's intelligentsia cadre. In 
1992 Walesa was tainted by allegations of collaboration with the 
communist-era secret pOlice. He formed a new party deliberately 
modelled on the party of government during Pilsudski's interwar 
authoritarian regime, called the Non-Party Bloc in Support of 
Reforms (BBWR), but it performed poorly in the parliamentary 
elections of 1993. The victory of the ex-communists in these 
elections gave Walesa the opportunity to re-establish his 
anti-communist credentials. The result was increasingly hostile 
confrontations between the President and the leftist governments 
of Pawlak and Oleksy, which undermined public confidence in the 
political process. His bid for re-election as President in 1995 failed. 
Having alienated many voters with his confrontational style he 
was defeated by Aleksander Kwasniewski. Walesa's bitter 
accusation of electoral fraud, his allegations of treason against 
Oleksy and the publicity surrounding his claim that he would 
have to return to the shipworks to earn a living maintained his 
profile. With Solidarity Electoral Action's victory in the 1997 
elections and the next Presidential elections scheduled for 2000 
one should not underestimate his political ambition or his potency 
as the figurehead of Solidarity. 
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